Friday, May 14, 2010

Mahmud Ghaznavid and the Raid on Somanatha

In 1026 A.D., Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni raided the famous Hindu temple of Somanatha in present-day Gujarat, India. He is reported to have looted the wealth of the temple, desecrated and demolished the temple building and broken the Hindu idol which was a Shiva lingam. The event has been retold over the ages by different peoples in different ways. This paper will explore how the historiography of this event has been manipulated, embroidered and how it has evolved and changed over the period until it has reached us in its present version.

Before embarking on an exploration of the different perceptions of this event in history, we must first understand and acknowledge that the destruction of temples or other places of worship was not an unknown phenomenon in Indian society. Grand temples were built by rulers and were maintained by their successors as symbols of the might and glory of their dynasties. These temples were built with huge royal grants, and revenues from entire villages and estates were dedicated for their upkeep (Thapar, Early India, pg 427). In addition to performing the principal function of serving as places of worship, these temples exhibited the power and generosity of their royal patrons. As such, whenever a ruling dynasty was overthrown or a place conquered by an invader, many of these temples or other places of worship were sometimes destructed as bold statements of control by the incoming regimes, symbolizing an end of the previous government and the new rival government’s contempt for it. This destruction also served the additional purpose of impressing upon the masses that a similar fate awaited their other places of worship if they were not loyal to the new regime. The Rashtrakuta King, Indra III, destroyed a Pratihara temple in Kalpa when he defeated the Pratiharas. Similarly, Subhatavarma, the Paramara king of Malwa, destroyed the Chaulukyas’ temples, as well as the Jaina temples and Arab mosques that were built under Chaulukya patronage (Thapar, Early India, pg 428). Not only this but these temples were repositories of massive treasures, accumulated there from the offerings and taxation of pilgrims, revenues dedicated by entire villages, as well as the trade in which many of these temples themselves engaged. Inevitably, these temples attracted the plundering armies of various greedy rulers. The kings of Kashmir are known to have engaged in plundering temples, and one of them, Harshadeva, had a minister especially appointed for this purpose of sacking temples. Many such instances of temple destructions are on record (Thapar, Early India, pg 428).

We now come to examine the reasons behind Mahmud of Ghazni’s seventeen or so raids into India. There were several political developments in the Middle East at this time. The Seljuk Turks were rising in power and there were tensions with the Christians of Europe in the prelude to the Crusades (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 50). Mahmud needed to consolidate his rule in Central Asia. He had come to power by usurping his brother’s throne (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 49) (he defeated his brother Ismail in 997 A.D. in a battle and ascended the throne; his brother had inherited the throne from their father Subuktigin who had nominated Ismail as his successor) 1. He needed legitimacy in the eyes of his people as their king as well as finances to establish his authority (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 40). He also wished to develop his capital at Ghazni into a rich commercial and cultural centre to match the glories of Baghdad, and for this he needed wealth and craftsmen (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 41, 48). He needed elephants and slaves to maintain his army (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 39). The raids into the Indian Subcontinent were an ideal means to achieving all these ends. India was a wealthy, trading country and its temples were a rich source of wealth for replenishing the treasury at Ghazni. One entire raid of Mahmud was conducted for the sole purpose of acquiring a special kind of elephants for his armies (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 48). Also, at this time, horse trade was a very profitable business in India (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 30-31). Good quality horses were not bred in India and were imported instead from the Orient and Central Asia. Arabs were more dominant over the horse trade in Gujarat due to their sea trade than the Central Asians who traded over land with India. One possible reason for Mahmud’s invasion of Gujarat may have been to break the Arab monopoly over horse trade in the region (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 48). The raids, many of whose accounts were exaggerated by Mahmud himself in his letters to the Abbasid caliph, also helped Mahmud gain the caliph’s recognition and commendation which gained him respect and awe in the Muslim world as a champion of the Muslims. The Caliph Al-Qadir Billah lavished titles on him (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 51) such as “Yamin-ud-Daula” (after which his house became known as the Yamini dynasty) and “Amin-ul-Millat” between 1026 and 1029 A.D 2. The motives behind the raids of Mahmud into India were therefore mainly political and economical. To some extent, the raids of Mahmud were also based on religious iconoclasm. Mahmud did not only destroy Hindu temples as his Jihad against the infidel; he, being a staunch Sunni, also destroyed the Shiite and Ismailia places of worship in Multan, regarding any form of Islam other than Sunni Islam as being heresy (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 42, 48, 50; Thapar, Early India, pg 427).

The narratives of this event vary in their extent of underlining the importance of this event. The most fanciful and the most filled with contradictions are the narratives that come from the Muslim historians in Turko-Persian accounts. The Muslim historians tended to glorify this raid as being a huge achievement of the Muslims and of Mahmud. Many things in these narratives seem to be fantasies and on many counts it happens that the contradictory accounts of one historian cancel out those of other historians. For instance, some Turko-Persian historians mention that the idol had a human form (Thapar, pg 52, 56). The idol was meant as a lingam and as such it would be unprecedented in India if this was true (Thapar, pg 47-48). A lingam idol is supposed to be in the form of a stump or a column (Thapar, pg 56). Some Turko-Persian historians say that the idol’s form was such that it was partly inside the ground whereas the other parts were protruding outside (Thapar, pg 52). Still others think it used to hang in the air under the influence of magnetic fields. These claims contradict each other (Thapar, pg 52). Many accounts say that the idol was hollow and was filled with jewels inside. This too would be unprecedented in Hindu tradition, lingams are never hollow (Thapar, pg 52). Various Turko-Persian accounts exaggerate the implications of the raid when they state that the Gujarati economy was totally devastated by Mahmud’s raid when infact, historical evidence sees a flourishing economy in Gujarat at and after this time period. Some Turko-Persian accounts also exaggerate the number of villages that were dedicated to serving the Somanatha temple by putting their number upto 10,000 villages. The largest recorded number of villages dedicated to serving any major temple in India was 300 (Thapar, pg 54). Some Turko-Persian accounts claim that there were 30 rings marked around the idol, each ring representing 1,000 years of worship of the idol. This would put the age of Somanatha to 30,000 years, which is clearly an exaggeration (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 52). There are also many myths in the Turko-Persian traditions about the events that took place when Mahmud captured the temple; for example, it is said that Mahmud burnt the idol instead of smashing it and having reduced it to lime, he gave it to the priests in a betel leaf to eat (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 53). The amount of riches looted from the temple is also exaggerated; if it was true then Somanatha’s treasures would be greater than treasuries of states (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 42, 43, 51). In the letters which Mahmud sent to the Caliph in Baghdad, Mahmud almost always used to say that he had killed 50,000 of the enemy’s men. This number was repeated time and again in his letters no matter which conquest he made and against whom. It is an exaggerated amount, a formulaic number (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 51; Thapar, Early India, pg 427).

Coming to the Sanskrit accounts from Somanatha and its surrounding areas of Gujarat, we find no mention at all of Mahmud’s destruction of the temple. While the people of the area had not forgotten about the raid, it seems to be an event that generally did not arouse much interest and was therefore not warranted much attention. The Kadamba King came via the sea on a pilgrimage to Somanatha from the area around Goa in 1038 A.D. His account of the pilgrimage does not even mention Mahmud’s raid which had occurred about eleven years previously, nor does he mention any scenes of destruction or a devastated economy in the region, which is surprising if we consider the Turko-Persian narratives of the amount of destruction carried out during Mahmud’s raid (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 75). The first known inscription that actually mentions Mahmud’s raid comes from 1263 A.D.; 237 years after the raid had taken place. This inscription very briefly mentions in passing that Mahmud had left behind a governor at Somanatha after capturing the area (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 95). Another inscription which dates back to 1264 A.D. mentions an Arab trader who was given land in the vicinity of the Somanatha temple to build a mosque (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 84). The statements in the inscription show us that the people of the region were on friendly terms with the Arabs and there was a thriving trade between the two communities. The existence of mosques shows us that a reasonable number of Muslims were living in the area (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 97). Sanskrit inscriptions of the time seldom mention attacks into India by Turks, not mentioning Mahmud’s attack on Somanatha at all (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 83, 99). One might say that perhaps the Hindus deliberately do not mention attacks by Muslims on Hindu temples out of shame. This argument is offset by the fact that the inscriptions mention attacks on temples by Hindu rulers more frequently than they mention the Muslim attacks over India.

It should be noted here that Hindus at that time did not view the raids by Mahmud or other Muslims into the Subcontinent as being “Muslim” attacks (Thapar, Somanatha, 98, 164). Rather, they tended to think of them in terms of the invaders’ nationalities. The attacks were perceived as being attacks by Turks, Central Asians etc as such, and there was no such antagonism amongst the Hindus. They did view the attacks with distaste but there was no Hindu versus Muslim antagonism, and there was no trauma amongst Hindus as such over the attacks. They were used to invasions for a long time (the Greeks, Huns, Kushans and many others had invaded India in the past). One reason why the Hindus of Somanatha at that time might not have been so bitter about the destruction of the temple might be because the effects of the destruction were very short lived, the region slipped back into Hindu control very soon, and the economy thrived so much so that it reached a peak that was never seen before Mahmud had invaded the region. Perhaps all this covered up the initial short-lived resentment that might have been there amongst Hindus. Sanskrit inscriptions state that the temple of Somanatha was reconstructed and renovated several times over the ages. However, they state that this was done because the temple was withering away with age, they do not say that reconstructions were done because the temple got attacked (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 81, 189).

We now come to the British versions of Mahmud’s raid on Somanatha. The British tended to take for granted that the versions of history coming from Muslim historians, particularly Farishta, were accurate (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 163-164). They did not consider the Sanskrit accounts or versions of history available in other regional languages. The British, like other Europeans, looked upon the Muslims as being barbarians. They came up with the notion that Mahmud had turned the greenery of India into deserts, and that the British were now there to return to India its gardens (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 164). They tried to understand the Indian society in terms of being characterized by a clear-cut dichotomy between the Muslims and Hindus, and hence came up with the notions of “Hindu rule” and “Muslim rule” over the Subcontinent (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 164). In order to prolong their presence in India, they used the “divide and rule” strategy and started up the Hindu versus Muslim antagonism. The version of Mahmud’s raid on Somanatha which is today believed to be a source of deep antagonism between Hindus and Muslims was fanned during the British rule over India. To some extent, it can be said that Muslim historians are to be blamed too because it is infact their version which the British used to propagate. However, we must remember that these versions were largely exaggerated.

It should be mentioned here about the controversy of the gates of Somanatha temple. In about 1842, Lord Ellenborough came up with “The Proclamation of the Gates” and a debate arose in the House of Commons (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 166). The British had went to war in Afghanistan, and at Ghazni, they plucked out the gates from Mahmud’s tomb, bringing them back to India as trophies, proclaiming them to be gates of the Somanatha temple. How Lord Ellenborough came to think of these gates as being from the temple of Somanatha remains a mystery as there are no historical accounts in Turko-Persion sources of Mahmud taking any gates from the temple with him back to Ghazni (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 167). Even the design of the gates was not Indian (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 168). The British brought these gates to India with a huge publicity, hoping to win over loyalties of the Hindus by showing themselves as their saviors and protectors of their interests in India (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 169-170). The impact was not up to their expectations as the Hindus were not incited against Muslims as that time (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 169), which makes one think that the present Hindu-Muslim antagonism probably arose after the Indian War of Independence in 1857. Matters concerning India were of much interest in the House of Commons at that time; Macaulay’s “Minute of India Education” to establish English as the medium of instruction in India had been discussed a few years back. People in the House debated about what motivated Ellenborough to start the controversy, whether it was right to use religious differences to fuel Hindu-Muslim antagonism or would it be in their national interest (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 171). Whatever the case, the story of the so-called gates of Somanatha did not yield the desired results at that time and the story was abandoned subsequently. The gates today lie abandoned in a room in the Agra Fort.

The present Somanatha temple was constructed after Independence in 1951 (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 186). The reconstruction required clearing away of the ruins from the site. Archeologists and historians protested at the idea as they thought as they did not want past politics to destroy the historical site. Their efforts were overruled and the site was identified as a Hindu national monument. Munshi and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel used the temple as a symbol of the resurgence of ‘Hindu’ nationalism and liberty from Muslim ‘foreign’ oppression. The non-Hindus were not allowed to worship in the new temple. Munshi spoke of the rebuilt temple as being associated with the Government of India and this stance was vehemently opposed by Jawaharlal Nehru since it went against his policy of a secular government ruling over India. This position of Nehru was different from that of Vallabhbhai Patel who was the Home Minister from Gujarat (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 190). Nehru was adamant that the funding for rebuilding the temple should come from public donations and not from the Government of India (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 191).

The ratha-yatra of the Vishva Hindu Parishad and Bharatiya Janata Party offset the secular credentials of Indian government. It was designed to mobilize support for the destruction of Babri Mosque and it began its journey from Somanatha in September 1990. The second gathering in 1992 resulted in the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya, leading to the violence which ended in the killings in Gujarat in 2002. The motivation behind all this was the theory of antagonism that had always existed between Muslims and Hindus, a theory fanned by the British in India. It was the result of the debate in the House of Commons and the resulting religious nationalisms which arose from it (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 194).

In the end, it can be concluded from the research that Mahmud’s raid on Somanatha was not historically a significant event. However, in subsequent years it was made to seem to be so crucial in Indian history that it has today infact become important.

Research based on:
1. "Mahmud of Ghazna: Biography from Answers.com." Answers.com: Wiki Q&A Combined with Free Online Dictionary, Thesaurus, and Encyclopedias. Web. 14 May 2010. .
2. "Muslims Invade India." Voice of Dharma. Web. 14 May 2010. .
2. http://www.cyberistan.org/misub28294445.pdf
Thapar, Romila. Penguin History of Early India: from the Origins to A.D.1300. New Delhi: Penguin, 2003. Print.
Thapar, Romila. Somanatha: the Many Voices of a History. London: Verso, 2005. Print.
Tarikh-i Farishta (Call number KIC 954.022 M952T, available in LUMS Library).
The life and times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna / Muhammad Nazim (Call number KIC 958 M952L 1971, available in LUMS Library).
Somnath ki Fatah, by Muhammad Husain Azad. From an Urdu textbook used in the curriculum of Matric Board of Karachi.

(This article was written by me for my Themes in South Asian History class, taught by the acclaimed historian Dr Ayesha Jalal at LUMS in my Junior year.)

Monday, May 3, 2010

Pakistan's Unstable Relationship with Central Asia

The Islamic states of Central Asia share a relationship marked with both economic interdependence as well as mistrust with Pakistan. They share a cultural and historical relationship with each other since times immemorial. Most of the invaders who came into the Indo-Pak region over the centuries came here from the north and central Asia, including the Mughals and the Ghaznavids. Pakistan and this region also share the common bond of being linked by Islam as a common faith; many people in the Indian Subcontinent converted to Islam due to the efforts of Sufis who came here from Central Asia. In today’s world, these states face similar economic problems and threat perceptions. A common strategy against these problems can go far in achieving economic milestones and bringing stability into the entire region. As such, Central Asia occupies a very special position in Pakistan’s foreign policy. This is apparent to the Central Asian States, as can be seen from the high level exchanges that have taken place between them.1

It would be relevant to go back into the 1990s to examine Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics. The birth of the Central Asian states was welcomed in the Islamic world when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s. These states are extremely rich in mineral resources. Their gas reserves are estimated at more than 236 trillion cubic feet, whereas their oil reserves are estimated to be about 60 billion oil barrels, sufficient for fuelling entire European needs for about eleven years. Still other estimates put the region’s oil reserves to an even higher 200 billion barrels.2 However, being landlocked, these states were unable to take advantage of their natural endowments when they came into being. As such, these states needed to cooperate with neighbouring states in order to engage with the global economy. These neighbouring states were Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Furthermore, the need to engage with other countries was important for these states because they wanted to lower their dependency on Russia and be able to stand on their own feet; all their bureaucratic, political, military, financial structure was based on the communist Russian model.

Amongst all the neighbouring states, Pakistan was the one which was looked upon with the most favour by the Central Asian States. Amongst Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, Pakistan was most developed in technology, science, education and industry. Pakistan’s official language was English which gave it an edge over the other two countries because English is the language of the modern world transactions and negotiations. The Central Asian states were eager to learn English from Pakistan in order to engage in world economy. Pakistan could train pilots from the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan also had prosperous textile, shipping, and fishing industries, and a commendable banking and ports sector. Pakistan could serve the interests of these states by providing them with the much needed access to the sea via its ports of Karachi, Bin Qasim and Gwadar.3 Iran was not looked upon with favour by Central Asia mainly due to the Islamic Revolution which had taken place there. The Iranians were emphatic about Islamization and were engaged in religious interference in the region. They were seen as radicals by these states mainly because these states had a relatively more secular and tolerant attitude, having lived under the communists for decades. With Turkey, these states had a colonial past and they did not want to revive it, hence they were relatively distant with Turkey as well. This does not mean that these states did not want good relations with Iran or Turkey; it was just Pakistan which was viewed with relatively greater favour by these states in wanting to establish good relations.

At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Pakistan was overly eager in wanting to recognize the Central Asian states and wanted to start a cordial relationship with them. It did not take into consideration the various diversities of these states and therefore the need to address each of them in accordance to their complexity and multiplicity of national interests. Pakistan became one of the first countries of the world to formally recognize the Central Asian states on 19th December, 1991. The first high-level Pakistani delegation, headed by Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali who was the minister of state for economic affairs, visited the Central Asian Republics in November – December 1991. At that time, Akram Zaki who was the secretary general of foreign affairs had said, “recognition of the Central Asian states would open new vistas of bilateral co-operation with these states with whom Pakistan had close ties of history, faith, and culture.” Pakistan gave a loan of $ 10 million to each of these states, with a loan of $ 30 million for Uzbekistan. As a sign of its good-will, Pakistan also gave medicines worth $ 100,000 to each of these states as well as five thousand tons of rice. The time between 1991-1993 saw a great number of high-level meetings between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics. Although Pakistan’s engagement increased with all the Central Asian states, it was Uzbekistan which had most of Pakistan’s attention. A lot of agreements for economic, cultural, education and technological cooperation were signed between the two nations. Pakistan agreed to import hydroelectric power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1992 and set up Joint Economic Commissions (JECs) with the Central Asian states to implement various projects. Apart from this, Pakistan also provided these states with fully funded programs for instruction in English language, accounting, banking, insurance, postal service and diplomacy. These programs continued despite political disturbances amongst the states.4 Pakistan was amongst the first countries which sent its passenger planes to these states.

Although Pakistan’s policies towards these states had an emotional streak based on bonds of Islamic brotherhood, its objectives remained economic and commercial. In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which was created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as a successor organization of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), extended its membership to Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and the five Central Asian Republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). The organization had great plans for cooperation and development in the region but it has so far failed largely due to the scarcity of resources as well as lack of political concord5; Pakistan, Iran and Turkey fell over each other in their attempts to reap the most advantage from the organization.

The Central Asian states did not want to support the political aspirations of any state; they were only desperate to build their economic infrastructure. The Central Asian states mainly wanted economic and cultural relations with Pakistan, as opposed to political relations. Pakistan on the other hand, tried to exploit the ECO platform to gain support for its cause in Kashmir. The Central Asian states opposed this move by Pakistan as the ECO was a platform for economic cooperation and not for the settlement of political issues. Pakistan’s efforts to exploit ECO for its own political objectives greatly disillusioned the Central Asian States. They began to wonder whether Pakistan really was sincere towards them. Even if Pakistan wanted to gain the support of Central Asian Republics over Kashmir against India, Pakistan failed to consider that these states for decades had lived under the rule of the Soviet Union which had a deeply pro-Indian attitude. These newly independent countries needed time to overcome the psyche they had inherited from the Russians, the psyche of India being considered good and Pakistan being considered bad. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev told Pakistan’s then Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan that the bureaucratic, political, economic structure of the Central Asian states was still based on the lines of the communist model so Pakistan should not try to force them to change their stance overnight. The stance of these countries would change, but it would take some time.

Relations between Pakistan and Central Asia seemed fairly good when the Taliban emerged out of the blues on the scene of civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to support the Pakhtuns against the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic factions in Afghanistan for its own strategic interests in Afghanistan. The Taliban were Pakhtuns and Pakistan’s support for them after 1994 came as a blow to its initial warm relations with the Central Asian states. Pakistan’s recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 adversely affected its relations in particular with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both of which are neighbours of Afghanistan and were apprehensive that the Taliban’s radical ideology would seep into their territories from Afghanistan. There were Islamist militant groups already operating in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which had relations with al-Qaeda and Taliban and which allegedly received their training in Afghanistan. This posed a serious security threat to the stability of the newly independent Central Asian states. Pakistan, in pursuit of its own strategic interests, continued its backing for the Taliban despite opposition from these states regarding Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, relations began dwindling between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics.6 Iran too came into the fray and wanted to assert its influence in the region after the Taliban slaughtered the Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan. Now both Iran and Pakistan were fighting to control the New Great Game instead of cooperating to play a constructive role in the economic growth of the region.

Then came the events of 9/11 which gave a one eighty degree turn to Pakistan’s foreign policy overnight. Pakistan joined hands with USA in the war on terror to dismantle the al-Qaeda and Taliban network in Afghanistan. The current altered environment in the light of the new foreign policy stance of Pakistan has once again opened the doors of bilateral cooperation between Central Asia and Pakistan. However, the mistrust that has built up amongst the Central Asian states against Pakistan due to the Taliban episode in Afghanistan can not evaporate anytime soon.7

One more factor which might adversely affect Pakistan-Central Asia relations is the existence of foreign elements (Arab, Central Asian, Chechen) in Pakistan’s tribal belt in its north-west frontier. These elements came to Pakistan after the USA attacked Afghanistan in 2001. The elimination of these elements is essential for the stability and security of the entire region, and is a pre-requisite for any sort of economic cooperation, investment and trade amongst the regional powers. Pakistan has been conducting military operations in the tribal areas to clear the area of these militants ever since 2004. However, it is difficult to seal the Pak-Afghan border to keep out these militants due to the difficult and long terrain. Pakistan wants to close the border via landmines and fencing but the idea is not welcomed by the regime in Afghanistan.8

In order to establish good economic relations and build the trust of the Central Asian states, Pakistan needs to ensure the safety and security within its own dominion first. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has reported a rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan from about 1,800 occurences in 2008 to greater than 1,900 occurences in 2009. Suicide attacks increased from 40 in 2007 to 84 in 2009, a more than two-fold increase. More than 8,600 people were either killed or wounded in these terrorist incidents in 2009, a 30 % increase from 2008.9 Such an environment of insecurity, uncertainty, and failure of law and order can never be conducive for attracting foreign investment and capital into the country.

Maintenance of good relations with India and Afghanistan both are crucial if Pakistan wants to start economic activities with Central Asia. One of the proposed oil and gas pipelines is supposed to originate in Turkmenistan and reach Pakistan through Afghanistan, going onwards into India. Pakistan’s population of 170 million people together with India’s population of 1.15 billion is a huge and unexplored market for energy and oil companies such as Chevron, Total and Delta, and can also be a source of readily available skilled, cheap, abundant labour for them. But the stability of the region is essential for these companies to come in because ultimately it is companies like these which will set up the pipeline with their technical expertise and financial strength. As such Pakistan, Afghanistan and India need to maintain good relations with each other. Pakistan should stop supporting the mujahidin in Kashmir and India should stop supporting the Baloch separatist elements in Pakistan. It is essentially a battle between the intelligence agencies of the two countries, ISI and RAW. It is proposed that these agencies should sit down and talk their way to a settlement of disputes for the larger interests of the region. With Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to build a policy which will safeguard its interests in Afghanistan when the US forces leave the country so that there is no power vacuum in Afghanistan as it had been in the past. A durable solution might be to support Karzai’s current regime and work towards building popular support and confidence for the regime amongst the Afghans rather than supporting different corrupt warlords in the area. For this, Pakistan needs the help of the advanced countries to build up infrastructure, education and health facilities in Afghanistan. Helping to solve the issues of the common Afghan is crucial in order to decrease the support for Taliban. Pakistan needs to change its attitude of treating Afghanistan as a backward and lowly state that should be grateful for Pakistan’s help in troubled times and should instead move forward with it as a partner state.

Pakistan also needs to make new and better policies for its economy and governance. Many countries of the world had suffered from terrorism in the past, yet they did not falter in their economic growth. Pakistan’s textile exports stood at $ 4.20 billion during July-November 2009-10, a 3.21 % decline from the same period in fiscal year 2008-09 when it had stood at $ 4.34 billion, says the Federal Bureau of Statistics. The All-Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA) claimed that Pakistan has suffered a drop in textile exports for the first time in twelve years because of security issues in the country, the on-going energy crisis, electricity and gas tariffs, rising cotton prices, and the rise in borrowing rates which hindered the textile companies from taking loans from banks. All this contributed to the increase in the input costs of the textile industry.10 Pakistan, which at one time had a far more commendable textile industry, has now been surpassed by Bangladesh in textile exports. Pakistan needs to switch its exports from agricultural raw materials to finished goods in order to make the economy more knowledge-based. A feasible and better economic and governance policy is needed to attract investment projects from abroad.

These problems cannot be solved overnight. It would be a long and exhausting process and many of the solutions proposed might seem to be on the wishful side. However, nothing is impossible, what is needed is consistency and the political will. Pakistan’s solving these major hurdles in the establishment of security and political stability in the region would help Pakistan credibly demonstrate to the Central Asian states its sincerity, eagerness and hope for wanting to establish commercial and economic relations with these states. This would go miles in reducing the trust deficit that presently exists between the two regions.

Today, Pakistan is endeavouring to improve bilateral relations with Central Asia. It is trying to use multilateral organizations in order to strengthen its ties for cooperation with all the regional countries, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The objectives of Pakistan’s policy towards these countries are the same as before, to wit, they are still based on commercial and economic interests and the creation of good-will for strengthening of the relationship. Pakistan wants to realize the advantages it has due to its geostrategic location as a possible energy and trade corridor for the landlocked Central Asian states, Afghanistan, and western China. The infrastructure for this intense activity is being setup in Pakistan, as evident from the development of the Karakoram Highway in the north and the Gwadar deep seaport in Balochistan. China has pledged $ 350 million to Pakistan for maintenance and upgrading of the Karakoram Highway, and the 2004 quadrilateral agreement amongst Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, China, and Kazakhstan for transit and trade can be expanded to incorporate Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in future.11

Today, Pakistan’s efforts to re-establish warm relations with Central Asia are gradually beginning to bear fruit. Islam Karimov, the Uzbek president, visited Pakistan again after fourteen years in May 2006. Nine agreements for trade and economic cooperation, and one agreement for fighting against terrorism were signed during this visit. At present, Pakistan and Tajikistan are considering the establishing of lines from Tajikistan for the transmission of power to Pakistan. National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) has now been operating in Central Asia for nearly the past five years and today has about fourteen branches in the region, generating 90 % of the bank’s overseas revenue.12 China wants to open up its western regions for trade through Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway, Karachi and Gwadar in order to reduce the economic disparity which currently exists in west China as compared to the more developed eastern areas.13 West China is too far away from the Chinese coastline in the east for it to engage in much economic activity.

Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in December 2002 to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, with an estimated cost of $ 2 billion. There are hopes that the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan oil and gas pipeline would originate as soon as the political situation in the region becomes stable. Hu Deping, the chairman of All China Federation of Commerce and Industry, said during Musharraf’s 2006 tour of China that China had plans to set up an oil refinery in the Gwadar region with an expenditure of $ 4.5 billion and a capacity of 10 million tons per annum. The refinery would help transform the crude oil imported from the Middle East into petroleum products before it is transported into west China via the transit corridor of Pakistan.14

Musharraf, during the same Shanghai visit in 2006, emphasized the potential for Pakistan in contributing to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He said, “…in geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic terms, Pakistan is most suitably positioned not only to promote but also to play a key role in all interests espoused in the SCO charter. Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia. We offer critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra-regionally and inter-regionally…We have a vision to develop Pakistan as a hub of economic activity linking the neighbouring regions through our railways, highways, and ports, thus serving as a trade and energy corridor.”15

Bibliography

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15)
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no16_1_ses/11_rahman.pdf

10) "January-2010 - Textile Briefs National." Pakistan Textile Journal. Pakistan Textile Journal. Web. 03 May 2010. .

1, 3, 4) Khwaja, Asma Shakir. "THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst." The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 23 Feb. 2005. Web. 03 May 2010. .

12) Mangi, Naween A., and Farhan Sharif. "National Bank of Pakistan Aims to Tap ‘War Chest’ of Bad Debts - BusinessWeek." BusinessWeek - Business News, Stock Market & Financial Advice. Bloomberg, 16 Mar. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010. .

2) Maresca, John J. "Oil Pipeline - Central Asia - Gas - Energy." Worldpress.org - World News From World Newspapers. Worldpress.org, 12 Feb. 1998. Web. 02 May 2010. .

9) Pakistan. "Pakistan, Afghan Make South Asia Terror Capital." JPOST.com. The Jerusalem Post, 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010. .

(This article was written by me for my Critical Issues in Pakistan's Foreign Policy class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Junior year at LUMS.)

Sunday, May 2, 2010

"It was never between you and them" ~ Mother Teresa

People are often unreasonable, illogical, and self-centered;
Forgive them anyway.

If you are kind,
people may accuse you of selfish ulterior motives;
Be kind anyway.

If you are successful,
you will win some false friends and some true enemies;
Succeed anyway.

If you are honest and frank,
people may cheat you;
Be honest and frank anyway.

What you spend years building,
someone could destroy overnight;
Build anyway.

If you find serenity and happiness,
they may be jealous;
Be happy anyway.

The good you do today,
people will often forget tomorrow;
Do good anyway.

Give the world the best you have,
and it may never be enough;
Give the best you've got anyway.

You see, in the final analysis
it is between you and God;
it was never between you and them anyway.

~ Mother Teresa

(A beautiful poem which makes me feel humble whenever I think about it.)

Thursday, December 31, 2009

Au Revoir 2009

Its 8:18 PM of the New Year's eve and I am sitting in front of the PC at my grandmother's place, pondering over the events of this year... As I have nothing constructive to do at the moment, so thought of writing this note...

Looking back, 2009 was a year which I shall remember mainly for its political events, what with frequent suicide bomb blasts, the ongoing global economic recession, the military operations in SWAT, Waziristan, the US drone attacks, the loadshedding and catastrophic rainfall in Karachi over the summer...

Nobody likes to recount the bad events that have happened in their lives. I am no different; just another human being - flesh, bone, blood..

Sitting in this mild Karachi evening, looking forward to the clock striking mid-night when the streets of Karachi would resound with firing and fire-crackers and what not, it is only the good events of this year that I want to recall: my brother got admission into LUMS, I took courses such as Pakistan's Foreign Relations, Global Cities, bought my camera, went on so many trips, became an MFR in LUMS EMS, made so many new friends who created so many good memories for me to cherish over the years to come..

When I think about it, I do look forward to 2010; it is the year after which I will enter 2011, the big year, year of my graduation, God-willing..

I end this note with a silent prayer. May Allah Almighty make this new year a blessing for me, my family and friends, for Pakistan, and for all humanity, and may He make it a year which is safe for all of us, a year for us to remember with fondness...

Amen...

Farewell 2009 A.D.

Tuesday, June 2, 2009

Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan

This article will look at the factors due to which Pakistan switched from supporting Afghan leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Sayyaf to supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and why Pakistan continued its support of the Taliban when the entire international community and the regional countries of Asia except the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia opposed the Taliban and Pakistan’s support for them.

Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan has always been driven by its strategic interests. Pakistan and Afghanistan are neighboring states and Pakistan shares 2430 km 1 of its 6560 km long border 2 with Afghanistan along the controversial Durand Line.

Pakistan has, for a long time, harmonized its strategic interests with those of the United States of America. This started when Pakistan entered into the fold of CENTO and SEATO in the 1950s and this trend continued in the days of the Cold War. Pakistan did not acquire a lot from this policy except for the aids and grants that this policy gained Pakistan from the West (Grover, Pg 262). Some of Pakistan’s cardinal foreign policy decisions took place when Pakistan was under military rule. Generals of the third world countries have never been farsighted or great thinkers and so is the case in Pakistan. Popular governments are always the ones that have had to clear up the mess caused by such policies afterwards. From 1988 onwards, there had been several elected governments in Pakistan which were periodically ousted from power for attempting to follow a policy which was the opposite of the one which the military wanted to follow in Afghanistan. Because Pakistan had a different government almost after every couple of years in the 1990s, Pakistani military establishment continued its own policies in Afghanistan. A cruel political reality is that Pakistani military and its agencies are largely an autonomous body which is largely not answerable to the elected governments. The proof of this is the fact that although elected governments tried to eliminate Islamic militants from Pakistani territory, these militants still were there along the Pak-Afghan border where they were getting military training from the Pakistan army in the use of guerilla warfare and explosives (Grover, Pg 263). Therefore, a discussion of Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan should rather be seen through the perception of the Pakistani military and not merely through that of the elected government. We must first discuss Pakistan’s strategic interests over Afghanistan in the light of circumstances which prevailed after the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.

The most important issue for Pakistan was the disputed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This border, also called the Durand Line was erected during the British Raj in India under a treaty with Afghanistan in 1893 after the Second Afghan war of 1878-80. The area between the Durand Line and British India was accepted as “free tribal territory” and its people retained their tribal autonomy despite being under Britain’s sovereignty. The covenant was renewed time and again between the British and Afghans by more agreements in 1905, 1929 and 1930. The Durand Line proved to be a bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Partition of India in 1947. The Afghans now refused to accept the border which divided Afghanistan from the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The NWFP is culturally, historically, linguistically and ethnically very close to Afghanistan and many people of the region have family members on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. The Pakhtun tribes are all largely followers of Sunni Islam, Pashtu-speaking, but are politically divided into the settled areas of NWFP, tribal areas (FATA) and those in Afghanistan. The Afghans’ demanded that based on these factors, NWFP should be made a part of Afghanistan or else made into independent Pakhtunistan (Grover, Pg 264). The issue got further complex because of the inter-tribal wedlocks between Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and those in NWFP. The Durand Line was further made diluted by the influx of millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistani territory across the Pak-Afghan border after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan converted a large part of the refugee population into being fighters against the Soviets (Mujahideen). This notion of Jihad brought Pakistan a large amount of financial help from the wealthy Muslim states. Pakistan also got a large amount of financial and military help from the West. Between 1979 and 1989, Pakistan reportedly got more than ten billion dollars of aid. Pakistan very selectively distributed part of this money amongst select groups of the Mujahideen and refugees to create a friendly group amongst the Afghans which would not be against Pakistan. Pakistan thought that this would cater to a number of its interests later on. Apart from settling the border dispute, it would give Pakistan the strategic depth to face India (Grover, Pg 265).

The Soviet retreat from Afghanistan led to the diminishing of foreign aid from the US to Pakistan. Pakistan now looked towards Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a friendly successor in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar’s subsequent failure and negotiations with Rabbani’s government may be some factors which led to formation of the Taliban later on. Afghanistan did not have any charismatic person who could command the loyalties of the Afghan population. Pakistan tried to invent such a leader in Gulbuddin Hekmatyar but he was not accepted by all factions of the Mujahideen population. Subsequently, Pakistan lost its credibility in the eyes of the Afghans as a sympathetic mediator in solving the Afghan’s problems.

There were several other developments at about this time in the international world. Iran’s success in its Islamic Revolution in the 1980s gave it a sort of leadership position in the Islamic world. The Saudis felt this menace from Iran and were in favor of having a strong government in Kabul soon which could counter the growing influence of Tehran in the region.

Another development was the discovery of mineral and fuel resources in the newly independent Central Asian Republics which came into being with the breakup of the Soviet Union after the Cold War. These natural resources drew the attention of USA into the region. A US company called UNOCAL Corporation and a Saudi company called Delta Oil Company, two major oil and gas companies of the world joined hands together to make use of these resources for the markets in Pakistan and Eastern Asia. Two major pipelines were proposed over a distance of 1000 miles, costing a total of 4.7 billion dollars, in order to carry the minerals from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. This was termed as the UNOCAL/Delta Oil’s Corridor to Commerce (Grover, Pg 266). It was stated in the details of the project that “one of the major obstacles to project implementation is the political instability in Afghanistan. It is fundamentally important that a single body representing the whole of Afghanistan is formed.” (Grover, Pg 267)

Under these circumstances, Pakistan was willing to assist UNOCAL/Delta Oil Company as it very well suited Pakistan’s strategic and economic goals and UNOCAL/Delta also knew of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan during the Cold War. Pakistan tried to bring into play its past tactics in Afghanistan. It knew that a full-scale war in Afghanistan could not be victorious for it, seeing what had recently happened with the former Soviet Union which had been a superpower in its time. It therefore used religion as a basis to bring unity amongst the ethnically divided Afghans. Pakistan had previously used this tactic of using religion with some amount of success in Kashmir and Indian Punjab. It now used this strategy of exploiting religion to create the Taliban, as a substitute for the Rabbani regime in Kabul to help it in realizing its economic and strategic interests. The Taliban, like Hekmatyar, were not accepted by all the Afghans because they represent only a part of the ethnically divided population of Afghanistan. An understanding developed between General Dostum and Ahmed Shah Masood of Afghanistan and they successfully managed to evade Taliban’s assaults on Panjshir Valley. Pakistan failed for another major reason. To begin with, Pakistan is not strong enough to do such a mammoth task and it also did not realize that USA would lose its interest in this part of the world once the Soviet troops returned to Russia (Grover, Pg 267).

Ahmed Rashid wrote an article in Herald in which he quoted Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, stating that Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy was not right since the very start as it favored only those Afghan leaders which were its favorites, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against others such as Masood during the Soviet invasion. According to Rashid, Pakistan would have been far better off had it let a legitimate and credible leadership to evolve in Afghanistan which had the support of the Afghan masses. Pakistan is also accused of directing the CIA arms equipment towards its favorites and supporting Pakhtuns in order to preserve Pakhtun command in Afghanistan. Pakistan maintained this attitude when Soviet invasion ended in Afghanistan, hardly thinking that it was annoying the neighbors of Afghanistan, namely Iran and the Central Asian Republics, many of whom vehemently joined Teheran in opposing Islamabad’s actions in Kabul. It can be rightly said however that Pakistan, like other nations of the world, had never expected the Soviet Union to break apart in 1991, and Pakistan indeed attempted to tend to wounds it had caused to Iran in 1995 and 1996 when many visits took place of Pakistan high officials to Iran, including the Prime Minister’s visit to Teheran in November 1995 to eliminate Iran’s fears about the Taliban. Pakistan was in a frenzy to gain recognition of Iran and other countries for the Taliban as the Taliban moved towards the capture of Kabul (Grover, Pg 268).

Pakistan’s policy over the Taliban led it to be quite regionally isolated by the end of 1996. Iran, the Central Asian Republics and Russia were opposing it on one side and Pakistan’s Gulf friends were not giving it the financial support in the quantities that it required. Nasim Zehra’s article “Hot War over Afghanistan” in the Nation stated: “Teheran’s current policy towards Afghanistan does not alienate it regionally but Pakistan is viewed suspiciously by Russia, Kazakhstan, China and Tajikistan. Teheran-Delhi growing trade ties have now been supplemented by deeper diplomatic and political understanding between the two on Afghanistan, while Islamabad’s Washington supporters are weary of openly supporting Islamabad’s policy of backing the Taliban. Compared to Islamabad, the going is better for Teheran.” (Grover, Pg 269).

To conclude, we can see that Pakistan supported the Taliban in the face of growing international opposition for strategic and economics interests. Pakistan had initially supported Afghan leaders like Hekmatyar because it seemed that their interests would be similar to those of Pakistan if they came to power. At their failure, Pakistan began supporting Taliban because they were the ones who had managed to control most of Afghanistan and hence seemed to bring about some level of stability in the country. Many of the war-torn country’s inhabitants welcomed the Taliban as their saviors, even though many of them resented them on ethnic basis. They seemed to be a good alternative for Pakistan instead of people like Hekmatyar because they were basically Pakhtuns, and Pakistan has a large Pakhtun population in its North West Frontier Province. Therefore, Pakistan felt that a Pakhtun authority in Kabul would be suitable for promoting its interests as it would sympathize with Pakistan. It would also help in solving Pakistan’s border dispute along the Durand Line and the Pakhtunistan issue sentiments which, however lessened, still existed with Afghanistan. Pakistan already had a hostile neighbor in India and could not afford to have an unfriendly Afghanistan. For the sake of preserving its sovereignty, it needed to have clearly defined and respected borders. The Taliban were strongest in the areas surrounding the Pak-Afghan border and Pakistan felt that supporting them would prove to lead to friendly relations with Afghanistan in the years to come. Thus, it always wanted to have a friendly Afghanistan, which seemed possible to it at the time if Afghanistan came under Taliban rule. Stability of Afghanistan was also important for Pakistan due to economic reasons. The wealth of natural resources in the Central Asian Republics could be tapped by Pakistan only through Afghanistan. There was the issue of the pipelines through Afghanistan from Central Asia which could be important for enhancing Pakistan’s economy. There was possible influence from USA which never wanted Pakistan to have a gas pipeline with Iran and instead much favored gas from Central Asia. Pakistan was also becoming concerned that Turkey and Iran could deprive it of trade with the landlocked Central Asian States via Karachi and Gwadar by developing trade links through Port Bandar Abbas in Iran and through the Mediterranean via Turkey. In October 1994, Pakistan’s interior minister Naseerullah Babar undertook a highly publicized journey across Afghanistan through Kandahar and Herat and then dispatched a trade convoy along the same path in order to display the potential of Pakistan as a trade outlet to the sea for Central Asia. It was the Taliban who had protected this very trade convoy (Marsden, 132). The Taliban were in control of this trade route so Pakistan felt that helping them could be beneficial for Pakistan. The Taliban had an appeal to the young madrassah students and had no difficulty in recruitment therefore. Thus, Pakistan felt that the Taliban had an excellent chance of controlling the Pakhtun belt and could also take over the whole of Afghanistan if they were supported, just as Abdur Rahman had done with British help in the 1800s. The political stability that would come as a result would therefore give Pakistan not only trade opportunities with Central Asian Republics, but also strategic depth against its rival India (Peter Marsden, 143). Taliban were also accepted by Saudi Arabia and UAE which were friends of Pakistan and Pakistan expected that after some time other countries would also recognize the Taliban regime. It was due to these factors that Pakistan continued to support the Taliban in the 1990s in the face of increasing opposition from the international community.



Bibliography

1. "Afghanistan Border." World Map, Map of the World. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 June 2009. .

2. "The Geography of border landscapes -." Google Book Search. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 June 2009. .

3. Grover, Verinder. Afghanistan. Minneapolis: Deep & Deep Publications,India, 2000. Print.

4. Marsden, Peter. Taliban war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan. Karachi: Oxford UP, Zed Books Ltd., 1998. Print.

(This article was written by me for my Pakistan's Foreign Relations class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Sophomore year at LUMS.)

Monday, May 11, 2009

Globalization, Sovereignty & Pakistan

This article will look upon the concept of sovereignty of states and how the ongoing phenomenon of globalization has blurred this concept by diluting the distinctions between national and international politics in the modern world where terrorism is a major threat for the world. Lastly, it will analyze the repercussions of the current NATO drone attacks on Pakistani territory on the traditional concept of sovereignty.

The sovereignty of a state implies the independence of a state under international law and its competence and right to exercise its rules or law within its clearly defined territory at its own discretion without the intervention from outside forces. The concept also includes all matters whereby the state is permitted under international law to defend its territory and safeguard the security of its citizens without stamping upon the sovereignty of other states and the rightful authority of the state to represent its citizens abroad by engaging in treaties etc.

The concept of sovereignty is not new. It was there in the form of established traditions of international relations amongst such states as Egypt, China and Holy Roman Empire. The present concept of sovereignty of a nation has its roots in agreements which were part of the Treaties of Westphalia which took place in 1648 A.D., signed by European states. The main points of the concept of sovereignty and the rights and duties of states were laid down in Montevideo Convention in 1933. These points include the following main criteria for a state’s eligibility to be declared sovereign: that a state should have “a permanent population, a defined territory, and a functioning government” (IRDC, 13). The UN Charter basically adopts and endorses all these factors in its vision of the system of international world that it strives to maintain. The UN Charter mentions the idea of the equality of all sovereign states. This equality is the foundation over which state governments forge relations with each other and participate in different organizations. This principle of legal equality of all sovereign states has a protective advantage for smaller or weaker states so that they do not come under political pressure from the more powerful states. The United Nation’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in 1949 that "between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations." (IRDC, 13) The International Court of Justice has also in the past referred to "the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on which the whole of international law rests." (IRDC, 13) Aggressive actions of states towards other states are viewed as negative in the international arena because they are a menace to the very structure of the international world as they violate the very concept of sovereignty of states which forms the basis of this structure. If the base is threatened then the entire structure could collapse. It is for this reason that states have used their sovereignty itself to condemn wars and conflicts which threaten world order, peace and security (IRDC, 13).

The concept of nonintervention in a state’s domestic jurisdiction is a very important aspect of sovereignty. This jurisdiction refers to the ability of the state to govern its citizens within its dominion. This jurisdiction is either “prescriptive” or “enforcement” (IRDC, 13). Prescriptive jurisdiction is the capacity of the state to create laws within and outside its borders. Enforcement jurisdiction is its ability to implement these laws within its borders. The United Nations Charter especially bans countries from intervening in the local affairs of other countries. Article 2 (7) of the Charter states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." (IRDC, 13)

We now turn our attention to the limits of sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations protects the sovereignty of nations but it also addresses the issue of maintenance of international law and order. By Chapter VII of the charter, the Security Council of the United Nations can take actions or intervene in the affairs of sovereign states if they threaten world peace, or engage in aggressive actions (IRDC, 13). Simply put, sovereignty of states only matters as long as there is peace and stability amongst states and can surrender to the demands of world peace and security.

Secondly, Article 1 (2) of the said Charter states that "[a]ll Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." (IRDC, 13) This means that all sovereign states of the world have international obligations, which can be customary or treaty obligations, and the mere idea that a state is sovereign does not mean that it can turn a blind eye to these obligations. The Charter also directs the member states of the United Nations to cooperate amongst themselves in solving problems related to economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian issues and achieving the basic human rights and freedoms of the people. Thus, the Charter raises these issues to an international level. Sovereignty of a state therefore does not mean that a state can violate international standards of human rights within its territory and expect to get away with it from the eyes of the international community (IRDC, 13).

A challenge to the traditional concept of state sovereignty arises in the cases of those states that are unable to exercise complete authority and control over their own people and over parts of their own territory. The ability of a state to achieve complete control over these dimensions is a core aspect for a state to be truly a sovereign nation. One analyst calls these states with weak authority as “quasi-states” (IRDC, 13). Some people even have the stance that such weak or failed states should not even be part of the United Nations which essentially comprises of members that are sovereign nations, because such weak states defy the United Nations Charter Article 4 which mentions that UN membership criteria for states requires that the states “are able to carry out” their obligations (IRDC, 13). A state’s incomplete control over its population and dominion casts doubts on its ability to be able to carry out such obligations. The state’s authority is essential for the protection of basic rights and is the foundation for local as well as international law and order. The proof of the failure of a state’s sovereignty is the existence of forces within the state’s domestic population which challenge the territorial sovereignty of the state. These forces bar the state from exercising its authority over its complete territory, preventing it from delivering fundamental public goods to its population such as establishment of public security and safety of the population’s life and property. Under such circumstances, what is seen to happen is the massive outflow of refugees towards safer places and the displacement of the local population (IRDC, 13). Such consequences can prompt the United Nations Security Council to legitimize foreign intervention in such a state, under consideration for the international peace and order.

An aspect of the concept of foreign intervention is the idea of "sovereignty as responsibility," created by Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (IRDC, 13). According to this idea, it becomes a state’s responsibility to request or accept foreign help or intervention if the state itself is unable to deliver fundamental public goods of security, justice and peace to its population. The state becomes answerable to two entities at the same time under such circumstances: the domestic population, as well as the international community whose responsibility it is to maintain world security and peace. In effect, this idea suggests that a state’s sovereignty gets temporarily discontinued under such circumstances and the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the country now falls with the international world (IRDC, 13).

Traditionally, security has been seen in terms of connections between nations. Today, the aspect of individual security of citizens is becoming the cardinal concern for states. A state is the principal provider of this security but in the case of states with weakened authority in their territories, it is the responsibility of the international community to come to the aid of the populations at risk.

We shall now look at how this concept of state sovereignty been seen to get diluted in recent years, particularly in the rapidly globalizing world.

The concept of “globalization” is related to the concept of “complex interdependence” between nations which is relevant to the topic under discussion in this paper. Today, the territorial state is being overshadowed by non-territorial factors which include multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international organizations (Keohane & Nye, 236). Telecommunication and air travel have reduced the world into being a “global village” and the increase in social, cultural and economic transactions mean we today are seeing a world which increasingly has lesser or softened boundaries or borders (Keohane & Nye, 236). Multiple channels of contact between nations are making the divide between domestic and international politics insignificant. The policy attitude or stance of a state’s local population gets affected by contact with populations of other states, through the media and other sources, whether this communication is organized communication or otherwise. We today are seeing a world in which economic issues are the principal concern of states and where states and people are becoming increasingly culturally, socially, and economically interdependent upon each other. Globalization, according to political scientist David Held, is the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (FP, 1).

All around the globe we are seeing increasing numbers of organizations and companies connecting with people and the current recession in the world economy is not hindering them in doing so. It might even help to revive the economy in some cases to a certain extent (FP, 1). For example, the demand for the services of international charity organizations is increasing as more and more people lose their jobs in the current economic crisis. Religions and cults too may witness greater numbers of followers as hardships encourage interest in the after-life. Transnational terrorists would also not be hindered in their activities by the economic recession. Globalization is such a powerful and multiform factor in today’s world that the current economic recession cannot drastically hamper or transpose it (FP, 1).

The deeper a political situation is entrenched in the complex interdependence between nations, the more likely are the results of the political process going to be affected by transnational relations. Terrorism is one such issue in question. It is a collective problem for the whole world no matter in which part of the world a terrorist act may take place in. A nation fighting terrorism should not be left alone to deal with it, abandoned by other countries of the world. Rather that nation should be supported morally, diplomatically and militarily in its fight by the whole world.

While globalization has created new opportunities and possibilities for mankind, it has also created problems which we have never encountered before. For example, it has created new opportunities for militants to engage in acts of terrorism. The Taliban and Al Qaeda’s mobility internationally, recruitment ability, and financial resources to fund their endeavors have been aided by the factors of globalization such as greater and better communication opportunities, greater ease of travel and wider means of transportation, and permeable borders (FP 2).

In the 1990s, it was thought that economic ties were a remedy to prevent wars. Power, it was thought, would eventually pass from government hands into the hands of the private companies and NGOs. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 changed that thinking of the world. Overnight, the thinking of the world changed and these ideas went out of trend. Public security now became the topmost priority of nations. The insecurity due to the ongoing economic recession has further fuelled this cry and we have also seen an increase in public demand for greater government control in the financial sector. Skeptics of globalization argue that commercial ties amongst nations have been enfeebled due to the current global economic crisis. With the return of stronger governments, these skeptics foresee a greater intensity in the traditional power politics of the states. They cite the evidence for this in the resurgence of nationalist spirit in South Asia, Middle East, Latin America and Russia. These skeptics argue that globalization’s role in stabilizing the political situation of the world is therefore exaggerated. But we must remember that claims of a return to nationalism and strong governments are also very exaggerated. Granted that China may ally itself with Russia to counter the US in its relations with Iran, but we must not forget that Chinese and American economies are today greatly intertwined with one another (China has trillions of dollars of US debt and the US is also its main market for Chinese goods). Russia itself has been hit badly by the economic crisis and its oil revenues are falling so much so that Venezuela is calling back foreign oil companies. The crux of the skeptic’s argument is that globalization did not eliminate nationalism; rather it made it more complicated such that globalization and geopolitics exist along side each other in the modern world (FP 2).

The opposite view to these skeptics is that due to increased interdependence amongst nations as a result of globalization, the aspect of nationalism is slowly disappearing and the world today is taking on a more integrated outlook in which countries are governed more by economic and commercial concerns and the exchange of ideas and cultural and social aspects. An example is that of the European Union (EU) which comprises of nations which were formerly each other’s enemies before the late twentieth century when nationalism was on the rise. Today the countries of European Union are peaceful trade partners, working together to achieve, maximize, promote and preserve their common economic goals. The increased interaction between countries of the world has resulted in them signing more treaties with each other and becoming members of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Band (ADB). Signing of treaties in a way mars the sovereignty of a state because it can pose limitations on the actions of states and also raise their international obligations.

The current Pakistani leadership has been caught unsuspectingly by the numbers of Taliban as well as the intensely bitter autonomy of other militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Recently there have started a series of NATO drone attacks on Pakistani territory. These attacks on Pakistani territory are indeed a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, but we must also remember that stopping the drone attacks in the tribal areas would not be a remedy against the problem of militancy because the public in those areas does not really accept Pakistani army and the United States is not very popular with them either. Pakistan could lose even its already little sovereignty in the tribal regions if something is not done soon. Pakistan has protested against these attacks but the United States argues that Pakistan has never been truly sovereign in the Federally Administered tribal Areas (FATA) as it has never been able to fully control that region ever since its independence in 1947. The United States argues that as Pakistan itself is not able to deal with the problem of militancy in the tribal region, it should allow the foreign forces to deal with the militants. I personally think that Pakistan should allow the NATO drone attacks to take place in FATA. The Taliban are becoming an increasing source of discontent and chaos in the country. They are a nuisance not only for global peace and security but also for the survival of Pakistan itself. Any attack or war against the Taliban should be welcomed in my opinion to eradicate the threat from them forever once and for all, even if it comes at the breach of our sovereignty. What use would our argument for Pakistan’s sovereignty be if Pakistan does not survive and breaks up? That would be a greater price to pay for Pakistan if it tries to defend its sovereignty at this hour. Even if we look at the principles of sovereignty as stated in the United Nations Charter, I think the NATO attacks are reasonable because Pakistan has really failed in fighting militancy in FATA. It has been unable to successfully control the tribal region for the last sixty years. It has been incapable of providing security to the population in that area and as such it is the responsibility and the duty of the international community to take the matter of fighting militants in FATA into their hands.

In conclusion, I think the overall concept of sovereignty still holds in international politics today, even though it has been diluted much by the phenomenon of globalization. Geopolitics and globalization coexist in the modern world.

Bibliography

"Foreign Policy: Think Again: Globalization." Foreign Policy - the global magazine of economics, politics, and ideas. 11 May 2009 .

"1. State Sovereignty: International Development Research Centre." INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE | CENTRE DE RECHERCHES POUR LE D�VELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL. 11 May 2009 .

Keohane, Robert & Nye, Joseph. “Complex interdependence and the Role of Force” in Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition (1977). Pp 236-250.

(This article was written by me for my Pakistan's Foreign Relations class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Sophomore year at LUMS.)

Friday, July 18, 2008

The Multiplicity of Legal Opinions in Islam

In the name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful.

In this article, I shall discuss the implications of having multiple opinions regarding legal issues and how they have a positive impact on the Muslim ummah; their legitimacy, authority, validity and correctness; why Muslims should not abandon the four madhabs and become their own “mujtahids”; the negation of the idea that accepting multiple positions in fiqh is a form of compromise in order to maintain harmony in the ummah; and the inter-relationship between hadith, fiqh and usul al-fiqh.

Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence. Rules of fiqh are inferred from the Quran and Sunnah (which includes ahadith) through the methodology which is called usul al-fiqh. Usul al-fiqh is the study of the origins, the sources and the practice of the fiqh. These sources include the ahadith, hence the relationship between fiqh, usul al-fiqh and hadith.

Coming straight to the point, in my opinion, plurality of legal opinion does not in any way harm the authority and legitimacy of new rules. In Ijma, there is massive plurality of opinion, yet the procedure is such that when a decision is passed in Ijma, there is no room for anyone to doubt its validity and the decision becomes binding on all Muslims to follow. If anything, Ijma, which is the product of plurality of opinions of scholars, adds to the authority of laws that are zanni or of a speculative type. In addition, all the scholars in Ijma are required to be in agreement regarding an issue otherwise Ijma is not passed. As long as there is dissent, there is the probability that one group is wrong. Unanimity removes this possibility, hence adding to the legitimacy of the legal opinion.

In ijtihad as well, no mujtahid is allowed to over-rule the verdict given by a previous mujtahid. Only the mujtahid who gave the original decision can alter it, and that too if the previous verdict was a serious miscarriage of justice or was against the law. If the mujtahid was allowed to change his decision frequently and under any circumstances, it would lead to uncertainty and hence cast doubt about the validity of ijtihad. Hence, plurality of legal opinion in matters of ijtihad too adds to the authority and legitimacy of new rulings instead of hampering it.

In the present era, where revelations from Allah and the coming of new Prophets has been terminated, it is ijtihad through which we can continue to get guidance by which to stay on the right path in the light of Quranic teachings and Sunnah in the face of changing circumstances. The rules whereby the previous ijtihad of a mujtahid can be changed are very strict. All this promotes stability and continuity of Islamic law.

The first implication of plurality of legal opinion in Islam that comes to mind is the spirit of tolerance that prevails amongst the Muslim scholars, a feature rare to find in the jurisprudence of other religions. In the case of Ijma, different scholars come up with different solutions or answers to the same problem. They then unanimously accept a particular view. In this way, Ijma can be said to promote a culture of tolerance. The plurality of legal opinions here does not in any way harm the unity of the ummah in the case of Ijma. On the contrary, it promotes unity when Muslims unanimously agree on something. We can also mention here the tolerance that Muslims of one madhab are supposed to show to followers of the other three madhabs; they are required to accept all four madhabs to be of equal validity and respect all four of them. Here again, the plurality of legal opinion does not harm unity of the ummah.

An advantage of plurality in legal opinion is that through it the very best solutions to a problem can be found out. For instance, in Ijma, all opinions of the scholars are heard and the best and most suitable one is adopted. If there was no plurality of legal opinion and only one authoritative person’s opinion was supposed to be implemented, it is possible that there might be an opinion that was better than that person’s opinion which, if implemented, could have had even better consequences.

Plurality of legal opinion, in my opinion, can also be related to the adaptive capability of Islam under changing circumstances. For example, in Ijma, the best solution proposed by all the mujtahids regarding a new problem is adopted, hence playing a role in the evolution and adaptation of Islam in the face of new situations.

Moreover, the motive behind the idea of having plurality of legal opinions is that it makes people ponder over the commandments of Allah. A mujtahid is supposed to come up with his own ijtihad in a matter. He may not imitate another mujtahid or allow a more learned mujtahid’s decision affect his own ijtihad. This way, Islam makes the mujtahid ponder over the teachings of Allah.

Yet another implication that came to my mind is that plurality of legal opinion gives people more choice as to who to follow. They can choose and follow the opinion which they like and which they find most suitable and easy to follow and which they are most comfortable with. This highlights the characteristic of Islam that Islam makes religious practices easier for people to follow.

Due to the above mentioned facts, I think plurality of legal opinion is a positive characteristic of Islamic law.

Does plurality generate negative heterogeneity? The arguments already given above in support of the idea that plurality of legal opinion promotes notions of authority, legitimacy, stability and continuity can be used to argue that plurality would not in any way generate negative heterogeneity amongst Muslims. However, in my opinion, these characteristics minimize the possibility of negative heterogeneity but do not altogether eliminate it. History tells us that in the early centuries of Islam, there were a lot of disagreements and confusions amongst the ulema regarding matters of fiqh. It was after Imam Shafi’i laid down the methodology or usul al-fiqh that these differences, though they existed later on in the four madhabs, were largely minimized. It was, in my opinion, precisely because of these differences that the four madhabs were formed, otherwise only the madhab of Imam Shafi’i would have been there and no other schools of thought would have emerged. These differences continue even today but are of a lesser intensity than before. The greatest proof that these differences have been minimized and brought under control is that all four madhabs respect each other and Muslims have not adhered to or formed any more new madhabs. Jurists have always endeavored to get their opinions coincide with the prevailing opinion of the madhab they belong to, hence minimizing heterogeneity. One might say that there should be only one madhab so that there would be no heterogeneity at all, but we must be grateful that there are not more than four madhabs, else there would have been increased chances of conflict in my opinion.

Can multiple positions in legal matters be valid and/or correct? To understand the answer, we must, logically speaking, look at how these multiple positions are arrived at. The mujtahid who is a highly qualified Islamic scholar, when performing ijtihad, uses considerations of justice and fairness and the established usul al-fiqh to perform various forms of analysis such as qiyas and istihsan which are all based on the Quran and Sunnah. In the case of Ijma, all opinions are analysed and the most suitable one is agreed upon. Obviously, it is agreed upon because it is correct. Logically too, the decision adopted is the unanimous decision of a lot of highly qualified people and is selected from a wide variety of other opinions so it must be correct. All the decisions of all the mujtahids are accepted as correct in Islam. For ordinary Muslims, accepting the validity of the Ijma is a divine command whether they like it or not. Hence, multiple positions in my opinion are valid and correct. It is not hard to realize that this acceptance of multiple positions as being correct is the very basis of tolerance between the followers of the four madhabs.

One might wonder whether accepting multiple positions is an apologetic stance aiming to gloss over irreconcilable positions. I think the greatest argument against this view is the fact that a mujtahid is not allowed to take the ruling of another mujtahid over his own ijtihad even though the other mujtahid may be more learned than him. A mujtahid is bound only by his own ijtihad. He is not even allowed to adhere to the rulings of his madhab but must derive the rulings himself. If accepting multiple positions was an apologetic stance aiming to gloss over irreconcilable legal positions, then surely the purpose of the stance would have been to bring about harmony which can only be brought about by having minimum legal positions rather than multiple ones. The real reason why Islam allows the possibility of having multiple legal positions is to make people ponder over the instructions given by Allah.

In my opinion, it would be impractical for an ordinary individual to take it upon himself to evaluate the Quranic ayats and ahadith in the light of his own knowledge or aql. First of all, we must realize that the four madhabs have not developed in one night. They have been improved, added into, and updated by highly qualified scholars for centuries. A layman cannot claim to have gained enough mastery of Islam so as to practice his own ijtihad in legal matters. Secondly, for a person striving to become competent enough, he must first master Arabic in addition to gaining all the required knowledge of the Quran and Sunnah. This is because it would be unadvisable for anyone to read translations of the Quran or the ahadith in order to become a master of fiqh as translations often are unable to convey the exact essence of the meaning of the text as mentioned in the reading “Al-Fatiha”. Arabic has a very rich and diverse vocabulary and often translations of Arabic works lack the proper words required to convey the exact meaning of the text. As mentioned in the reading “Understanding the four madhabs”, another obstacle in the path of such a person, if he is a non-Arab, can be the fact that not all Arabic works are available in other languages. For example, many authentic books of ahadith are not there in English. This would be a serious handicap in the knowledge of an amateur attempting to come up with his own decisions regarding judicial matters. Such a stance is likely to create much confusion and discord in the ranks of the Muslims and can be successfully exploited by the enemies of Islam to undermine the unity of the ummah. Furthermore, becoming a mujtahid is a time-consuming and difficult job. If all Muslims tried to become mujtahids then all the other affairs of the ummah would come to a standstill. It is for this reason that Muslims have been asked to keep in touch with scholars rather than becoming their own mujtahids. I agree with Maulana Kamaluddin Ahmed’s notion in class where he mentioned the chains representing the different madhabs linked to the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him). He said that this chain would break down if ordinary people took the matters of judicial decisions in their own hands instead of following the madhabs.

To conclude, I think that having multiple legal positions in religious and judicial matters is a blessing for Muslims and a positive feature of Islamic law. I consider these multiple positions of the mujtahidun to be perfectly valid, correct and legitimate, and I do not think that accepting their authority is by any means a form of compromise in order to maintain the sanctity of the ummah. More so, in my opinion, ordinary Muslims should not strive to come up with their own interpretations of religious matters unless they are competent enough in their knowledge of these matters.

(This article was written by me for my Islamic Studies class taught by Mufti Kamaluddin Ahmed during my Sophomore year at LUMS.)