"People are generally comfortable wearing multiple identities," says Ayesha Jalal, Pakistan’s acclaimed historian, sociologist, researcher, teacher and writer, "I'm quite comfortable being a woman, a Muslim, a Pakistani, an American."1
I happened to take a course with Ayesha Jalal when she came to teach at Lahore University of Management Sciences for a semester last year. She changed many of my perceptions about different historical facts and events.
During her lectures, a thought often came to my mind. I imagined meeting her for the first time on a busy road and not knowing who she was, imagined getting into a historical debate with her. She could sweep me off my feet with her factual arguments, just as she was doing right at that very moment as I listened to her in class. I would obviously have thought that I had met a very vociferous yet intelligent and eloquent pedestrian, one who knows how to argue her case. I would have wondered how she knew so much about history. Only her being Ayesha Jalal could have explained it all.
A short lady with a thin frame and a face increasingly getting lined due to age, you get a sense of her confidence when you hear her speak and see her body language. Ayesha Jalal does not give a perception of someone capable of attracting controversies, yet in recent years she has, both at home and abroad. She caused much controversy when she made public her research findings that the creation of Pakistan was a historical accident and that Jinnah had never meant to create Pakistan.2
Dr Jalal is a grand-niece of the famous and controversial Urdu novelist, Saadat Hasan Manto, her grandmother being the sister of Manto. She is the daughter of Manto’s favorite nephew, Hamid Jalal, Additional Secretary to the Prime Minister in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s time. Her father worked in All India Radio before Partition in 1947 and later in Pakistan’s Information Ministry. Dr Jalal first came to the United States of America in 1970 at the age of 16 when her father was posted in the United Nations.
Dr Jalal says she was inspired to study history because of her uncle Manto. Her grandmother often used to read out Manto’s works to her.
“ ‘Toba Tek Singh ' planted questions in my head and made me question the Partition of India,” she says. She used to be amused in childhood at this Manto story of insane people trying to interpret Partition.
In 1971, while studying at Stuyvesant High School in New York, she was attracted to studying sciences, but the events of that year in Pakistan made her question her identity.1
"It really made me question some of my received perceptions of myself as a Pakistani," says Ayesha Jalal. She belonged to a very patriotic family, with family members being in the civil service, and had been brought up in Pakistan under prevailing notions of Pakistan’s history. Hence, witnessing the break up of her country was a “mental trauma” for her.1
“It was a very awkward time,” she speaks.1
Such questions eventually made her want to study history and find answers for herself. When she returned to Pakistan in 1972 with her family, she enrolled in a science school but did not find the quality of education up to scratch. She instead started to pursue the social sciences and never regretted it. Eventually, Ayesha Jalal completed her Bachelors in History and Political Science from Wellesley College in 1978, and went on to do a PhD in History from the Trinity College, University of Cambridge, in 1983 with a dissertation “Jinnah, the Muslim Leage and the Demand for Pakistan”.
Ayesha Jalal has led an enviable career. She has been a Leverhulme Fellow at the Center of South Asian Studies, Cambridge, Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington, DC and Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. She has taught at Harvard University, Columbia University, and University of Wisconsin-Madison. Currently, she is Mary Richardson Professor of History and Director of the Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies at Tufts University.
Dr Jalal maintains that she never sought to become a historian, but was "propelled to do so".1
"I felt that the methods of history really allowed me to question the things I was interested in," she says. "1971 was a very difficult time. The Pakistan army in the name of preserving national integrity massacred people in the eastern wing. That kind of discomfort can spark off anger and a quest to understand."1
When General Zia ul Haq came to power and began the Islamization of Pakistan under the notion that it was formed on the basis of Islam, Jalal began to question the way by which Pakistan was created. At that time also, the papers of the transfer of power at the time of Partition were released. Jalal used these papers during her PhD at Cambridge in those days and eventually used them to publish her first book on Jinnah in 1985.1
As an author, Ayesha Jalal has seven books to her credit, including Partisans of Allah and The Sole Spokesman. She is married to Sugata Bose, a Hindu from India and the grandnephew of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and grandson of nationalist leader Sarat Chandra Bose. He is also her research partner. Together, they have written a book called Modern South Asia which is the first South Asian history book that has been written in joint collaboration between a Pakistani and an Indian.
During her time at Columbia as Associate Professor in the 1990s, she opposed the university for accepting funds from the Hinduja Group, who are nationalist Hindus, to establish a research center for Indic studies at Columbia. She was denied tenure and filed a case against the university for ethnic, gender and religious biases against her as she maintained that her fellow Indian Hindu faculty members "were uncomfortable with a Pakistani woman teaching Indian history" and had “blocked her tenure application”. New York District Court acquitted Columbia, stating that Dr Jalal’s accusations were “thin but suggestive”.2
Ayesha Jalal has received several awards during her career. In 1998, she won the prestigious MacArthur Fellowship of $ 265,000, and on Pakistan Day, 2010, she received the Sitara-i-Imtiaz from the Pakistani government during her tenure at LUMS.
In her teaching methods, Ayesha Jalal always tries to help her students make their own interpretations of different aspects of history and encourages them to reach their own conclusions about it, helping them find answers to their own questions in the light of facts.
"I cannot tell people what to think. I myself wrote against the grain of everything I was supposed to believe in," speaks Dr Ayesha Jalal. "I believe in helping people question, to think and really create a sense of awkwardness with some received wisdoms. That's where my own personal intellectual journey began."1
External works cited:
1. http://www.tufts.edu/home/feature/?p=jalal
2. http://rethinkingislam-sultanshahin.blogspot.com/2009/07/ayesha-jalal-interpreter-of-jihad.html
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Saturday, March 12, 2011
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Pakistan - India Relations in Recent Years
On 20th February 1999, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan. He came via bus from Amritsar to Lahore (Sattar, 229). This was only the second time that an Indian Prime Minister came to Lahore; Jawaharlal Nehru had visited Lahore in 1960 for the Indus Water Treaty (Singh, 197). The cities of Amritsar and Lahore had felt the Partition of 1947 most deeply as they are so close geographically and people still remembered how they used to often travel between the two cities before 1947 (Singh, 197). Coming to Pakistan via the Wagah border by bus, that too on the inaugural run of the new Lahore - Delhi bus service, was a remarkable message to the world that India wished to improve its relations with Pakistan (Singh, 198; Sattar, 229).
Prime Minister Vajpayee gave a speech in front of the Minar-e-Pakistan. He said that the members of his delegation who were sitting behind him had requested him not to visit the Minar-e-Pakistan which is a symbol of the Partition of the Subcontinent and the ideology of Pakistan, a celebration of the separation of the two countries in 1947. Yet, despite their repeated requests, he had chosen to visit the place and give a speech to show his sincerity and commitment to the cause of establishing peace between India and Pakistan. A lot of protests were staged in Pakistan by the Jamaat-e-Islami, terrorists activities took place in Kashmir, and the All-Party Hurriyat Conference announced a strike in Kashmir (Singh, 199). All this was aimed at destabilizing the peace process but these attempts proved to be futile (Singh, 199). Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration which was aimed at speeding up the process of the resolution of all disputes and outstanding issues, including the Jammu and Kashmir problem which had proved to be a bone of contention between the two countries ever since their inception (Singh, 199). The countries also condemned terrorism and agreed to take measures to avoid the risk of nuclear war between them, and pledged to inform each other beforehand when testing missiles (Sattar, 230). The move was much appreciated all over the globe, including in India (Singh, 199).
Then came an unfortunate twist of fate and the Kargil conflict happened between the two countries. Soon after the Lahore Declaration, Pakistan started shelling across the Line of Control as it had been doing for years to give cover to infiltrators to enter into Kashmir (Singh, 201). That year, the shelling started much earlier and with much greater intensity than usual in winter (Singh, 201). Reports came to the Indians that infiltrators had entered into Batalik, a village on the Line of Control (Singh, 202). Patrols sent to the area were attacked by the infiltrators, starting the Fifth Battle of Ladakh (Singh, 202). On 8th May 1999, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, made an unannounced tour of the area opposite Kargil (Singh, 202). On 9th May, Pakistan Army shelling blew apart 5,000 tonnes of ammunition on the Indian side (Singh, 202). A few days later, Indian Army launched the Operation Vijay in Batalik (Singh, 202). Till now, the Indians were focusing on the infiltrators but by middle of May, indications started coming about the involvement of the Pakistani Army in the conflict in Kargil.
The Indians debated about the use of Air Force in the conflict since the geographical area of the conflict was limited in size and the casualties would have been greater, particularly as there was also a risk of loss of aircrafts which in turn could attract public condemnation (Singh, 203-204). Then there was the factor that aircrafts would have difficulty in determining the area of the Line of Control, since the Line of Control is not a visibly marked line (Singh, 204).
By now it was clear that the infiltrators were not regular terrorists who had come to destabilize Indian-held Kashmir, but were soldiers of the Pakistan Army (Singh, 204). Their skill, numbers, and equipment made this evident (Singh, 204) . They had come with the mission to block the Siachen glacier from Srinagar (Singh, 204). Any party which was in control of the strategic high altitude posts of Kargil would be able to observe the activity on the highway which connected the Indian troops of Ladakh (Singh, 205). This highway was used in transportation of seventy percent of the supplies used by the Indian soldiers of the area (Singh, 205). Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke to Nawaz Sharif, “We are aware that this intrusion in Kargil involved the use of regular troops from the Pakistan Army.” (Singh, 205) India let it be clear to Pakistan that this would not be tolerated at any cost and India would have to retaliate.
International community had now started issuing statements about the conflict, including the United Nations and the United States of America (Singh, 205). Pakistan and India had both become nuclear states the previous year, hence international concern was automatically on the rise about the ongoing conflict between the two states. Indian Air Force had started taking actions in Kargil and the first aircrafts, a MiG-27 and a MiG-21, were lost on 27th May (Singh, 206). To control the situation, Pakistan called for ‘meaningful international engagement’ and Nawaz Sharif spoke to Vajpayee again, offering to send the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to Delhi to ‘diffuse the current situation and to pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue’, stating that the Pakistan Army was not involved in the conflict in ‘any fashion’ (Singh, 206). Vajpayee then had to inform Sharif that the Indians had got hold of the dead body of a Pakistani soldier - along with his army documents (Singh, 206). Pakistan’s ambassador to USA, Riaz Khokhar, gave statements that the Line of Control was “vague or undefined in some manner”, while Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Sartaj Aziz said that the “fighters” in Kargil could be from “Afghanistan who may have crossed the LOC in support of the local mujahideen forces” (Singh, 208)
Jaswant Singh, who at that time was the Indian Minister for External Affairs, states that Madeleine Albright, the then-Secretary of State of USA, spoke to him about the developments in Kargil and that the USA had spoken to Pakistan about it, suggesting a cease-fire and that India and Pakistan should start a dialogue at the earliest in order to prevent the situation from getting out of hand (Singh, 206-207).
By mid-June, the Indian Army had re-established itself well in the region and the clearance of the region from the Pakistani soldiers continued till July (Singh, 209). The tides were turned. Pakistan hurriedly sent its Foreign Secretary to Delhi on 12th June 1999 (Singh, 220). The meeting was fruitless as India and the Vajpayee establishment felt stabbed in the back by Pakistan’s aggression into Indian-held Kashmir, immediately after the Lahore Declaration had been signed by the two countries (Singh, 221, 228). Sartaj Aziz was given the following conditions by India:
“1) immediate vacation of the aggression,
2) reaffirmation of the validity of the LOC,
3) abandoning of cross-border terrorism,
4) dismantling the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,
5) reaffirmation of the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.” (Singh, 226)
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hurried on an uninvited visit to Washington to have an emergency meeting with President Clinton on 4th July 1999 – US Independence Day - to get US help in negotiations with India (Sattar, 232). President Clinton kept in touch with Vajpayee about the meetings with Sharif, even inviting Vajpayee to the meetings, but Vajpayee refused (Singh; Sattar, 232). On 11th July, the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan met at Attari on the Indian side of the border to discuss the procedure of the withdrawal of Pakistani soldiers from Kargil in less than a week’s time. (Singh, 226) The conflict was over by 16th July, claiming the lives of between eleven to twelve thousand Pakistanis and Indians (Sattar, 232; Hagerty, 40).
In 2001, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his government invited Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to a dialogue in Agra in relation to solving the Kashmir dispute (Sattar, 236). This was inspite of the fact that Pervez Musharraf was the very man who had conceived of the Kargil invasion into Indian-held Kashmir.
The Agra Summit took place on 15th and 16th July 2001. The two leaders, Vajpayee and Musharraf, met each other and reached a settlement between them, and then on 16th they informed their foreign ministers of the points agreed upon which should be used to form a declaration to be finalized that day (Sattar, 236). The foreign ministers of the two countries then formed a draft of the declaration and took them to their respective authorities for approval. President Musharraf approved this document (Sattar, 236). However, the draft was not approved by the Indian cabinet committee on political affairs. Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, discussed a slight amendment on the point about Kashmir with his Pakistani counterpart, Abdul Sattar, as the Indians felt that enough emphasis had not yet been put on the issue of terrorism (Sattar, 236). The Pakistani minister agreed to the amendment and preparations for the ceremony for signing of the declaration commenced (Sattar, 236). Jaswant Singh hoped to get this amended draft approved by the Indian authorities but this did not happen. The Pakistanis were informed that the document would not be signed at that time due to certain disagreements in the Indian cabinet committee about the declaration, and that the Indian Prime Minister would visit Pakistan later to sign the final agreement (Sattar, 237). Musharraf felt offended and stormed off from India without even visiting the Khawaja Moinuddin Chishti shrine in Ajmer Sharif, as was scheduled (Singh, 257, 260). Vaypayee was livid.
Jaswant Singh in his book “A Call to Honour” states that Musharraf had a rather grandstanding attitude during the Summit’s initial press conference with the media: “he refused to accept the presence of terrorism as an issue; continued to emphasize only the centrality of Jammu and Kashmir; was almost desmissive of Lahore; would not at all accept the reality of what Kargil was, what he had done; and he seemed almost to dismiss the Shimla Agreement… He wanted to carry back a victory, to be able to say: ‘We straightforward, direct-dealing military men achieve results, we do not beat about the bush etc.’” (Singh, 255) According to Singh, this meeting with the media shaped the atmosphere and subsequently shaped Musharraf’s attitude for the rest of the Summit duration. (Singh, 255) Apart from that, Musharraf had been refusing so far from setting an agenda for the talks to be held in the Summit, despite Indian officials repeated emphasis on its significance. Thus there was no agenda when the representatives of the two countries assembled at Agra (Singh, 256).
The Agra Summit ended without any agreement being reached upon. Only the prospect of another summit was a silver lining in the gloom. President Musharraf said, “I came back empty-handed but the Summit was not a failure”, while Jaswant Singh said, “We will pick up threads from the visit of the President of Pakistan.” (Abdul Sattar, 237) This optimism soon died down. Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated that “No agreement was reached. There was no closure of an agreement and no subscription by signature.” (Abdul Sattar, 237) President Musharraf blamed Indian deputy prime minister Lal Krishna Advani for preventing the Indian cabinet committee from approving the draft of the declaration, while Advani said that the failure was due to Pakistan not agreeing “to the clauses on terrorism in the draft suggested by India.” (Abdul Sattar, 238) Thus, India and Pakistan let go of another opportunity to solve their disputes as a result of their internal disagreements.
The 2001 Agra Summit was an ideal time for the resolution of the decades old Jammu and Kashmir dispute. At that time, Pakistan was being represented by the Army which are the hardliners in Pakistan, while India was being represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which are the Hindu hardliners in India. A lasting settlement of disputes can only be reached if the powerful hardliners of the two countries sat down for talks towards the settlement of all long-standing disputes. This was the case in Agra as both hardliners were assembled at one place for negotiations and the constellations were ripe and propitious for the two countries to make decisions for peace and progress. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, was very sincere towards the cause of establishing good relations with Pakistan. He had also devised the Chenab Formula, whereby a part of Indian-held land in Kashmir along the River Chenab could be handed over to Pakistan in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. No other Indian government could ever have even thought about giving away even an inch of Indian land which Vajpayee was prepared to do for this cause. Pakistanis, unfortunately, did not avail this opportunity. Vajpayee was around his 80s, there may never be another person like Vajpayee on the Prime Minister’s post in India. There is now no more a Chenab Formula which Pakistan could have availed at that time.
Musharraf was a military man and had the mentality of how he could conquer Kashmir for Pakistan by warfare. Plus, the Pakistan Army belonged to a Muslim nation and Muslims had traditionally ruled the Subcontinent, for a thousand years before the British arrived. The Pakistan Army had also not been able to absorb the humiliations of 1971 at the hands of a Hindu people. Musharraf’s attempts proved futile and near the end of his regime he was forced to reconsider his take on the issue. He resorted to diplomatic means towards the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. To this end, the Musharraf government held negotiations with the Man Mohan Singh establishment in India for the resolution of the Kashmir problem. Rumor has it that it was decided in 2007 that the Muslim areas of Kashmir were to go under Pakistan’s administration while the non-Muslim regions were to come under Indian administration, and there was supposed to be a relaxed border in Kashmir. This formula was based on (a) a soft border along the Line of Control, (b) a joint mechanism, (c) demilitarization in Kashmir and (d) easing of trade and cross border human contact in Kashmir. Indian Prime Minister was supposed to come over to Islamabad to sign the new declaration, and was waiting for his invitation and other formalities to be completed. Unfortunately, the invitation never came. The Chief Justice controversy brewed up in Pakistan in 2007 and President Musharraf got increasing forced into this new front, eventually resigning from his post in August 2008 due to the political developments in Pakistan. Hence, once more the fate of Kashmir could not change. The present government of Pakistan denies that any formula was devised between the Musharraf and Man Mohan Singh governments, whereas Musharraf continues to reiterate about the formula.
Kashmir is a region with no access to the sea, it is a landlocked region. For it to prosper, any formula agreed upon would need to consider that its economy would have to be inevitably linked with either Pakistan or with India, or with both (Hannum, 22). Autonomy given to Kashmir in most areas of government except defense and foreign affairs would also have various obligations for both India and Pakistan, particularly in the field of economy and finance (Hannum, 21). Also, before giving autonomy to Kashmir in crucial areas of government, one should consider “(1) those areas in which Kashmiris believe that self-government is essential; (2) areas in which continued linkages and cooperation with India and/or Pakistan are desirable; and (3) symbolic issues which may not have great practical impact on daily Kashmiri life but which would strengthen Kashmiri identity and culture.” (Hannum, 21)
Today, there are a few states of the world which have self-government in all areas except defense and foreign affairs. For example, the Cook Islands and Niue have autonomy and yet their people continue to have New Zealand nationality (Hannum, 18). Andorra is a sovereign member of the United Nations but its defense comes under the combined jurisdiction of Spain and France (Hannum, 17). The possibility of Kashmir having a similar successful political structure is there in the light that similar arrangements do exist with success and peace in a few other parts of the world.
Pakistan and India have fought several wars over the Kashmir dispute during the past six decades, losing thousands of lives and destroying their infrastructures in wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999, spending millions of dollars in these conflicts and to keep themselves armed for possibilities of any military clashes at the cost of cutting down their expenditures on other important areas for development, such as education and health, ruining regional peace conditions. It would not be feasible now for them to let go of Kashmir by giving it complete independence. On the other hand, if something is not done soon, these conditions and these losses would continue and Kashmir will remain the bone of contention between the two regional countries. In the long run, therefore, a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem is to the benefit for all the three parties concerned, to wit, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris.
The proposed Man Mohan – Musharraf formula of 2007 was good because it evidently took into consideration the convenience and welfare of all the three concerned parties. The soft border would have enhanced people to people contact amongst the Kashmiri families who were divided because of the Line of Control. It would also have enhanced trade as trade would have become much easier and efficient, which could have brought prosperity and progress. People on the two sides of the Line of Control could have helped each other in time of need, as the need arose in the 2005 earthquake in Azad Kashmir. An issue here would have been of terrorist training camps in Azad Kashmir, but then again, these Jihadist camps would not exist if the Kashmir dispute was peacefully resolved as the Pakistani intelligence agencies would not facilitate them. Plus there was to be a joint mechanism between India and Pakistan which could have been very fruitful in maintaining peace since the two armies would have been cooperating. Demilitarization of the region would have reduced tension between the two countries as well as saved the already meager financial resources of Pakistan. Hence, overall the formula was beneficial for the two countries so there is a high possibility that it would have been viable, since the interests of the stakeholders would have been well served by it.
Bibliography
Research included readings of books from course-packs of courses taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan at LUMS.
1) “A Call to Honour” by Jaswant Singh
2) “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” by Abdul Sattar
3) “South Asia in World Politics” by Devin T. Hagerty
4) “Kashmir – A Way Forward” by Hurst Hannum
Prime Minister Vajpayee gave a speech in front of the Minar-e-Pakistan. He said that the members of his delegation who were sitting behind him had requested him not to visit the Minar-e-Pakistan which is a symbol of the Partition of the Subcontinent and the ideology of Pakistan, a celebration of the separation of the two countries in 1947. Yet, despite their repeated requests, he had chosen to visit the place and give a speech to show his sincerity and commitment to the cause of establishing peace between India and Pakistan. A lot of protests were staged in Pakistan by the Jamaat-e-Islami, terrorists activities took place in Kashmir, and the All-Party Hurriyat Conference announced a strike in Kashmir (Singh, 199). All this was aimed at destabilizing the peace process but these attempts proved to be futile (Singh, 199). Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration which was aimed at speeding up the process of the resolution of all disputes and outstanding issues, including the Jammu and Kashmir problem which had proved to be a bone of contention between the two countries ever since their inception (Singh, 199). The countries also condemned terrorism and agreed to take measures to avoid the risk of nuclear war between them, and pledged to inform each other beforehand when testing missiles (Sattar, 230). The move was much appreciated all over the globe, including in India (Singh, 199).
Then came an unfortunate twist of fate and the Kargil conflict happened between the two countries. Soon after the Lahore Declaration, Pakistan started shelling across the Line of Control as it had been doing for years to give cover to infiltrators to enter into Kashmir (Singh, 201). That year, the shelling started much earlier and with much greater intensity than usual in winter (Singh, 201). Reports came to the Indians that infiltrators had entered into Batalik, a village on the Line of Control (Singh, 202). Patrols sent to the area were attacked by the infiltrators, starting the Fifth Battle of Ladakh (Singh, 202). On 8th May 1999, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, made an unannounced tour of the area opposite Kargil (Singh, 202). On 9th May, Pakistan Army shelling blew apart 5,000 tonnes of ammunition on the Indian side (Singh, 202). A few days later, Indian Army launched the Operation Vijay in Batalik (Singh, 202). Till now, the Indians were focusing on the infiltrators but by middle of May, indications started coming about the involvement of the Pakistani Army in the conflict in Kargil.
The Indians debated about the use of Air Force in the conflict since the geographical area of the conflict was limited in size and the casualties would have been greater, particularly as there was also a risk of loss of aircrafts which in turn could attract public condemnation (Singh, 203-204). Then there was the factor that aircrafts would have difficulty in determining the area of the Line of Control, since the Line of Control is not a visibly marked line (Singh, 204).
By now it was clear that the infiltrators were not regular terrorists who had come to destabilize Indian-held Kashmir, but were soldiers of the Pakistan Army (Singh, 204). Their skill, numbers, and equipment made this evident (Singh, 204) . They had come with the mission to block the Siachen glacier from Srinagar (Singh, 204). Any party which was in control of the strategic high altitude posts of Kargil would be able to observe the activity on the highway which connected the Indian troops of Ladakh (Singh, 205). This highway was used in transportation of seventy percent of the supplies used by the Indian soldiers of the area (Singh, 205). Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke to Nawaz Sharif, “We are aware that this intrusion in Kargil involved the use of regular troops from the Pakistan Army.” (Singh, 205) India let it be clear to Pakistan that this would not be tolerated at any cost and India would have to retaliate.
International community had now started issuing statements about the conflict, including the United Nations and the United States of America (Singh, 205). Pakistan and India had both become nuclear states the previous year, hence international concern was automatically on the rise about the ongoing conflict between the two states. Indian Air Force had started taking actions in Kargil and the first aircrafts, a MiG-27 and a MiG-21, were lost on 27th May (Singh, 206). To control the situation, Pakistan called for ‘meaningful international engagement’ and Nawaz Sharif spoke to Vajpayee again, offering to send the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to Delhi to ‘diffuse the current situation and to pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue’, stating that the Pakistan Army was not involved in the conflict in ‘any fashion’ (Singh, 206). Vajpayee then had to inform Sharif that the Indians had got hold of the dead body of a Pakistani soldier - along with his army documents (Singh, 206). Pakistan’s ambassador to USA, Riaz Khokhar, gave statements that the Line of Control was “vague or undefined in some manner”, while Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Sartaj Aziz said that the “fighters” in Kargil could be from “Afghanistan who may have crossed the LOC in support of the local mujahideen forces” (Singh, 208)
Jaswant Singh, who at that time was the Indian Minister for External Affairs, states that Madeleine Albright, the then-Secretary of State of USA, spoke to him about the developments in Kargil and that the USA had spoken to Pakistan about it, suggesting a cease-fire and that India and Pakistan should start a dialogue at the earliest in order to prevent the situation from getting out of hand (Singh, 206-207).
By mid-June, the Indian Army had re-established itself well in the region and the clearance of the region from the Pakistani soldiers continued till July (Singh, 209). The tides were turned. Pakistan hurriedly sent its Foreign Secretary to Delhi on 12th June 1999 (Singh, 220). The meeting was fruitless as India and the Vajpayee establishment felt stabbed in the back by Pakistan’s aggression into Indian-held Kashmir, immediately after the Lahore Declaration had been signed by the two countries (Singh, 221, 228). Sartaj Aziz was given the following conditions by India:
“1) immediate vacation of the aggression,
2) reaffirmation of the validity of the LOC,
3) abandoning of cross-border terrorism,
4) dismantling the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,
5) reaffirmation of the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.” (Singh, 226)
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hurried on an uninvited visit to Washington to have an emergency meeting with President Clinton on 4th July 1999 – US Independence Day - to get US help in negotiations with India (Sattar, 232). President Clinton kept in touch with Vajpayee about the meetings with Sharif, even inviting Vajpayee to the meetings, but Vajpayee refused (Singh; Sattar, 232). On 11th July, the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan met at Attari on the Indian side of the border to discuss the procedure of the withdrawal of Pakistani soldiers from Kargil in less than a week’s time. (Singh, 226) The conflict was over by 16th July, claiming the lives of between eleven to twelve thousand Pakistanis and Indians (Sattar, 232; Hagerty, 40).
In 2001, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his government invited Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to a dialogue in Agra in relation to solving the Kashmir dispute (Sattar, 236). This was inspite of the fact that Pervez Musharraf was the very man who had conceived of the Kargil invasion into Indian-held Kashmir.
The Agra Summit took place on 15th and 16th July 2001. The two leaders, Vajpayee and Musharraf, met each other and reached a settlement between them, and then on 16th they informed their foreign ministers of the points agreed upon which should be used to form a declaration to be finalized that day (Sattar, 236). The foreign ministers of the two countries then formed a draft of the declaration and took them to their respective authorities for approval. President Musharraf approved this document (Sattar, 236). However, the draft was not approved by the Indian cabinet committee on political affairs. Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, discussed a slight amendment on the point about Kashmir with his Pakistani counterpart, Abdul Sattar, as the Indians felt that enough emphasis had not yet been put on the issue of terrorism (Sattar, 236). The Pakistani minister agreed to the amendment and preparations for the ceremony for signing of the declaration commenced (Sattar, 236). Jaswant Singh hoped to get this amended draft approved by the Indian authorities but this did not happen. The Pakistanis were informed that the document would not be signed at that time due to certain disagreements in the Indian cabinet committee about the declaration, and that the Indian Prime Minister would visit Pakistan later to sign the final agreement (Sattar, 237). Musharraf felt offended and stormed off from India without even visiting the Khawaja Moinuddin Chishti shrine in Ajmer Sharif, as was scheduled (Singh, 257, 260). Vaypayee was livid.
Jaswant Singh in his book “A Call to Honour” states that Musharraf had a rather grandstanding attitude during the Summit’s initial press conference with the media: “he refused to accept the presence of terrorism as an issue; continued to emphasize only the centrality of Jammu and Kashmir; was almost desmissive of Lahore; would not at all accept the reality of what Kargil was, what he had done; and he seemed almost to dismiss the Shimla Agreement… He wanted to carry back a victory, to be able to say: ‘We straightforward, direct-dealing military men achieve results, we do not beat about the bush etc.’” (Singh, 255) According to Singh, this meeting with the media shaped the atmosphere and subsequently shaped Musharraf’s attitude for the rest of the Summit duration. (Singh, 255) Apart from that, Musharraf had been refusing so far from setting an agenda for the talks to be held in the Summit, despite Indian officials repeated emphasis on its significance. Thus there was no agenda when the representatives of the two countries assembled at Agra (Singh, 256).
The Agra Summit ended without any agreement being reached upon. Only the prospect of another summit was a silver lining in the gloom. President Musharraf said, “I came back empty-handed but the Summit was not a failure”, while Jaswant Singh said, “We will pick up threads from the visit of the President of Pakistan.” (Abdul Sattar, 237) This optimism soon died down. Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated that “No agreement was reached. There was no closure of an agreement and no subscription by signature.” (Abdul Sattar, 237) President Musharraf blamed Indian deputy prime minister Lal Krishna Advani for preventing the Indian cabinet committee from approving the draft of the declaration, while Advani said that the failure was due to Pakistan not agreeing “to the clauses on terrorism in the draft suggested by India.” (Abdul Sattar, 238) Thus, India and Pakistan let go of another opportunity to solve their disputes as a result of their internal disagreements.
The 2001 Agra Summit was an ideal time for the resolution of the decades old Jammu and Kashmir dispute. At that time, Pakistan was being represented by the Army which are the hardliners in Pakistan, while India was being represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which are the Hindu hardliners in India. A lasting settlement of disputes can only be reached if the powerful hardliners of the two countries sat down for talks towards the settlement of all long-standing disputes. This was the case in Agra as both hardliners were assembled at one place for negotiations and the constellations were ripe and propitious for the two countries to make decisions for peace and progress. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister, was very sincere towards the cause of establishing good relations with Pakistan. He had also devised the Chenab Formula, whereby a part of Indian-held land in Kashmir along the River Chenab could be handed over to Pakistan in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. No other Indian government could ever have even thought about giving away even an inch of Indian land which Vajpayee was prepared to do for this cause. Pakistanis, unfortunately, did not avail this opportunity. Vajpayee was around his 80s, there may never be another person like Vajpayee on the Prime Minister’s post in India. There is now no more a Chenab Formula which Pakistan could have availed at that time.
Musharraf was a military man and had the mentality of how he could conquer Kashmir for Pakistan by warfare. Plus, the Pakistan Army belonged to a Muslim nation and Muslims had traditionally ruled the Subcontinent, for a thousand years before the British arrived. The Pakistan Army had also not been able to absorb the humiliations of 1971 at the hands of a Hindu people. Musharraf’s attempts proved futile and near the end of his regime he was forced to reconsider his take on the issue. He resorted to diplomatic means towards the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. To this end, the Musharraf government held negotiations with the Man Mohan Singh establishment in India for the resolution of the Kashmir problem. Rumor has it that it was decided in 2007 that the Muslim areas of Kashmir were to go under Pakistan’s administration while the non-Muslim regions were to come under Indian administration, and there was supposed to be a relaxed border in Kashmir. This formula was based on (a) a soft border along the Line of Control, (b) a joint mechanism, (c) demilitarization in Kashmir and (d) easing of trade and cross border human contact in Kashmir. Indian Prime Minister was supposed to come over to Islamabad to sign the new declaration, and was waiting for his invitation and other formalities to be completed. Unfortunately, the invitation never came. The Chief Justice controversy brewed up in Pakistan in 2007 and President Musharraf got increasing forced into this new front, eventually resigning from his post in August 2008 due to the political developments in Pakistan. Hence, once more the fate of Kashmir could not change. The present government of Pakistan denies that any formula was devised between the Musharraf and Man Mohan Singh governments, whereas Musharraf continues to reiterate about the formula.
Kashmir is a region with no access to the sea, it is a landlocked region. For it to prosper, any formula agreed upon would need to consider that its economy would have to be inevitably linked with either Pakistan or with India, or with both (Hannum, 22). Autonomy given to Kashmir in most areas of government except defense and foreign affairs would also have various obligations for both India and Pakistan, particularly in the field of economy and finance (Hannum, 21). Also, before giving autonomy to Kashmir in crucial areas of government, one should consider “(1) those areas in which Kashmiris believe that self-government is essential; (2) areas in which continued linkages and cooperation with India and/or Pakistan are desirable; and (3) symbolic issues which may not have great practical impact on daily Kashmiri life but which would strengthen Kashmiri identity and culture.” (Hannum, 21)
Today, there are a few states of the world which have self-government in all areas except defense and foreign affairs. For example, the Cook Islands and Niue have autonomy and yet their people continue to have New Zealand nationality (Hannum, 18). Andorra is a sovereign member of the United Nations but its defense comes under the combined jurisdiction of Spain and France (Hannum, 17). The possibility of Kashmir having a similar successful political structure is there in the light that similar arrangements do exist with success and peace in a few other parts of the world.
Pakistan and India have fought several wars over the Kashmir dispute during the past six decades, losing thousands of lives and destroying their infrastructures in wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999, spending millions of dollars in these conflicts and to keep themselves armed for possibilities of any military clashes at the cost of cutting down their expenditures on other important areas for development, such as education and health, ruining regional peace conditions. It would not be feasible now for them to let go of Kashmir by giving it complete independence. On the other hand, if something is not done soon, these conditions and these losses would continue and Kashmir will remain the bone of contention between the two regional countries. In the long run, therefore, a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem is to the benefit for all the three parties concerned, to wit, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris.
The proposed Man Mohan – Musharraf formula of 2007 was good because it evidently took into consideration the convenience and welfare of all the three concerned parties. The soft border would have enhanced people to people contact amongst the Kashmiri families who were divided because of the Line of Control. It would also have enhanced trade as trade would have become much easier and efficient, which could have brought prosperity and progress. People on the two sides of the Line of Control could have helped each other in time of need, as the need arose in the 2005 earthquake in Azad Kashmir. An issue here would have been of terrorist training camps in Azad Kashmir, but then again, these Jihadist camps would not exist if the Kashmir dispute was peacefully resolved as the Pakistani intelligence agencies would not facilitate them. Plus there was to be a joint mechanism between India and Pakistan which could have been very fruitful in maintaining peace since the two armies would have been cooperating. Demilitarization of the region would have reduced tension between the two countries as well as saved the already meager financial resources of Pakistan. Hence, overall the formula was beneficial for the two countries so there is a high possibility that it would have been viable, since the interests of the stakeholders would have been well served by it.
Bibliography
Research included readings of books from course-packs of courses taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan at LUMS.
1) “A Call to Honour” by Jaswant Singh
2) “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” by Abdul Sattar
3) “South Asia in World Politics” by Devin T. Hagerty
4) “Kashmir – A Way Forward” by Hurst Hannum
Saturday, December 11, 2010
Marxism in Pakistan
This article explores the development of Marxism in Pakistan's politics and history through the years and tries to identify the factors that may have inhibited its spread in Pakistan.
At the time of its creation, Pakistan was very weak and struggling to stand on its own feet. It turned for help to various countries but did not get a very good response. At this critical time, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan received an invitation on 2nd June 1949 from USSR for a visit to Moscow for holding dialogues.1, 2 Liaquat Ali Khan saw a ray of hope through this invitation but delayed the tour and after some time got an invitation for a visit from USA offering economic and political aid as well as support on the Kashmir issue.1, 2 Pakistan accepted this invitation and Liaquat Ali Khan visited Washington in May 1950.1, 2 From then onwards, Pakistan became a member of the rightist camp.1, 2
Speaking of Marxism in Pakistan, it is necessary to mention the All-India Progressive Writers’ Association. Soviet literary policy influenced Urdu literature in India and Pakistan. The Soviet Communist Party organized the Union of Soviet Writers in 1934. At that time, the Soviet foreign policy was enticing Communist groups in other countries to unite under antifascist alliances. The All-India Progressive Writers’ Association (AIPWA) was established in 1936 with the first All-India Progressive Writers’ Conference being held in Lucknow. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, who was the leftist leader of the Congress Party, was invited to preside over the Conference. (Malik, 649) The Association was a tool of the Communist Party of India (CPI), though any charges of this Communist affiliation were strongly denied. The Communist leader Sajjad Zaheer was elected as the Secretary General of the All-India Progressive Writers’ Association. However, the patronage of many well-known non-Communist personalities such as Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Maulavi Abdul Haqq, President of Anjuman Taraqqi-i Urdu, Doctor Abid Husain, Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, Josh Malih-Abadi, and Abdul Majid Salik, subsided the suspicions of any Communist affiliations of the Association a great deal. Between 1936 and 1947, the Movement had much influence on Urdu writers. Many Marxist writers emerged from the Punjab such as Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Ahmad Nadim Qasimi, Zahir Kashmiri and Sahir Ludhianvi. They incorporated Marxist ideas in Urdu poetry and tried to fuse these ideas in novels and story writing as well. (Malik, 652)
The progressive writers largely belonged to upper and middle classes of the society so they did not know about the lives of the proletariat even though they were united under the idea that they should help these lower classes. These writers agreed that their social class connection was due to the prevailing capitalist social order and all of them were determined to work against their own social classes. Faiz Ahmad Faiz said that “Marx, Engels, and Lenin were not manual workers; not one of them had ever worked in any factory even for a day. Much would depend on how well [the progressive writers] understand the problems of the workers, act wisely and sincerely.” According to Faiz, literary imagination and sincerity in expression could be sufficient tools for the progressive writers even if they did not have the chance to have contact with the workers. Faiz said, “If the message of the progressive writers does not reach the uneducated workers at least it reaches the middle classes. The war between the capitalist and the proletariat is not the exclusive war of the proletariat; it is a battle challenging all of us. Are not we part of our society?” (Malik, 652-653) Many practical suggestions to familiarize the progressive writers with the conditions of the proletariat were made, some were even followed. A branch of peasant poetry emerged in which Sayyid Muttalabi Faridabadi became well-known. (Malik, 654)
The Progressive Writers’ Association could not do well in Pakistan after 1947, as in Pakistan the Communist ideology of the Association was not looked upon favorably. The Communist Party got annihilated in Pakistan after Partition. The Communist Party of India (CPI) tried to work in Pakistan for a few months between 1947-1948, and in 1948 decided to have a distinct and new Communist Party in Pakistan. CPI had a difficult time trying to find a leader who could head the new party in Pakistan. In the end, Sajjad Zaheer became the Secretary-General of the newly formed Communist party of Pakistan (CPP). Zaheer now resigned from the post of Secretary-General of AIPWA. Ahmad Nadim Qasimi was named the Secretary-General of the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers’ Association (APPWA) at its formal creation in Lahore. (Malik, 659)
Even though CPP was a perfectly legal political party between 1948-1954, it was closely being monitored by the Pakistani Government. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951, charged the CPP with having attempted to hatch a plan to overthrow the Pakistani government with the help of some accomplices from Pakistan Army. Sajjad Zaheer and Faiz Ahmad Faiz were put behind bars and faced a trial along with Major General Akbar Khan, the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff. All the accused were convicted in 1953 and by 1954 the Communist Party of Pakistan was declared illegal across the country. (Malik, 659) However, the CPP had helped formulate several other Leftist political organizations in Pakistan. Mian Iftakhar-ud-Din and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan created the leftist Azad Pakistan Party in early 1950s. This party was an ally of Ganatantri Dal, a leftist organization in East Pakistan. (Malik, 659-660)
In late 1940s, Mian Iftakhar-ud-Din started the Progressive Papers Limited which was a leftist stock company. It began publishing Pakistan Times, the daily Imroz, and many other political magazines. Faiz Ahmad Faiz became the first editor of The Pakistan Times and managing editor of the daily Imroz. In 1953, Ahmad Nadim Qasmi who was the Secretary-General of the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers’ Association (APPWA) became the editor of the Imroz. (Malik, 660)
Under Qasmi, the APPWA made various attempts to influence young writers and poets of Pakistan. To a large extent, they did manage to draw many intellectuals to the movement. The personal charisma of Ahmad Nadim Qasmi and Faiz Ahmad Faiz was instrumental in this as they still had rather stainless reputations. (Malik, 660)
The decline of the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers’ Association was hastened by their belligerent attitude against the Pakistani government and their rigid stance against those writers who wavered from the beliefs of the Association. (Malik, 661)
The first all-Pakistan Conference took place in Lahore in 1949. There were four Soviet representatives present. The progressive writers discussed that a new time of revolutionary struggle was now there with the creation of Pakistan and there was a need for the writers to avail new opportunities of action. The manifesto which was formed discussed the trends in Pakistani literature and also stated the position of the progressive writers that they had challenged the policies of the Pakistani government and were ready to work for the development of Socialism in Pakistan. The manifesto also discussed the presence of writers in Pakistan whose only purpose was to promote the policies of the Pakistani leadership (“reactionary writers”). (Malik, 661)
From the writers who favored the current establishment, many belonged to active groups. One such group spoke of art for art’s sake; they were indifferent to art with meaning and were only concerned with style and decoration in literary texts. Another group spoke of nationalism; they were only concerned with selling Islamic literature and in reality were unaware of the true spirit of Islam. Likewise, several such groups were discussed. (Malik, 661)
The manifesto declared that the progressive writers looked upon art not just for art’s sake, but also believed that art should be used to benefit society and change society for the better. A number of publications were labeled as belonging to groups which favored the current Pakistani establishment, such as Mah-i Nao, Naya Daur, Saqi, and Urdu Adab, and progressive writers were instructed not to participate in them. In the end, the manifesto condemned many writers who supported the capitalist regime, among them Sadat Hasan Manto, Hasan Askari Noon Mim Rashid and Qurrat al-Ayin Hayder, instructing the progressive magazines to refrain from publishing their works. (Malik, 662)
Not all the writers had accepted Marxism, although they had earlier been sympathetic towards the movement. The movement required much sacrifice and the uncompromising attitude of the Association destroyed the unity of the movement. Dissidents under Hasan Askari and Manto accepted the notion of art for art’s sake. The remaining members of the APPWA gathered around Ahmad Nadim Qasmi and Faiz Ahmad Faiz and eventually began to be called the Sawera group, after the name of one of their magazines. The splintering of APPWA was good for their rivals who consequently gained considerable influence over the country’s publications. (Malik, 662-663)
APPWA’s policies led to clashes with the Pakistani establishment. In the 1949 Conference, APPWA passed following resolutions which
“- condemned the Provincial Government’s Public Safety Act, and the Public Safety Ordinance of the Government of Pakistan;
- demanded the withdrawal of the arrest warrant for Sajjad Zaheer;
- disapproved of the decisions of the Pakistan Newspapers Editors Conference, which condemned those provisions of the Pakistan Safety Ordinance which were only applicable to newspapers;
- lent moral support to the journalists of the Sindh Observer, who were in conflict with the paper’s management;
- condemned the “reactionary writers” international organization, P.E.N.;
- demanded the recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and congratulated the Chinese masses on their success against the Kuomintang;
- condemned the repressive policies of the capitalist countries against their progressive writers;
- appreciated the courage and determination of Indian progressive writers, and - condemned the “terrorism” of the Nehru and Patel government;
- declared the Association’s determination to take full part in the international struggle to preserve peace;
- emphasized the policy of support to provincial dialects along with Urdu;
- recommended the policy of bringing literature and art closer to the masses.” (Malik, 663)
It was not a good idea to announce these eleven resolutions since they challenged the Pakistani establishment at a period when the Association was not strong enough. The supporters of the movement were only there in the cities of Pakistan and the patron of APPWA, the Communist Party of Pakistan was still trying to gain grounds in Pakistan. This policy tells us of the misjudgment of Sajjad Zaheer about the Pakistani political scenario. The Pakistani Government was weak after Partition but it was not that fragile that it could not tackle the problem from the leftists, particularly since this problem was on such a limited scale. In 1951, the APPWA was announced to be a political party by the Pakistani establishment and was frequently disturbed by it until 1958. (Malik, 663)
It was Ayub Khan who finished the Progressive Papers Limited in 1958. It was charged with conspiring with a foreign power and its assets were forcibly put up on auction, sold to a group of businessmen for 4,600,000 ruppees. This was a death blow for APPWA, since it deprived the progressive writers of their means of making a living. Many writers became incorporated into different organizations while the most rebellious were left to make a scarce living out of their own publications. Hence the Association died out completely. (Malik, 663-664)
In 1966, there was a debate in West Pakistan about the compatibility between Islam and socialism and whether the term “Islamic Socialism” made sense or was a term that had inherent contradictions. A number of Middle Eastern intellectuals had earlier written about the topic, especially after Nasser’s formal proclamation of “Arab Socialism” in early 1960s. The Pakistani “Islamic Socialists” were negligent of this literature and hence did not make good use of it. (Fazlur Rahman, 31)
Allama Iqbal had criticized the capitalism of the West, had appreciated Lenin in his poem “Lenin’s Petition to God”, had suggested the abolishment of religion if it did not give the proletariat their rights in a poem “God’s Command to Angels”, and in “It Is God’s Earth” he said that the resources on earth belong to all humanity and cannot become the property of a handful of people. (Fazlur Rahman, 31) Iqbal wrote the following verses about Karl Marx:
“The world does not like tricks and
Of science and wit nor, their contests
This age does not like ancient thoughts,
From core of hearts their show detests.
O wise economist, the books you write
Are quite devoid of useful aim:
They have twisted lines with orders strange
No warmth for labour, though they claim.
The idol houses of the West,
Their schools and churches wide
The ravage caused for, greed of wealth
Their wily wit attempts to hide.”5
However, Iqbal also criticized certain aspects of Communism. In “Satan’s Advisory Council” he rejected the materialistic philosophy of Communism. He thought that Communism had brought about an equitable economic system (which was similar to that of Islam) but it should not have materialism behind it. He wrote to Sir Francis Younghusband that “If Bolshevism can accept God, it will come very close to Islam. I will not, therefore, be surprised if at some future time Islam overwhelms Russia or Russia overwhelms Islam.” Similarly, Iqbal rejected the “atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal [Nehru]” and also termed the Muslim League’s apathy towards improving the conditions of the Islamic masses as being un-Islamic in his letters to Jinnah. (Fazlur Rahman, 31)
In the 1966 arguments, Iqbal was vigorously quoted by the two sides. The socialists quoted his statements about the similarities between Islam and socialism, while their opponents quoted his denunciation of atheistic socialism. Both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan had actually used the term “Islamic Socialism”. (Fazlur Rahman, 31) In the Introduction to the Guidelines of his Third Five-Year Plan, Ayub Khan had mentioned that the aim of his policies was “Islamic Socialism”. But the topic gained a lot of controversy and the term “Islamic Socialism” was excluded from the text when it was finally published. (Fazlur Rahman, 32)
Bhutto launched his socialist campaign in 1966 and he was quick to understand that he needed to incorporate Islam in his socialism in order strengthen his political support in the country. J.A.Rahim, who was a Communist in his party did not approve of this and protested vehemently when Mawlana Kawsar Niazi was appointed the Propaganda Secretary of the Party. However, the Pakistan People’s Party maintained its stance of Islamic Socialism in its election manifesto, and after winning the 1970 elections Bhutto proclaimed his victory as “great victory for Islam”. In Pakistani society, vows of bringing prosperity in future through the bringing into check of the assets of upper classes brings good results in elections, especially if such vows are mingled with a touch of Islam. (Fazlur Rahman, 31) Whereas it was easy to win the elections, it was not so easy for Bhutto to manage the affairs of state once he came into power. His party’s vote bank had included a very diverse set of people, including Communists, socialists, Islamic Socialists and even landlords. Such diversity makes it difficult to have a definite policy, keeping the interests of all factions in mind. Clearly, an Islamic Socialist country would firstly need a well drafted ideology based on Islam, and secondly would need the relevant ideologically engineered government frame work for it to function. Both these features were not there in Bhutto’s time. (Fazlur Rahman, 32)
The slogan of the PPP was “Islamic Socialism”, yet it was excluded from the 1973 Constitution. There was nothing incorrect in the term, it could have been used to make true the possibilities of establishing an equitable Islamic system in the modern environment. Perhaps the opposition of the other two socialist inclined political parties, the National Awami Party and the Jamiyat ul-Ulama, made Bhutto compromise with the rightists. (Fazlur Rahman, 32)
When speaking of Marxism in Pakistan, it would be unjust to not mention Faiz Ahmad Faiz, a known Marxist, and one of the finest poets of Urdu in twentieth century. Poetry had been Faiz’s passion in his early life. It was after he started teaching at Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College in Amritsar in 1935 that he got a passion for politics and public relations. He made many new Marxist friends, among them Mahmuduz-Zafar and his wife Rashid Jahan. Reading The Communist Manifesto greatly influenced Faiz. It was banned in India, but Faiz got access to it through his new Marxist friends. From then on, Faiz led a politically active life. He helped establish the All-India Progressive Writers’ Association. (Khalid, 260) About Faiz’s poetry, Sajjad Zaheer said “[T]he values represented by the poet are the same as the values of all progressive humanity of today. But Faiz has adopted them so well that they neither appear distinct from the best traditions of our civilization and culture, nor is the individuality of the poet, his soft, sweet, and lyrical style divorced from them.” (Khalid, 261)
In Lahore, after Partition, Faiz engaged in various works including journalism, trade unions and the international peace movement. But such activities were not endorsed in the newly formed state as its government increasing leaned towards the right and adopted a pro-American stance in its foreign relations. (Khalid, 261)
In 1951, Faiz met his army friends who were dissatisfied with the current political system of the country and wanted to bring about a change. Faiz brought his Communist friend Sajjad Zaheer to the discussion. Although they all decided that the time was not suitable for any attempt to bring about change, they were discovered and charged with having plotted and conspired to overthrow the regime, and were hence convicted. Faiz got a sentence of four years in jail. Faiz spent this time writing poetry, which he had abandoned earlier. His poetic collection, Dast-e Saba was published while he was still in prison. (Khalid, 261-262)
When Faiz was freed, Cold War was happening and left wing activities were suppressed in Pakistan. Faiz could do very little. He remained a part of the International Peace Committee and he acquired an international literary reputation, receiving the Lenin Peace Prize in 1962, the greatest honor the Soviet Union had for foreign literary figures. (Khalid, 262)
Circumstances improved for Faiz when Bhutto came to power, a man whose policies Faiz liked. Bhutto appointed him as Consultant on Cultural Affairs to Ministry of Education. Then came Zia ul Haq’s regime and Faiz spent much of the time abroad in exile until 1983 when he returned to Lahore. He passed away the following year. (Khalid, 262-263)
According to Russian author Vasilieva, “the political and social values that were of the first importance for Faiz did not pass the test of history”. Faiz’s poetry in his poetic collection Mire Dil, Mire Musafir is characterized mostly with sadness, doubt and despair. According to Vasilieva, this despair and grief was largely due to Faiz’s doubts about the Soviet Union and also due to doubts about Faiz’s lifelong beliefs and aims, or about how they were being brought about. (Khalid, 267) Faiz died in 1984, and did not survive to see the collapse of so many things which were important to him, including the break up of the Soviet Union. (Khalid, 268)
We now turn our attention towards how the present Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party in Pakistan came into being.7 The Communist Party of Pakistan was banned after the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in 1951, together with its many front organizations such as Democratic Students Federation, the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers Association, Railway Workers’ Union (headed by Communist Mirza Ibrahim).7 The Communist Party and the movement became clandestine.7
The party tried to build up support, operating behind Maulana Bhashani’s anti-imperialist National Awami Party (NAP).7 NAP was a mixture of regional nationalists and leftists.7 In 1960s, CPP tried to stir up support from amongst the working classes.7
Then came the rift between the Chinese and the Soviets which splintered the Pakistani Communists into two groups.7 The Pakistani Maoists started the Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) in 1970 under Major Ishaq Muhammed.7 The MKP started a guerilla war against feudals in Hashtnagar.7 The success of the People’s War, as this war was called, had an encouraging effect on the leftist movement in Pakistan.7 This war liberated an area of 200 square miles and similar movements started erupting all over the country.7 The Communist Party of Pakistan was pro-Soviet and it also started a peasant armed movement in Patfeeder in Baluchistan.7 They also began to influence various worker unions in the cities. The 1970s was period of struggles against the bourgeoisie, and the peasants and workers gained control of various sectors which remain strongholds of the working classes.7
In 1977, there was a military coup and the communist leaders were put behind bars. The head of MKP, Major Ishaq Muhammed, too was jailed and died in 1982. After him a peasant communist leader, Ghulam Nabi Kalu, led the MKP.7
In 1986, MKP criticized Gorbachev’s policies for the reason that they thought it would restore capitalism in USSR.7 The CPP, however, maintained their support for Glasnost and Perestroika.7 The fall of the Soviet Union had an adverse affect on the communist movement in Pakistan.7 Many people deserted the movement and it was a time of ideological confusion and political disillusionment.7 It was at this time in 1995 that the Communist Party of Pakistan and the Mazdoor Kissan Party engaged in self assessment and united to form the new Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party (CMKP) to save the communist movement.7
One reason which can be identified why Marxism has not flourished in Pakistan is that the workers and peasants are not exactly united to rise in order to bring about a revolution. The working classes in Pakistan are mostly the serfs, peasants, daily wage workers who are divided along the lines of ethnicities, sectarianism, kinship, communities, castes.
Another reason why Marxism has not been able to spread in Pakistan may be that a notion is propagated by the rulers of the promise of roti, kapra aur makaan (bread, clothes and house) for all, though it means nothing to the rulers. This is the ideological guise beneath which the rulers who themselves are the bourgeoisie are manipulating the thinking of the proletariat masses to stay in power by making the masses think along certain lines designed by these rulers.
Another reason why spread of Marxism has been inhibited in Pakistan is that the Pakistani society is emotionally attached to Islam. The ruling classes have, by a propaganda, spread the notion that Marxism is an ungodly ideology, which is opposed to religion in general, and is a threat to Islam in particular. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union was branded as being the "infidel” Soviets.8
To divert the attention of the proletariat from a revolution, the rulers have created outside enemies (the phenomenon of the security state, tensions with India, ISI created Taliban, and so on), which portray the ruling class as well as the whole nation as the deprived victims of imperialism.
Privatization and structural adjustments programs of World Bank, IMF (neoliberalism in general) break down trade unions and affect labor laws negatively, which can lead to a break down in the Left's movement.
Bibliography:
1.
2. "Liaquat Ali Khan « My Distinguished Sense." My Distinguished Sense. Web. 10 Dec. 2010. .
3. Malik, Hafeez (1967) The Marxist Literary Movement in India and Pakistan, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (pg. 649-664)
4. Fazlur Rahman, “Islam and the New Constitution of Pakistan”, in J. Henry Korson ed. Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, 1974, Pages 31-33.
5. "The Voice of Karl Marx « Red Diary." Red Diary. Web. 10 Dec. 2010. .
6. Khalid, Adeeb, The Life and Works of Faiz Ahmad Faiz
7. Vidrohi. "History of the Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party. « The Rebel Road…." The Rebel Road…. Web. 10 Dec. 2010. .
8.
At the time of its creation, Pakistan was very weak and struggling to stand on its own feet. It turned for help to various countries but did not get a very good response. At this critical time, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan received an invitation on 2nd June 1949 from USSR for a visit to Moscow for holding dialogues.1, 2 Liaquat Ali Khan saw a ray of hope through this invitation but delayed the tour and after some time got an invitation for a visit from USA offering economic and political aid as well as support on the Kashmir issue.1, 2 Pakistan accepted this invitation and Liaquat Ali Khan visited Washington in May 1950.1, 2 From then onwards, Pakistan became a member of the rightist camp.1, 2
Speaking of Marxism in Pakistan, it is necessary to mention the All-India Progressive Writers’ Association. Soviet literary policy influenced Urdu literature in India and Pakistan. The Soviet Communist Party organized the Union of Soviet Writers in 1934. At that time, the Soviet foreign policy was enticing Communist groups in other countries to unite under antifascist alliances. The All-India Progressive Writers’ Association (AIPWA) was established in 1936 with the first All-India Progressive Writers’ Conference being held in Lucknow. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, who was the leftist leader of the Congress Party, was invited to preside over the Conference. (Malik, 649) The Association was a tool of the Communist Party of India (CPI), though any charges of this Communist affiliation were strongly denied. The Communist leader Sajjad Zaheer was elected as the Secretary General of the All-India Progressive Writers’ Association. However, the patronage of many well-known non-Communist personalities such as Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Maulavi Abdul Haqq, President of Anjuman Taraqqi-i Urdu, Doctor Abid Husain, Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, Josh Malih-Abadi, and Abdul Majid Salik, subsided the suspicions of any Communist affiliations of the Association a great deal. Between 1936 and 1947, the Movement had much influence on Urdu writers. Many Marxist writers emerged from the Punjab such as Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Ahmad Nadim Qasimi, Zahir Kashmiri and Sahir Ludhianvi. They incorporated Marxist ideas in Urdu poetry and tried to fuse these ideas in novels and story writing as well. (Malik, 652)
The progressive writers largely belonged to upper and middle classes of the society so they did not know about the lives of the proletariat even though they were united under the idea that they should help these lower classes. These writers agreed that their social class connection was due to the prevailing capitalist social order and all of them were determined to work against their own social classes. Faiz Ahmad Faiz said that “Marx, Engels, and Lenin were not manual workers; not one of them had ever worked in any factory even for a day. Much would depend on how well [the progressive writers] understand the problems of the workers, act wisely and sincerely.” According to Faiz, literary imagination and sincerity in expression could be sufficient tools for the progressive writers even if they did not have the chance to have contact with the workers. Faiz said, “If the message of the progressive writers does not reach the uneducated workers at least it reaches the middle classes. The war between the capitalist and the proletariat is not the exclusive war of the proletariat; it is a battle challenging all of us. Are not we part of our society?” (Malik, 652-653) Many practical suggestions to familiarize the progressive writers with the conditions of the proletariat were made, some were even followed. A branch of peasant poetry emerged in which Sayyid Muttalabi Faridabadi became well-known. (Malik, 654)
The Progressive Writers’ Association could not do well in Pakistan after 1947, as in Pakistan the Communist ideology of the Association was not looked upon favorably. The Communist Party got annihilated in Pakistan after Partition. The Communist Party of India (CPI) tried to work in Pakistan for a few months between 1947-1948, and in 1948 decided to have a distinct and new Communist Party in Pakistan. CPI had a difficult time trying to find a leader who could head the new party in Pakistan. In the end, Sajjad Zaheer became the Secretary-General of the newly formed Communist party of Pakistan (CPP). Zaheer now resigned from the post of Secretary-General of AIPWA. Ahmad Nadim Qasimi was named the Secretary-General of the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers’ Association (APPWA) at its formal creation in Lahore. (Malik, 659)
Even though CPP was a perfectly legal political party between 1948-1954, it was closely being monitored by the Pakistani Government. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951, charged the CPP with having attempted to hatch a plan to overthrow the Pakistani government with the help of some accomplices from Pakistan Army. Sajjad Zaheer and Faiz Ahmad Faiz were put behind bars and faced a trial along with Major General Akbar Khan, the Pakistan Army Chief of Staff. All the accused were convicted in 1953 and by 1954 the Communist Party of Pakistan was declared illegal across the country. (Malik, 659) However, the CPP had helped formulate several other Leftist political organizations in Pakistan. Mian Iftakhar-ud-Din and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan created the leftist Azad Pakistan Party in early 1950s. This party was an ally of Ganatantri Dal, a leftist organization in East Pakistan. (Malik, 659-660)
In late 1940s, Mian Iftakhar-ud-Din started the Progressive Papers Limited which was a leftist stock company. It began publishing Pakistan Times, the daily Imroz, and many other political magazines. Faiz Ahmad Faiz became the first editor of The Pakistan Times and managing editor of the daily Imroz. In 1953, Ahmad Nadim Qasmi who was the Secretary-General of the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers’ Association (APPWA) became the editor of the Imroz. (Malik, 660)
Under Qasmi, the APPWA made various attempts to influence young writers and poets of Pakistan. To a large extent, they did manage to draw many intellectuals to the movement. The personal charisma of Ahmad Nadim Qasmi and Faiz Ahmad Faiz was instrumental in this as they still had rather stainless reputations. (Malik, 660)
The decline of the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers’ Association was hastened by their belligerent attitude against the Pakistani government and their rigid stance against those writers who wavered from the beliefs of the Association. (Malik, 661)
The first all-Pakistan Conference took place in Lahore in 1949. There were four Soviet representatives present. The progressive writers discussed that a new time of revolutionary struggle was now there with the creation of Pakistan and there was a need for the writers to avail new opportunities of action. The manifesto which was formed discussed the trends in Pakistani literature and also stated the position of the progressive writers that they had challenged the policies of the Pakistani government and were ready to work for the development of Socialism in Pakistan. The manifesto also discussed the presence of writers in Pakistan whose only purpose was to promote the policies of the Pakistani leadership (“reactionary writers”). (Malik, 661)
From the writers who favored the current establishment, many belonged to active groups. One such group spoke of art for art’s sake; they were indifferent to art with meaning and were only concerned with style and decoration in literary texts. Another group spoke of nationalism; they were only concerned with selling Islamic literature and in reality were unaware of the true spirit of Islam. Likewise, several such groups were discussed. (Malik, 661)
The manifesto declared that the progressive writers looked upon art not just for art’s sake, but also believed that art should be used to benefit society and change society for the better. A number of publications were labeled as belonging to groups which favored the current Pakistani establishment, such as Mah-i Nao, Naya Daur, Saqi, and Urdu Adab, and progressive writers were instructed not to participate in them. In the end, the manifesto condemned many writers who supported the capitalist regime, among them Sadat Hasan Manto, Hasan Askari Noon Mim Rashid and Qurrat al-Ayin Hayder, instructing the progressive magazines to refrain from publishing their works. (Malik, 662)
Not all the writers had accepted Marxism, although they had earlier been sympathetic towards the movement. The movement required much sacrifice and the uncompromising attitude of the Association destroyed the unity of the movement. Dissidents under Hasan Askari and Manto accepted the notion of art for art’s sake. The remaining members of the APPWA gathered around Ahmad Nadim Qasmi and Faiz Ahmad Faiz and eventually began to be called the Sawera group, after the name of one of their magazines. The splintering of APPWA was good for their rivals who consequently gained considerable influence over the country’s publications. (Malik, 662-663)
APPWA’s policies led to clashes with the Pakistani establishment. In the 1949 Conference, APPWA passed following resolutions which
“- condemned the Provincial Government’s Public Safety Act, and the Public Safety Ordinance of the Government of Pakistan;
- demanded the withdrawal of the arrest warrant for Sajjad Zaheer;
- disapproved of the decisions of the Pakistan Newspapers Editors Conference, which condemned those provisions of the Pakistan Safety Ordinance which were only applicable to newspapers;
- lent moral support to the journalists of the Sindh Observer, who were in conflict with the paper’s management;
- condemned the “reactionary writers” international organization, P.E.N.;
- demanded the recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and congratulated the Chinese masses on their success against the Kuomintang;
- condemned the repressive policies of the capitalist countries against their progressive writers;
- appreciated the courage and determination of Indian progressive writers, and - condemned the “terrorism” of the Nehru and Patel government;
- declared the Association’s determination to take full part in the international struggle to preserve peace;
- emphasized the policy of support to provincial dialects along with Urdu;
- recommended the policy of bringing literature and art closer to the masses.” (Malik, 663)
It was not a good idea to announce these eleven resolutions since they challenged the Pakistani establishment at a period when the Association was not strong enough. The supporters of the movement were only there in the cities of Pakistan and the patron of APPWA, the Communist Party of Pakistan was still trying to gain grounds in Pakistan. This policy tells us of the misjudgment of Sajjad Zaheer about the Pakistani political scenario. The Pakistani Government was weak after Partition but it was not that fragile that it could not tackle the problem from the leftists, particularly since this problem was on such a limited scale. In 1951, the APPWA was announced to be a political party by the Pakistani establishment and was frequently disturbed by it until 1958. (Malik, 663)
It was Ayub Khan who finished the Progressive Papers Limited in 1958. It was charged with conspiring with a foreign power and its assets were forcibly put up on auction, sold to a group of businessmen for 4,600,000 ruppees. This was a death blow for APPWA, since it deprived the progressive writers of their means of making a living. Many writers became incorporated into different organizations while the most rebellious were left to make a scarce living out of their own publications. Hence the Association died out completely. (Malik, 663-664)
In 1966, there was a debate in West Pakistan about the compatibility between Islam and socialism and whether the term “Islamic Socialism” made sense or was a term that had inherent contradictions. A number of Middle Eastern intellectuals had earlier written about the topic, especially after Nasser’s formal proclamation of “Arab Socialism” in early 1960s. The Pakistani “Islamic Socialists” were negligent of this literature and hence did not make good use of it. (Fazlur Rahman, 31)
Allama Iqbal had criticized the capitalism of the West, had appreciated Lenin in his poem “Lenin’s Petition to God”, had suggested the abolishment of religion if it did not give the proletariat their rights in a poem “God’s Command to Angels”, and in “It Is God’s Earth” he said that the resources on earth belong to all humanity and cannot become the property of a handful of people. (Fazlur Rahman, 31) Iqbal wrote the following verses about Karl Marx:
“The world does not like tricks and
Of science and wit nor, their contests
This age does not like ancient thoughts,
From core of hearts their show detests.
O wise economist, the books you write
Are quite devoid of useful aim:
They have twisted lines with orders strange
No warmth for labour, though they claim.
The idol houses of the West,
Their schools and churches wide
The ravage caused for, greed of wealth
Their wily wit attempts to hide.”5
However, Iqbal also criticized certain aspects of Communism. In “Satan’s Advisory Council” he rejected the materialistic philosophy of Communism. He thought that Communism had brought about an equitable economic system (which was similar to that of Islam) but it should not have materialism behind it. He wrote to Sir Francis Younghusband that “If Bolshevism can accept God, it will come very close to Islam. I will not, therefore, be surprised if at some future time Islam overwhelms Russia or Russia overwhelms Islam.” Similarly, Iqbal rejected the “atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal [Nehru]” and also termed the Muslim League’s apathy towards improving the conditions of the Islamic masses as being un-Islamic in his letters to Jinnah. (Fazlur Rahman, 31)
In the 1966 arguments, Iqbal was vigorously quoted by the two sides. The socialists quoted his statements about the similarities between Islam and socialism, while their opponents quoted his denunciation of atheistic socialism. Both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan had actually used the term “Islamic Socialism”. (Fazlur Rahman, 31) In the Introduction to the Guidelines of his Third Five-Year Plan, Ayub Khan had mentioned that the aim of his policies was “Islamic Socialism”. But the topic gained a lot of controversy and the term “Islamic Socialism” was excluded from the text when it was finally published. (Fazlur Rahman, 32)
Bhutto launched his socialist campaign in 1966 and he was quick to understand that he needed to incorporate Islam in his socialism in order strengthen his political support in the country. J.A.Rahim, who was a Communist in his party did not approve of this and protested vehemently when Mawlana Kawsar Niazi was appointed the Propaganda Secretary of the Party. However, the Pakistan People’s Party maintained its stance of Islamic Socialism in its election manifesto, and after winning the 1970 elections Bhutto proclaimed his victory as “great victory for Islam”. In Pakistani society, vows of bringing prosperity in future through the bringing into check of the assets of upper classes brings good results in elections, especially if such vows are mingled with a touch of Islam. (Fazlur Rahman, 31) Whereas it was easy to win the elections, it was not so easy for Bhutto to manage the affairs of state once he came into power. His party’s vote bank had included a very diverse set of people, including Communists, socialists, Islamic Socialists and even landlords. Such diversity makes it difficult to have a definite policy, keeping the interests of all factions in mind. Clearly, an Islamic Socialist country would firstly need a well drafted ideology based on Islam, and secondly would need the relevant ideologically engineered government frame work for it to function. Both these features were not there in Bhutto’s time. (Fazlur Rahman, 32)
The slogan of the PPP was “Islamic Socialism”, yet it was excluded from the 1973 Constitution. There was nothing incorrect in the term, it could have been used to make true the possibilities of establishing an equitable Islamic system in the modern environment. Perhaps the opposition of the other two socialist inclined political parties, the National Awami Party and the Jamiyat ul-Ulama, made Bhutto compromise with the rightists. (Fazlur Rahman, 32)
When speaking of Marxism in Pakistan, it would be unjust to not mention Faiz Ahmad Faiz, a known Marxist, and one of the finest poets of Urdu in twentieth century. Poetry had been Faiz’s passion in his early life. It was after he started teaching at Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College in Amritsar in 1935 that he got a passion for politics and public relations. He made many new Marxist friends, among them Mahmuduz-Zafar and his wife Rashid Jahan. Reading The Communist Manifesto greatly influenced Faiz. It was banned in India, but Faiz got access to it through his new Marxist friends. From then on, Faiz led a politically active life. He helped establish the All-India Progressive Writers’ Association. (Khalid, 260) About Faiz’s poetry, Sajjad Zaheer said “[T]he values represented by the poet are the same as the values of all progressive humanity of today. But Faiz has adopted them so well that they neither appear distinct from the best traditions of our civilization and culture, nor is the individuality of the poet, his soft, sweet, and lyrical style divorced from them.” (Khalid, 261)
In Lahore, after Partition, Faiz engaged in various works including journalism, trade unions and the international peace movement. But such activities were not endorsed in the newly formed state as its government increasing leaned towards the right and adopted a pro-American stance in its foreign relations. (Khalid, 261)
In 1951, Faiz met his army friends who were dissatisfied with the current political system of the country and wanted to bring about a change. Faiz brought his Communist friend Sajjad Zaheer to the discussion. Although they all decided that the time was not suitable for any attempt to bring about change, they were discovered and charged with having plotted and conspired to overthrow the regime, and were hence convicted. Faiz got a sentence of four years in jail. Faiz spent this time writing poetry, which he had abandoned earlier. His poetic collection, Dast-e Saba was published while he was still in prison. (Khalid, 261-262)
When Faiz was freed, Cold War was happening and left wing activities were suppressed in Pakistan. Faiz could do very little. He remained a part of the International Peace Committee and he acquired an international literary reputation, receiving the Lenin Peace Prize in 1962, the greatest honor the Soviet Union had for foreign literary figures. (Khalid, 262)
Circumstances improved for Faiz when Bhutto came to power, a man whose policies Faiz liked. Bhutto appointed him as Consultant on Cultural Affairs to Ministry of Education. Then came Zia ul Haq’s regime and Faiz spent much of the time abroad in exile until 1983 when he returned to Lahore. He passed away the following year. (Khalid, 262-263)
According to Russian author Vasilieva, “the political and social values that were of the first importance for Faiz did not pass the test of history”. Faiz’s poetry in his poetic collection Mire Dil, Mire Musafir is characterized mostly with sadness, doubt and despair. According to Vasilieva, this despair and grief was largely due to Faiz’s doubts about the Soviet Union and also due to doubts about Faiz’s lifelong beliefs and aims, or about how they were being brought about. (Khalid, 267) Faiz died in 1984, and did not survive to see the collapse of so many things which were important to him, including the break up of the Soviet Union. (Khalid, 268)
We now turn our attention towards how the present Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party in Pakistan came into being.7 The Communist Party of Pakistan was banned after the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in 1951, together with its many front organizations such as Democratic Students Federation, the All-Pakistan Progressive Writers Association, Railway Workers’ Union (headed by Communist Mirza Ibrahim).7 The Communist Party and the movement became clandestine.7
The party tried to build up support, operating behind Maulana Bhashani’s anti-imperialist National Awami Party (NAP).7 NAP was a mixture of regional nationalists and leftists.7 In 1960s, CPP tried to stir up support from amongst the working classes.7
Then came the rift between the Chinese and the Soviets which splintered the Pakistani Communists into two groups.7 The Pakistani Maoists started the Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) in 1970 under Major Ishaq Muhammed.7 The MKP started a guerilla war against feudals in Hashtnagar.7 The success of the People’s War, as this war was called, had an encouraging effect on the leftist movement in Pakistan.7 This war liberated an area of 200 square miles and similar movements started erupting all over the country.7 The Communist Party of Pakistan was pro-Soviet and it also started a peasant armed movement in Patfeeder in Baluchistan.7 They also began to influence various worker unions in the cities. The 1970s was period of struggles against the bourgeoisie, and the peasants and workers gained control of various sectors which remain strongholds of the working classes.7
In 1977, there was a military coup and the communist leaders were put behind bars. The head of MKP, Major Ishaq Muhammed, too was jailed and died in 1982. After him a peasant communist leader, Ghulam Nabi Kalu, led the MKP.7
In 1986, MKP criticized Gorbachev’s policies for the reason that they thought it would restore capitalism in USSR.7 The CPP, however, maintained their support for Glasnost and Perestroika.7 The fall of the Soviet Union had an adverse affect on the communist movement in Pakistan.7 Many people deserted the movement and it was a time of ideological confusion and political disillusionment.7 It was at this time in 1995 that the Communist Party of Pakistan and the Mazdoor Kissan Party engaged in self assessment and united to form the new Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party (CMKP) to save the communist movement.7
One reason which can be identified why Marxism has not flourished in Pakistan is that the workers and peasants are not exactly united to rise in order to bring about a revolution. The working classes in Pakistan are mostly the serfs, peasants, daily wage workers who are divided along the lines of ethnicities, sectarianism, kinship, communities, castes.
Another reason why Marxism has not been able to spread in Pakistan may be that a notion is propagated by the rulers of the promise of roti, kapra aur makaan (bread, clothes and house) for all, though it means nothing to the rulers. This is the ideological guise beneath which the rulers who themselves are the bourgeoisie are manipulating the thinking of the proletariat masses to stay in power by making the masses think along certain lines designed by these rulers.
Another reason why spread of Marxism has been inhibited in Pakistan is that the Pakistani society is emotionally attached to Islam. The ruling classes have, by a propaganda, spread the notion that Marxism is an ungodly ideology, which is opposed to religion in general, and is a threat to Islam in particular. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union was branded as being the "infidel” Soviets.8
To divert the attention of the proletariat from a revolution, the rulers have created outside enemies (the phenomenon of the security state, tensions with India, ISI created Taliban, and so on), which portray the ruling class as well as the whole nation as the deprived victims of imperialism.
Privatization and structural adjustments programs of World Bank, IMF (neoliberalism in general) break down trade unions and affect labor laws negatively, which can lead to a break down in the Left's movement.
Bibliography:
1.
2. "Liaquat Ali Khan « My Distinguished Sense." My Distinguished Sense. Web. 10 Dec. 2010.
3. Malik, Hafeez (1967) The Marxist Literary Movement in India and Pakistan, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (pg. 649-664)
4. Fazlur Rahman, “Islam and the New Constitution of Pakistan”, in J. Henry Korson ed. Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, 1974, Pages 31-33.
5. "The Voice of Karl Marx « Red Diary." Red Diary. Web. 10 Dec. 2010.
6. Khalid, Adeeb, The Life and Works of Faiz Ahmad Faiz
7. Vidrohi. "History of the Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party. « The Rebel Road…." The Rebel Road…. Web. 10 Dec. 2010.
8.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Pakistan's Unstable Relationship with Central Asia
The Islamic states of Central Asia share a relationship marked with both economic interdependence as well as mistrust with Pakistan. They share a cultural and historical relationship with each other since times immemorial. Most of the invaders who came into the Indo-Pak region over the centuries came here from the north and central Asia, including the Mughals and the Ghaznavids. Pakistan and this region also share the common bond of being linked by Islam as a common faith; many people in the Indian Subcontinent converted to Islam due to the efforts of Sufis who came here from Central Asia. In today’s world, these states face similar economic problems and threat perceptions. A common strategy against these problems can go far in achieving economic milestones and bringing stability into the entire region. As such, Central Asia occupies a very special position in Pakistan’s foreign policy. This is apparent to the Central Asian States, as can be seen from the high level exchanges that have taken place between them.1
It would be relevant to go back into the 1990s to examine Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics. The birth of the Central Asian states was welcomed in the Islamic world when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s. These states are extremely rich in mineral resources. Their gas reserves are estimated at more than 236 trillion cubic feet, whereas their oil reserves are estimated to be about 60 billion oil barrels, sufficient for fuelling entire European needs for about eleven years. Still other estimates put the region’s oil reserves to an even higher 200 billion barrels.2 However, being landlocked, these states were unable to take advantage of their natural endowments when they came into being. As such, these states needed to cooperate with neighbouring states in order to engage with the global economy. These neighbouring states were Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Furthermore, the need to engage with other countries was important for these states because they wanted to lower their dependency on Russia and be able to stand on their own feet; all their bureaucratic, political, military, financial structure was based on the communist Russian model.
Amongst all the neighbouring states, Pakistan was the one which was looked upon with the most favour by the Central Asian States. Amongst Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, Pakistan was most developed in technology, science, education and industry. Pakistan’s official language was English which gave it an edge over the other two countries because English is the language of the modern world transactions and negotiations. The Central Asian states were eager to learn English from Pakistan in order to engage in world economy. Pakistan could train pilots from the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan also had prosperous textile, shipping, and fishing industries, and a commendable banking and ports sector. Pakistan could serve the interests of these states by providing them with the much needed access to the sea via its ports of Karachi, Bin Qasim and Gwadar.3 Iran was not looked upon with favour by Central Asia mainly due to the Islamic Revolution which had taken place there. The Iranians were emphatic about Islamization and were engaged in religious interference in the region. They were seen as radicals by these states mainly because these states had a relatively more secular and tolerant attitude, having lived under the communists for decades. With Turkey, these states had a colonial past and they did not want to revive it, hence they were relatively distant with Turkey as well. This does not mean that these states did not want good relations with Iran or Turkey; it was just Pakistan which was viewed with relatively greater favour by these states in wanting to establish good relations.
At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Pakistan was overly eager in wanting to recognize the Central Asian states and wanted to start a cordial relationship with them. It did not take into consideration the various diversities of these states and therefore the need to address each of them in accordance to their complexity and multiplicity of national interests. Pakistan became one of the first countries of the world to formally recognize the Central Asian states on 19th December, 1991. The first high-level Pakistani delegation, headed by Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali who was the minister of state for economic affairs, visited the Central Asian Republics in November – December 1991. At that time, Akram Zaki who was the secretary general of foreign affairs had said, “recognition of the Central Asian states would open new vistas of bilateral co-operation with these states with whom Pakistan had close ties of history, faith, and culture.” Pakistan gave a loan of $ 10 million to each of these states, with a loan of $ 30 million for Uzbekistan. As a sign of its good-will, Pakistan also gave medicines worth $ 100,000 to each of these states as well as five thousand tons of rice. The time between 1991-1993 saw a great number of high-level meetings between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics. Although Pakistan’s engagement increased with all the Central Asian states, it was Uzbekistan which had most of Pakistan’s attention. A lot of agreements for economic, cultural, education and technological cooperation were signed between the two nations. Pakistan agreed to import hydroelectric power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1992 and set up Joint Economic Commissions (JECs) with the Central Asian states to implement various projects. Apart from this, Pakistan also provided these states with fully funded programs for instruction in English language, accounting, banking, insurance, postal service and diplomacy. These programs continued despite political disturbances amongst the states.4 Pakistan was amongst the first countries which sent its passenger planes to these states.
Although Pakistan’s policies towards these states had an emotional streak based on bonds of Islamic brotherhood, its objectives remained economic and commercial. In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which was created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as a successor organization of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), extended its membership to Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and the five Central Asian Republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). The organization had great plans for cooperation and development in the region but it has so far failed largely due to the scarcity of resources as well as lack of political concord5; Pakistan, Iran and Turkey fell over each other in their attempts to reap the most advantage from the organization.
The Central Asian states did not want to support the political aspirations of any state; they were only desperate to build their economic infrastructure. The Central Asian states mainly wanted economic and cultural relations with Pakistan, as opposed to political relations. Pakistan on the other hand, tried to exploit the ECO platform to gain support for its cause in Kashmir. The Central Asian states opposed this move by Pakistan as the ECO was a platform for economic cooperation and not for the settlement of political issues. Pakistan’s efforts to exploit ECO for its own political objectives greatly disillusioned the Central Asian States. They began to wonder whether Pakistan really was sincere towards them. Even if Pakistan wanted to gain the support of Central Asian Republics over Kashmir against India, Pakistan failed to consider that these states for decades had lived under the rule of the Soviet Union which had a deeply pro-Indian attitude. These newly independent countries needed time to overcome the psyche they had inherited from the Russians, the psyche of India being considered good and Pakistan being considered bad. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev told Pakistan’s then Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan that the bureaucratic, political, economic structure of the Central Asian states was still based on the lines of the communist model so Pakistan should not try to force them to change their stance overnight. The stance of these countries would change, but it would take some time.
Relations between Pakistan and Central Asia seemed fairly good when the Taliban emerged out of the blues on the scene of civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to support the Pakhtuns against the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic factions in Afghanistan for its own strategic interests in Afghanistan. The Taliban were Pakhtuns and Pakistan’s support for them after 1994 came as a blow to its initial warm relations with the Central Asian states. Pakistan’s recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 adversely affected its relations in particular with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both of which are neighbours of Afghanistan and were apprehensive that the Taliban’s radical ideology would seep into their territories from Afghanistan. There were Islamist militant groups already operating in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which had relations with al-Qaeda and Taliban and which allegedly received their training in Afghanistan. This posed a serious security threat to the stability of the newly independent Central Asian states. Pakistan, in pursuit of its own strategic interests, continued its backing for the Taliban despite opposition from these states regarding Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, relations began dwindling between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics.6 Iran too came into the fray and wanted to assert its influence in the region after the Taliban slaughtered the Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan. Now both Iran and Pakistan were fighting to control the New Great Game instead of cooperating to play a constructive role in the economic growth of the region.
Then came the events of 9/11 which gave a one eighty degree turn to Pakistan’s foreign policy overnight. Pakistan joined hands with USA in the war on terror to dismantle the al-Qaeda and Taliban network in Afghanistan. The current altered environment in the light of the new foreign policy stance of Pakistan has once again opened the doors of bilateral cooperation between Central Asia and Pakistan. However, the mistrust that has built up amongst the Central Asian states against Pakistan due to the Taliban episode in Afghanistan can not evaporate anytime soon.7
One more factor which might adversely affect Pakistan-Central Asia relations is the existence of foreign elements (Arab, Central Asian, Chechen) in Pakistan’s tribal belt in its north-west frontier. These elements came to Pakistan after the USA attacked Afghanistan in 2001. The elimination of these elements is essential for the stability and security of the entire region, and is a pre-requisite for any sort of economic cooperation, investment and trade amongst the regional powers. Pakistan has been conducting military operations in the tribal areas to clear the area of these militants ever since 2004. However, it is difficult to seal the Pak-Afghan border to keep out these militants due to the difficult and long terrain. Pakistan wants to close the border via landmines and fencing but the idea is not welcomed by the regime in Afghanistan.8
In order to establish good economic relations and build the trust of the Central Asian states, Pakistan needs to ensure the safety and security within its own dominion first. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has reported a rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan from about 1,800 occurences in 2008 to greater than 1,900 occurences in 2009. Suicide attacks increased from 40 in 2007 to 84 in 2009, a more than two-fold increase. More than 8,600 people were either killed or wounded in these terrorist incidents in 2009, a 30 % increase from 2008.9 Such an environment of insecurity, uncertainty, and failure of law and order can never be conducive for attracting foreign investment and capital into the country.
Maintenance of good relations with India and Afghanistan both are crucial if Pakistan wants to start economic activities with Central Asia. One of the proposed oil and gas pipelines is supposed to originate in Turkmenistan and reach Pakistan through Afghanistan, going onwards into India. Pakistan’s population of 170 million people together with India’s population of 1.15 billion is a huge and unexplored market for energy and oil companies such as Chevron, Total and Delta, and can also be a source of readily available skilled, cheap, abundant labour for them. But the stability of the region is essential for these companies to come in because ultimately it is companies like these which will set up the pipeline with their technical expertise and financial strength. As such Pakistan, Afghanistan and India need to maintain good relations with each other. Pakistan should stop supporting the mujahidin in Kashmir and India should stop supporting the Baloch separatist elements in Pakistan. It is essentially a battle between the intelligence agencies of the two countries, ISI and RAW. It is proposed that these agencies should sit down and talk their way to a settlement of disputes for the larger interests of the region. With Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to build a policy which will safeguard its interests in Afghanistan when the US forces leave the country so that there is no power vacuum in Afghanistan as it had been in the past. A durable solution might be to support Karzai’s current regime and work towards building popular support and confidence for the regime amongst the Afghans rather than supporting different corrupt warlords in the area. For this, Pakistan needs the help of the advanced countries to build up infrastructure, education and health facilities in Afghanistan. Helping to solve the issues of the common Afghan is crucial in order to decrease the support for Taliban. Pakistan needs to change its attitude of treating Afghanistan as a backward and lowly state that should be grateful for Pakistan’s help in troubled times and should instead move forward with it as a partner state.
Pakistan also needs to make new and better policies for its economy and governance. Many countries of the world had suffered from terrorism in the past, yet they did not falter in their economic growth. Pakistan’s textile exports stood at $ 4.20 billion during July-November 2009-10, a 3.21 % decline from the same period in fiscal year 2008-09 when it had stood at $ 4.34 billion, says the Federal Bureau of Statistics. The All-Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA) claimed that Pakistan has suffered a drop in textile exports for the first time in twelve years because of security issues in the country, the on-going energy crisis, electricity and gas tariffs, rising cotton prices, and the rise in borrowing rates which hindered the textile companies from taking loans from banks. All this contributed to the increase in the input costs of the textile industry.10 Pakistan, which at one time had a far more commendable textile industry, has now been surpassed by Bangladesh in textile exports. Pakistan needs to switch its exports from agricultural raw materials to finished goods in order to make the economy more knowledge-based. A feasible and better economic and governance policy is needed to attract investment projects from abroad.
These problems cannot be solved overnight. It would be a long and exhausting process and many of the solutions proposed might seem to be on the wishful side. However, nothing is impossible, what is needed is consistency and the political will. Pakistan’s solving these major hurdles in the establishment of security and political stability in the region would help Pakistan credibly demonstrate to the Central Asian states its sincerity, eagerness and hope for wanting to establish commercial and economic relations with these states. This would go miles in reducing the trust deficit that presently exists between the two regions.
Today, Pakistan is endeavouring to improve bilateral relations with Central Asia. It is trying to use multilateral organizations in order to strengthen its ties for cooperation with all the regional countries, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The objectives of Pakistan’s policy towards these countries are the same as before, to wit, they are still based on commercial and economic interests and the creation of good-will for strengthening of the relationship. Pakistan wants to realize the advantages it has due to its geostrategic location as a possible energy and trade corridor for the landlocked Central Asian states, Afghanistan, and western China. The infrastructure for this intense activity is being setup in Pakistan, as evident from the development of the Karakoram Highway in the north and the Gwadar deep seaport in Balochistan. China has pledged $ 350 million to Pakistan for maintenance and upgrading of the Karakoram Highway, and the 2004 quadrilateral agreement amongst Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, China, and Kazakhstan for transit and trade can be expanded to incorporate Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in future.11
Today, Pakistan’s efforts to re-establish warm relations with Central Asia are gradually beginning to bear fruit. Islam Karimov, the Uzbek president, visited Pakistan again after fourteen years in May 2006. Nine agreements for trade and economic cooperation, and one agreement for fighting against terrorism were signed during this visit. At present, Pakistan and Tajikistan are considering the establishing of lines from Tajikistan for the transmission of power to Pakistan. National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) has now been operating in Central Asia for nearly the past five years and today has about fourteen branches in the region, generating 90 % of the bank’s overseas revenue.12 China wants to open up its western regions for trade through Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway, Karachi and Gwadar in order to reduce the economic disparity which currently exists in west China as compared to the more developed eastern areas.13 West China is too far away from the Chinese coastline in the east for it to engage in much economic activity.
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in December 2002 to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, with an estimated cost of $ 2 billion. There are hopes that the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan oil and gas pipeline would originate as soon as the political situation in the region becomes stable. Hu Deping, the chairman of All China Federation of Commerce and Industry, said during Musharraf’s 2006 tour of China that China had plans to set up an oil refinery in the Gwadar region with an expenditure of $ 4.5 billion and a capacity of 10 million tons per annum. The refinery would help transform the crude oil imported from the Middle East into petroleum products before it is transported into west China via the transit corridor of Pakistan.14
Musharraf, during the same Shanghai visit in 2006, emphasized the potential for Pakistan in contributing to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He said, “…in geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic terms, Pakistan is most suitably positioned not only to promote but also to play a key role in all interests espoused in the SCO charter. Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia. We offer critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra-regionally and inter-regionally…We have a vision to develop Pakistan as a hub of economic activity linking the neighbouring regions through our railways, highways, and ports, thus serving as a trade and energy corridor.”15
Bibliography
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15)
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no16_1_ses/11_rahman.pdf
10) "January-2010 - Textile Briefs National." Pakistan Textile Journal. Pakistan Textile Journal. Web. 03 May 2010..
1, 3, 4) Khwaja, Asma Shakir. "THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst." The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 23 Feb. 2005. Web. 03 May 2010..
12) Mangi, Naween A., and Farhan Sharif. "National Bank of Pakistan Aims to Tap ‘War Chest’ of Bad Debts - BusinessWeek." BusinessWeek - Business News, Stock Market & Financial Advice. Bloomberg, 16 Mar. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010..
2) Maresca, John J. "Oil Pipeline - Central Asia - Gas - Energy." Worldpress.org - World News From World Newspapers. Worldpress.org, 12 Feb. 1998. Web. 02 May 2010..
9) Pakistan. "Pakistan, Afghan Make South Asia Terror Capital." JPOST.com. The Jerusalem Post, 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010..
(This article was written by me for my Critical Issues in Pakistan's Foreign Policy class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Junior year at LUMS.)
It would be relevant to go back into the 1990s to examine Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics. The birth of the Central Asian states was welcomed in the Islamic world when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s. These states are extremely rich in mineral resources. Their gas reserves are estimated at more than 236 trillion cubic feet, whereas their oil reserves are estimated to be about 60 billion oil barrels, sufficient for fuelling entire European needs for about eleven years. Still other estimates put the region’s oil reserves to an even higher 200 billion barrels.2 However, being landlocked, these states were unable to take advantage of their natural endowments when they came into being. As such, these states needed to cooperate with neighbouring states in order to engage with the global economy. These neighbouring states were Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Furthermore, the need to engage with other countries was important for these states because they wanted to lower their dependency on Russia and be able to stand on their own feet; all their bureaucratic, political, military, financial structure was based on the communist Russian model.
Amongst all the neighbouring states, Pakistan was the one which was looked upon with the most favour by the Central Asian States. Amongst Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, Pakistan was most developed in technology, science, education and industry. Pakistan’s official language was English which gave it an edge over the other two countries because English is the language of the modern world transactions and negotiations. The Central Asian states were eager to learn English from Pakistan in order to engage in world economy. Pakistan could train pilots from the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan also had prosperous textile, shipping, and fishing industries, and a commendable banking and ports sector. Pakistan could serve the interests of these states by providing them with the much needed access to the sea via its ports of Karachi, Bin Qasim and Gwadar.3 Iran was not looked upon with favour by Central Asia mainly due to the Islamic Revolution which had taken place there. The Iranians were emphatic about Islamization and were engaged in religious interference in the region. They were seen as radicals by these states mainly because these states had a relatively more secular and tolerant attitude, having lived under the communists for decades. With Turkey, these states had a colonial past and they did not want to revive it, hence they were relatively distant with Turkey as well. This does not mean that these states did not want good relations with Iran or Turkey; it was just Pakistan which was viewed with relatively greater favour by these states in wanting to establish good relations.
At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Pakistan was overly eager in wanting to recognize the Central Asian states and wanted to start a cordial relationship with them. It did not take into consideration the various diversities of these states and therefore the need to address each of them in accordance to their complexity and multiplicity of national interests. Pakistan became one of the first countries of the world to formally recognize the Central Asian states on 19th December, 1991. The first high-level Pakistani delegation, headed by Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali who was the minister of state for economic affairs, visited the Central Asian Republics in November – December 1991. At that time, Akram Zaki who was the secretary general of foreign affairs had said, “recognition of the Central Asian states would open new vistas of bilateral co-operation with these states with whom Pakistan had close ties of history, faith, and culture.” Pakistan gave a loan of $ 10 million to each of these states, with a loan of $ 30 million for Uzbekistan. As a sign of its good-will, Pakistan also gave medicines worth $ 100,000 to each of these states as well as five thousand tons of rice. The time between 1991-1993 saw a great number of high-level meetings between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics. Although Pakistan’s engagement increased with all the Central Asian states, it was Uzbekistan which had most of Pakistan’s attention. A lot of agreements for economic, cultural, education and technological cooperation were signed between the two nations. Pakistan agreed to import hydroelectric power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1992 and set up Joint Economic Commissions (JECs) with the Central Asian states to implement various projects. Apart from this, Pakistan also provided these states with fully funded programs for instruction in English language, accounting, banking, insurance, postal service and diplomacy. These programs continued despite political disturbances amongst the states.4 Pakistan was amongst the first countries which sent its passenger planes to these states.
Although Pakistan’s policies towards these states had an emotional streak based on bonds of Islamic brotherhood, its objectives remained economic and commercial. In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which was created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as a successor organization of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), extended its membership to Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and the five Central Asian Republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). The organization had great plans for cooperation and development in the region but it has so far failed largely due to the scarcity of resources as well as lack of political concord5; Pakistan, Iran and Turkey fell over each other in their attempts to reap the most advantage from the organization.
The Central Asian states did not want to support the political aspirations of any state; they were only desperate to build their economic infrastructure. The Central Asian states mainly wanted economic and cultural relations with Pakistan, as opposed to political relations. Pakistan on the other hand, tried to exploit the ECO platform to gain support for its cause in Kashmir. The Central Asian states opposed this move by Pakistan as the ECO was a platform for economic cooperation and not for the settlement of political issues. Pakistan’s efforts to exploit ECO for its own political objectives greatly disillusioned the Central Asian States. They began to wonder whether Pakistan really was sincere towards them. Even if Pakistan wanted to gain the support of Central Asian Republics over Kashmir against India, Pakistan failed to consider that these states for decades had lived under the rule of the Soviet Union which had a deeply pro-Indian attitude. These newly independent countries needed time to overcome the psyche they had inherited from the Russians, the psyche of India being considered good and Pakistan being considered bad. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev told Pakistan’s then Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan that the bureaucratic, political, economic structure of the Central Asian states was still based on the lines of the communist model so Pakistan should not try to force them to change their stance overnight. The stance of these countries would change, but it would take some time.
Relations between Pakistan and Central Asia seemed fairly good when the Taliban emerged out of the blues on the scene of civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to support the Pakhtuns against the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic factions in Afghanistan for its own strategic interests in Afghanistan. The Taliban were Pakhtuns and Pakistan’s support for them after 1994 came as a blow to its initial warm relations with the Central Asian states. Pakistan’s recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 adversely affected its relations in particular with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both of which are neighbours of Afghanistan and were apprehensive that the Taliban’s radical ideology would seep into their territories from Afghanistan. There were Islamist militant groups already operating in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which had relations with al-Qaeda and Taliban and which allegedly received their training in Afghanistan. This posed a serious security threat to the stability of the newly independent Central Asian states. Pakistan, in pursuit of its own strategic interests, continued its backing for the Taliban despite opposition from these states regarding Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, relations began dwindling between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics.6 Iran too came into the fray and wanted to assert its influence in the region after the Taliban slaughtered the Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan. Now both Iran and Pakistan were fighting to control the New Great Game instead of cooperating to play a constructive role in the economic growth of the region.
Then came the events of 9/11 which gave a one eighty degree turn to Pakistan’s foreign policy overnight. Pakistan joined hands with USA in the war on terror to dismantle the al-Qaeda and Taliban network in Afghanistan. The current altered environment in the light of the new foreign policy stance of Pakistan has once again opened the doors of bilateral cooperation between Central Asia and Pakistan. However, the mistrust that has built up amongst the Central Asian states against Pakistan due to the Taliban episode in Afghanistan can not evaporate anytime soon.7
One more factor which might adversely affect Pakistan-Central Asia relations is the existence of foreign elements (Arab, Central Asian, Chechen) in Pakistan’s tribal belt in its north-west frontier. These elements came to Pakistan after the USA attacked Afghanistan in 2001. The elimination of these elements is essential for the stability and security of the entire region, and is a pre-requisite for any sort of economic cooperation, investment and trade amongst the regional powers. Pakistan has been conducting military operations in the tribal areas to clear the area of these militants ever since 2004. However, it is difficult to seal the Pak-Afghan border to keep out these militants due to the difficult and long terrain. Pakistan wants to close the border via landmines and fencing but the idea is not welcomed by the regime in Afghanistan.8
In order to establish good economic relations and build the trust of the Central Asian states, Pakistan needs to ensure the safety and security within its own dominion first. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has reported a rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan from about 1,800 occurences in 2008 to greater than 1,900 occurences in 2009. Suicide attacks increased from 40 in 2007 to 84 in 2009, a more than two-fold increase. More than 8,600 people were either killed or wounded in these terrorist incidents in 2009, a 30 % increase from 2008.9 Such an environment of insecurity, uncertainty, and failure of law and order can never be conducive for attracting foreign investment and capital into the country.
Maintenance of good relations with India and Afghanistan both are crucial if Pakistan wants to start economic activities with Central Asia. One of the proposed oil and gas pipelines is supposed to originate in Turkmenistan and reach Pakistan through Afghanistan, going onwards into India. Pakistan’s population of 170 million people together with India’s population of 1.15 billion is a huge and unexplored market for energy and oil companies such as Chevron, Total and Delta, and can also be a source of readily available skilled, cheap, abundant labour for them. But the stability of the region is essential for these companies to come in because ultimately it is companies like these which will set up the pipeline with their technical expertise and financial strength. As such Pakistan, Afghanistan and India need to maintain good relations with each other. Pakistan should stop supporting the mujahidin in Kashmir and India should stop supporting the Baloch separatist elements in Pakistan. It is essentially a battle between the intelligence agencies of the two countries, ISI and RAW. It is proposed that these agencies should sit down and talk their way to a settlement of disputes for the larger interests of the region. With Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to build a policy which will safeguard its interests in Afghanistan when the US forces leave the country so that there is no power vacuum in Afghanistan as it had been in the past. A durable solution might be to support Karzai’s current regime and work towards building popular support and confidence for the regime amongst the Afghans rather than supporting different corrupt warlords in the area. For this, Pakistan needs the help of the advanced countries to build up infrastructure, education and health facilities in Afghanistan. Helping to solve the issues of the common Afghan is crucial in order to decrease the support for Taliban. Pakistan needs to change its attitude of treating Afghanistan as a backward and lowly state that should be grateful for Pakistan’s help in troubled times and should instead move forward with it as a partner state.
Pakistan also needs to make new and better policies for its economy and governance. Many countries of the world had suffered from terrorism in the past, yet they did not falter in their economic growth. Pakistan’s textile exports stood at $ 4.20 billion during July-November 2009-10, a 3.21 % decline from the same period in fiscal year 2008-09 when it had stood at $ 4.34 billion, says the Federal Bureau of Statistics. The All-Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA) claimed that Pakistan has suffered a drop in textile exports for the first time in twelve years because of security issues in the country, the on-going energy crisis, electricity and gas tariffs, rising cotton prices, and the rise in borrowing rates which hindered the textile companies from taking loans from banks. All this contributed to the increase in the input costs of the textile industry.10 Pakistan, which at one time had a far more commendable textile industry, has now been surpassed by Bangladesh in textile exports. Pakistan needs to switch its exports from agricultural raw materials to finished goods in order to make the economy more knowledge-based. A feasible and better economic and governance policy is needed to attract investment projects from abroad.
These problems cannot be solved overnight. It would be a long and exhausting process and many of the solutions proposed might seem to be on the wishful side. However, nothing is impossible, what is needed is consistency and the political will. Pakistan’s solving these major hurdles in the establishment of security and political stability in the region would help Pakistan credibly demonstrate to the Central Asian states its sincerity, eagerness and hope for wanting to establish commercial and economic relations with these states. This would go miles in reducing the trust deficit that presently exists between the two regions.
Today, Pakistan is endeavouring to improve bilateral relations with Central Asia. It is trying to use multilateral organizations in order to strengthen its ties for cooperation with all the regional countries, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The objectives of Pakistan’s policy towards these countries are the same as before, to wit, they are still based on commercial and economic interests and the creation of good-will for strengthening of the relationship. Pakistan wants to realize the advantages it has due to its geostrategic location as a possible energy and trade corridor for the landlocked Central Asian states, Afghanistan, and western China. The infrastructure for this intense activity is being setup in Pakistan, as evident from the development of the Karakoram Highway in the north and the Gwadar deep seaport in Balochistan. China has pledged $ 350 million to Pakistan for maintenance and upgrading of the Karakoram Highway, and the 2004 quadrilateral agreement amongst Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, China, and Kazakhstan for transit and trade can be expanded to incorporate Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in future.11
Today, Pakistan’s efforts to re-establish warm relations with Central Asia are gradually beginning to bear fruit. Islam Karimov, the Uzbek president, visited Pakistan again after fourteen years in May 2006. Nine agreements for trade and economic cooperation, and one agreement for fighting against terrorism were signed during this visit. At present, Pakistan and Tajikistan are considering the establishing of lines from Tajikistan for the transmission of power to Pakistan. National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) has now been operating in Central Asia for nearly the past five years and today has about fourteen branches in the region, generating 90 % of the bank’s overseas revenue.12 China wants to open up its western regions for trade through Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway, Karachi and Gwadar in order to reduce the economic disparity which currently exists in west China as compared to the more developed eastern areas.13 West China is too far away from the Chinese coastline in the east for it to engage in much economic activity.
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in December 2002 to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, with an estimated cost of $ 2 billion. There are hopes that the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan oil and gas pipeline would originate as soon as the political situation in the region becomes stable. Hu Deping, the chairman of All China Federation of Commerce and Industry, said during Musharraf’s 2006 tour of China that China had plans to set up an oil refinery in the Gwadar region with an expenditure of $ 4.5 billion and a capacity of 10 million tons per annum. The refinery would help transform the crude oil imported from the Middle East into petroleum products before it is transported into west China via the transit corridor of Pakistan.14
Musharraf, during the same Shanghai visit in 2006, emphasized the potential for Pakistan in contributing to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He said, “…in geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic terms, Pakistan is most suitably positioned not only to promote but also to play a key role in all interests espoused in the SCO charter. Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia. We offer critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra-regionally and inter-regionally…We have a vision to develop Pakistan as a hub of economic activity linking the neighbouring regions through our railways, highways, and ports, thus serving as a trade and energy corridor.”15
Bibliography
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15)
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no16_1_ses/11_rahman.pdf
10) "January-2010 - Textile Briefs National." Pakistan Textile Journal. Pakistan Textile Journal. Web. 03 May 2010.
1, 3, 4) Khwaja, Asma Shakir. "THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst." The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 23 Feb. 2005. Web. 03 May 2010.
12) Mangi, Naween A., and Farhan Sharif. "National Bank of Pakistan Aims to Tap ‘War Chest’ of Bad Debts - BusinessWeek." BusinessWeek - Business News, Stock Market & Financial Advice. Bloomberg, 16 Mar. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010.
2) Maresca, John J. "Oil Pipeline - Central Asia - Gas - Energy." Worldpress.org - World News From World Newspapers. Worldpress.org, 12 Feb. 1998. Web. 02 May 2010.
9) Pakistan. "Pakistan, Afghan Make South Asia Terror Capital." JPOST.com. The Jerusalem Post, 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010.
(This article was written by me for my Critical Issues in Pakistan's Foreign Policy class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Junior year at LUMS.)
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Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan
This article will look at the factors due to which Pakistan switched from supporting Afghan leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Sayyaf to supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and why Pakistan continued its support of the Taliban when the entire international community and the regional countries of Asia except the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia opposed the Taliban and Pakistan’s support for them.
Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan has always been driven by its strategic interests. Pakistan and Afghanistan are neighboring states and Pakistan shares 2430 km 1 of its 6560 km long border 2 with Afghanistan along the controversial Durand Line.
Pakistan has, for a long time, harmonized its strategic interests with those of the United States of America. This started when Pakistan entered into the fold of CENTO and SEATO in the 1950s and this trend continued in the days of the Cold War. Pakistan did not acquire a lot from this policy except for the aids and grants that this policy gained Pakistan from the West (Grover, Pg 262). Some of Pakistan’s cardinal foreign policy decisions took place when Pakistan was under military rule. Generals of the third world countries have never been farsighted or great thinkers and so is the case in Pakistan. Popular governments are always the ones that have had to clear up the mess caused by such policies afterwards. From 1988 onwards, there had been several elected governments in Pakistan which were periodically ousted from power for attempting to follow a policy which was the opposite of the one which the military wanted to follow in Afghanistan. Because Pakistan had a different government almost after every couple of years in the 1990s, Pakistani military establishment continued its own policies in Afghanistan. A cruel political reality is that Pakistani military and its agencies are largely an autonomous body which is largely not answerable to the elected governments. The proof of this is the fact that although elected governments tried to eliminate Islamic militants from Pakistani territory, these militants still were there along the Pak-Afghan border where they were getting military training from the Pakistan army in the use of guerilla warfare and explosives (Grover, Pg 263). Therefore, a discussion of Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan should rather be seen through the perception of the Pakistani military and not merely through that of the elected government. We must first discuss Pakistan’s strategic interests over Afghanistan in the light of circumstances which prevailed after the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.
The most important issue for Pakistan was the disputed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This border, also called the Durand Line was erected during the British Raj in India under a treaty with Afghanistan in 1893 after the Second Afghan war of 1878-80. The area between the Durand Line and British India was accepted as “free tribal territory” and its people retained their tribal autonomy despite being under Britain’s sovereignty. The covenant was renewed time and again between the British and Afghans by more agreements in 1905, 1929 and 1930. The Durand Line proved to be a bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Partition of India in 1947. The Afghans now refused to accept the border which divided Afghanistan from the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The NWFP is culturally, historically, linguistically and ethnically very close to Afghanistan and many people of the region have family members on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. The Pakhtun tribes are all largely followers of Sunni Islam, Pashtu-speaking, but are politically divided into the settled areas of NWFP, tribal areas (FATA) and those in Afghanistan. The Afghans’ demanded that based on these factors, NWFP should be made a part of Afghanistan or else made into independent Pakhtunistan (Grover, Pg 264). The issue got further complex because of the inter-tribal wedlocks between Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and those in NWFP. The Durand Line was further made diluted by the influx of millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistani territory across the Pak-Afghan border after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan converted a large part of the refugee population into being fighters against the Soviets (Mujahideen). This notion of Jihad brought Pakistan a large amount of financial help from the wealthy Muslim states. Pakistan also got a large amount of financial and military help from the West. Between 1979 and 1989, Pakistan reportedly got more than ten billion dollars of aid. Pakistan very selectively distributed part of this money amongst select groups of the Mujahideen and refugees to create a friendly group amongst the Afghans which would not be against Pakistan. Pakistan thought that this would cater to a number of its interests later on. Apart from settling the border dispute, it would give Pakistan the strategic depth to face India (Grover, Pg 265).
The Soviet retreat from Afghanistan led to the diminishing of foreign aid from the US to Pakistan. Pakistan now looked towards Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a friendly successor in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar’s subsequent failure and negotiations with Rabbani’s government may be some factors which led to formation of the Taliban later on. Afghanistan did not have any charismatic person who could command the loyalties of the Afghan population. Pakistan tried to invent such a leader in Gulbuddin Hekmatyar but he was not accepted by all factions of the Mujahideen population. Subsequently, Pakistan lost its credibility in the eyes of the Afghans as a sympathetic mediator in solving the Afghan’s problems.
There were several other developments at about this time in the international world. Iran’s success in its Islamic Revolution in the 1980s gave it a sort of leadership position in the Islamic world. The Saudis felt this menace from Iran and were in favor of having a strong government in Kabul soon which could counter the growing influence of Tehran in the region.
Another development was the discovery of mineral and fuel resources in the newly independent Central Asian Republics which came into being with the breakup of the Soviet Union after the Cold War. These natural resources drew the attention of USA into the region. A US company called UNOCAL Corporation and a Saudi company called Delta Oil Company, two major oil and gas companies of the world joined hands together to make use of these resources for the markets in Pakistan and Eastern Asia. Two major pipelines were proposed over a distance of 1000 miles, costing a total of 4.7 billion dollars, in order to carry the minerals from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. This was termed as the UNOCAL/Delta Oil’s Corridor to Commerce (Grover, Pg 266). It was stated in the details of the project that “one of the major obstacles to project implementation is the political instability in Afghanistan. It is fundamentally important that a single body representing the whole of Afghanistan is formed.” (Grover, Pg 267)
Under these circumstances, Pakistan was willing to assist UNOCAL/Delta Oil Company as it very well suited Pakistan’s strategic and economic goals and UNOCAL/Delta also knew of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan during the Cold War. Pakistan tried to bring into play its past tactics in Afghanistan. It knew that a full-scale war in Afghanistan could not be victorious for it, seeing what had recently happened with the former Soviet Union which had been a superpower in its time. It therefore used religion as a basis to bring unity amongst the ethnically divided Afghans. Pakistan had previously used this tactic of using religion with some amount of success in Kashmir and Indian Punjab. It now used this strategy of exploiting religion to create the Taliban, as a substitute for the Rabbani regime in Kabul to help it in realizing its economic and strategic interests. The Taliban, like Hekmatyar, were not accepted by all the Afghans because they represent only a part of the ethnically divided population of Afghanistan. An understanding developed between General Dostum and Ahmed Shah Masood of Afghanistan and they successfully managed to evade Taliban’s assaults on Panjshir Valley. Pakistan failed for another major reason. To begin with, Pakistan is not strong enough to do such a mammoth task and it also did not realize that USA would lose its interest in this part of the world once the Soviet troops returned to Russia (Grover, Pg 267).
Ahmed Rashid wrote an article in Herald in which he quoted Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, stating that Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy was not right since the very start as it favored only those Afghan leaders which were its favorites, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against others such as Masood during the Soviet invasion. According to Rashid, Pakistan would have been far better off had it let a legitimate and credible leadership to evolve in Afghanistan which had the support of the Afghan masses. Pakistan is also accused of directing the CIA arms equipment towards its favorites and supporting Pakhtuns in order to preserve Pakhtun command in Afghanistan. Pakistan maintained this attitude when Soviet invasion ended in Afghanistan, hardly thinking that it was annoying the neighbors of Afghanistan, namely Iran and the Central Asian Republics, many of whom vehemently joined Teheran in opposing Islamabad’s actions in Kabul. It can be rightly said however that Pakistan, like other nations of the world, had never expected the Soviet Union to break apart in 1991, and Pakistan indeed attempted to tend to wounds it had caused to Iran in 1995 and 1996 when many visits took place of Pakistan high officials to Iran, including the Prime Minister’s visit to Teheran in November 1995 to eliminate Iran’s fears about the Taliban. Pakistan was in a frenzy to gain recognition of Iran and other countries for the Taliban as the Taliban moved towards the capture of Kabul (Grover, Pg 268).
Pakistan’s policy over the Taliban led it to be quite regionally isolated by the end of 1996. Iran, the Central Asian Republics and Russia were opposing it on one side and Pakistan’s Gulf friends were not giving it the financial support in the quantities that it required. Nasim Zehra’s article “Hot War over Afghanistan” in the Nation stated: “Teheran’s current policy towards Afghanistan does not alienate it regionally but Pakistan is viewed suspiciously by Russia, Kazakhstan, China and Tajikistan. Teheran-Delhi growing trade ties have now been supplemented by deeper diplomatic and political understanding between the two on Afghanistan, while Islamabad’s Washington supporters are weary of openly supporting Islamabad’s policy of backing the Taliban. Compared to Islamabad, the going is better for Teheran.” (Grover, Pg 269).
To conclude, we can see that Pakistan supported the Taliban in the face of growing international opposition for strategic and economics interests. Pakistan had initially supported Afghan leaders like Hekmatyar because it seemed that their interests would be similar to those of Pakistan if they came to power. At their failure, Pakistan began supporting Taliban because they were the ones who had managed to control most of Afghanistan and hence seemed to bring about some level of stability in the country. Many of the war-torn country’s inhabitants welcomed the Taliban as their saviors, even though many of them resented them on ethnic basis. They seemed to be a good alternative for Pakistan instead of people like Hekmatyar because they were basically Pakhtuns, and Pakistan has a large Pakhtun population in its North West Frontier Province. Therefore, Pakistan felt that a Pakhtun authority in Kabul would be suitable for promoting its interests as it would sympathize with Pakistan. It would also help in solving Pakistan’s border dispute along the Durand Line and the Pakhtunistan issue sentiments which, however lessened, still existed with Afghanistan. Pakistan already had a hostile neighbor in India and could not afford to have an unfriendly Afghanistan. For the sake of preserving its sovereignty, it needed to have clearly defined and respected borders. The Taliban were strongest in the areas surrounding the Pak-Afghan border and Pakistan felt that supporting them would prove to lead to friendly relations with Afghanistan in the years to come. Thus, it always wanted to have a friendly Afghanistan, which seemed possible to it at the time if Afghanistan came under Taliban rule. Stability of Afghanistan was also important for Pakistan due to economic reasons. The wealth of natural resources in the Central Asian Republics could be tapped by Pakistan only through Afghanistan. There was the issue of the pipelines through Afghanistan from Central Asia which could be important for enhancing Pakistan’s economy. There was possible influence from USA which never wanted Pakistan to have a gas pipeline with Iran and instead much favored gas from Central Asia. Pakistan was also becoming concerned that Turkey and Iran could deprive it of trade with the landlocked Central Asian States via Karachi and Gwadar by developing trade links through Port Bandar Abbas in Iran and through the Mediterranean via Turkey. In October 1994, Pakistan’s interior minister Naseerullah Babar undertook a highly publicized journey across Afghanistan through Kandahar and Herat and then dispatched a trade convoy along the same path in order to display the potential of Pakistan as a trade outlet to the sea for Central Asia. It was the Taliban who had protected this very trade convoy (Marsden, 132). The Taliban were in control of this trade route so Pakistan felt that helping them could be beneficial for Pakistan. The Taliban had an appeal to the young madrassah students and had no difficulty in recruitment therefore. Thus, Pakistan felt that the Taliban had an excellent chance of controlling the Pakhtun belt and could also take over the whole of Afghanistan if they were supported, just as Abdur Rahman had done with British help in the 1800s. The political stability that would come as a result would therefore give Pakistan not only trade opportunities with Central Asian Republics, but also strategic depth against its rival India (Peter Marsden, 143). Taliban were also accepted by Saudi Arabia and UAE which were friends of Pakistan and Pakistan expected that after some time other countries would also recognize the Taliban regime. It was due to these factors that Pakistan continued to support the Taliban in the 1990s in the face of increasing opposition from the international community.
Bibliography
1. "Afghanistan Border." World Map, Map of the World. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 June 2009..
2. "The Geography of border landscapes -." Google Book Search. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 June 2009..
3. Grover, Verinder. Afghanistan. Minneapolis: Deep & Deep Publications,India, 2000. Print.
4. Marsden, Peter. Taliban war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan. Karachi: Oxford UP, Zed Books Ltd., 1998. Print.
(This article was written by me for my Pakistan's Foreign Relations class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Sophomore year at LUMS.)
Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan has always been driven by its strategic interests. Pakistan and Afghanistan are neighboring states and Pakistan shares 2430 km 1 of its 6560 km long border 2 with Afghanistan along the controversial Durand Line.
Pakistan has, for a long time, harmonized its strategic interests with those of the United States of America. This started when Pakistan entered into the fold of CENTO and SEATO in the 1950s and this trend continued in the days of the Cold War. Pakistan did not acquire a lot from this policy except for the aids and grants that this policy gained Pakistan from the West (Grover, Pg 262). Some of Pakistan’s cardinal foreign policy decisions took place when Pakistan was under military rule. Generals of the third world countries have never been farsighted or great thinkers and so is the case in Pakistan. Popular governments are always the ones that have had to clear up the mess caused by such policies afterwards. From 1988 onwards, there had been several elected governments in Pakistan which were periodically ousted from power for attempting to follow a policy which was the opposite of the one which the military wanted to follow in Afghanistan. Because Pakistan had a different government almost after every couple of years in the 1990s, Pakistani military establishment continued its own policies in Afghanistan. A cruel political reality is that Pakistani military and its agencies are largely an autonomous body which is largely not answerable to the elected governments. The proof of this is the fact that although elected governments tried to eliminate Islamic militants from Pakistani territory, these militants still were there along the Pak-Afghan border where they were getting military training from the Pakistan army in the use of guerilla warfare and explosives (Grover, Pg 263). Therefore, a discussion of Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan should rather be seen through the perception of the Pakistani military and not merely through that of the elected government. We must first discuss Pakistan’s strategic interests over Afghanistan in the light of circumstances which prevailed after the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.
The most important issue for Pakistan was the disputed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This border, also called the Durand Line was erected during the British Raj in India under a treaty with Afghanistan in 1893 after the Second Afghan war of 1878-80. The area between the Durand Line and British India was accepted as “free tribal territory” and its people retained their tribal autonomy despite being under Britain’s sovereignty. The covenant was renewed time and again between the British and Afghans by more agreements in 1905, 1929 and 1930. The Durand Line proved to be a bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Partition of India in 1947. The Afghans now refused to accept the border which divided Afghanistan from the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The NWFP is culturally, historically, linguistically and ethnically very close to Afghanistan and many people of the region have family members on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. The Pakhtun tribes are all largely followers of Sunni Islam, Pashtu-speaking, but are politically divided into the settled areas of NWFP, tribal areas (FATA) and those in Afghanistan. The Afghans’ demanded that based on these factors, NWFP should be made a part of Afghanistan or else made into independent Pakhtunistan (Grover, Pg 264). The issue got further complex because of the inter-tribal wedlocks between Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and those in NWFP. The Durand Line was further made diluted by the influx of millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistani territory across the Pak-Afghan border after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan converted a large part of the refugee population into being fighters against the Soviets (Mujahideen). This notion of Jihad brought Pakistan a large amount of financial help from the wealthy Muslim states. Pakistan also got a large amount of financial and military help from the West. Between 1979 and 1989, Pakistan reportedly got more than ten billion dollars of aid. Pakistan very selectively distributed part of this money amongst select groups of the Mujahideen and refugees to create a friendly group amongst the Afghans which would not be against Pakistan. Pakistan thought that this would cater to a number of its interests later on. Apart from settling the border dispute, it would give Pakistan the strategic depth to face India (Grover, Pg 265).
The Soviet retreat from Afghanistan led to the diminishing of foreign aid from the US to Pakistan. Pakistan now looked towards Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as a friendly successor in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar’s subsequent failure and negotiations with Rabbani’s government may be some factors which led to formation of the Taliban later on. Afghanistan did not have any charismatic person who could command the loyalties of the Afghan population. Pakistan tried to invent such a leader in Gulbuddin Hekmatyar but he was not accepted by all factions of the Mujahideen population. Subsequently, Pakistan lost its credibility in the eyes of the Afghans as a sympathetic mediator in solving the Afghan’s problems.
There were several other developments at about this time in the international world. Iran’s success in its Islamic Revolution in the 1980s gave it a sort of leadership position in the Islamic world. The Saudis felt this menace from Iran and were in favor of having a strong government in Kabul soon which could counter the growing influence of Tehran in the region.
Another development was the discovery of mineral and fuel resources in the newly independent Central Asian Republics which came into being with the breakup of the Soviet Union after the Cold War. These natural resources drew the attention of USA into the region. A US company called UNOCAL Corporation and a Saudi company called Delta Oil Company, two major oil and gas companies of the world joined hands together to make use of these resources for the markets in Pakistan and Eastern Asia. Two major pipelines were proposed over a distance of 1000 miles, costing a total of 4.7 billion dollars, in order to carry the minerals from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. This was termed as the UNOCAL/Delta Oil’s Corridor to Commerce (Grover, Pg 266). It was stated in the details of the project that “one of the major obstacles to project implementation is the political instability in Afghanistan. It is fundamentally important that a single body representing the whole of Afghanistan is formed.” (Grover, Pg 267)
Under these circumstances, Pakistan was willing to assist UNOCAL/Delta Oil Company as it very well suited Pakistan’s strategic and economic goals and UNOCAL/Delta also knew of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan during the Cold War. Pakistan tried to bring into play its past tactics in Afghanistan. It knew that a full-scale war in Afghanistan could not be victorious for it, seeing what had recently happened with the former Soviet Union which had been a superpower in its time. It therefore used religion as a basis to bring unity amongst the ethnically divided Afghans. Pakistan had previously used this tactic of using religion with some amount of success in Kashmir and Indian Punjab. It now used this strategy of exploiting religion to create the Taliban, as a substitute for the Rabbani regime in Kabul to help it in realizing its economic and strategic interests. The Taliban, like Hekmatyar, were not accepted by all the Afghans because they represent only a part of the ethnically divided population of Afghanistan. An understanding developed between General Dostum and Ahmed Shah Masood of Afghanistan and they successfully managed to evade Taliban’s assaults on Panjshir Valley. Pakistan failed for another major reason. To begin with, Pakistan is not strong enough to do such a mammoth task and it also did not realize that USA would lose its interest in this part of the world once the Soviet troops returned to Russia (Grover, Pg 267).
Ahmed Rashid wrote an article in Herald in which he quoted Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, stating that Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy was not right since the very start as it favored only those Afghan leaders which were its favorites, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against others such as Masood during the Soviet invasion. According to Rashid, Pakistan would have been far better off had it let a legitimate and credible leadership to evolve in Afghanistan which had the support of the Afghan masses. Pakistan is also accused of directing the CIA arms equipment towards its favorites and supporting Pakhtuns in order to preserve Pakhtun command in Afghanistan. Pakistan maintained this attitude when Soviet invasion ended in Afghanistan, hardly thinking that it was annoying the neighbors of Afghanistan, namely Iran and the Central Asian Republics, many of whom vehemently joined Teheran in opposing Islamabad’s actions in Kabul. It can be rightly said however that Pakistan, like other nations of the world, had never expected the Soviet Union to break apart in 1991, and Pakistan indeed attempted to tend to wounds it had caused to Iran in 1995 and 1996 when many visits took place of Pakistan high officials to Iran, including the Prime Minister’s visit to Teheran in November 1995 to eliminate Iran’s fears about the Taliban. Pakistan was in a frenzy to gain recognition of Iran and other countries for the Taliban as the Taliban moved towards the capture of Kabul (Grover, Pg 268).
Pakistan’s policy over the Taliban led it to be quite regionally isolated by the end of 1996. Iran, the Central Asian Republics and Russia were opposing it on one side and Pakistan’s Gulf friends were not giving it the financial support in the quantities that it required. Nasim Zehra’s article “Hot War over Afghanistan” in the Nation stated: “Teheran’s current policy towards Afghanistan does not alienate it regionally but Pakistan is viewed suspiciously by Russia, Kazakhstan, China and Tajikistan. Teheran-Delhi growing trade ties have now been supplemented by deeper diplomatic and political understanding between the two on Afghanistan, while Islamabad’s Washington supporters are weary of openly supporting Islamabad’s policy of backing the Taliban. Compared to Islamabad, the going is better for Teheran.” (Grover, Pg 269).
To conclude, we can see that Pakistan supported the Taliban in the face of growing international opposition for strategic and economics interests. Pakistan had initially supported Afghan leaders like Hekmatyar because it seemed that their interests would be similar to those of Pakistan if they came to power. At their failure, Pakistan began supporting Taliban because they were the ones who had managed to control most of Afghanistan and hence seemed to bring about some level of stability in the country. Many of the war-torn country’s inhabitants welcomed the Taliban as their saviors, even though many of them resented them on ethnic basis. They seemed to be a good alternative for Pakistan instead of people like Hekmatyar because they were basically Pakhtuns, and Pakistan has a large Pakhtun population in its North West Frontier Province. Therefore, Pakistan felt that a Pakhtun authority in Kabul would be suitable for promoting its interests as it would sympathize with Pakistan. It would also help in solving Pakistan’s border dispute along the Durand Line and the Pakhtunistan issue sentiments which, however lessened, still existed with Afghanistan. Pakistan already had a hostile neighbor in India and could not afford to have an unfriendly Afghanistan. For the sake of preserving its sovereignty, it needed to have clearly defined and respected borders. The Taliban were strongest in the areas surrounding the Pak-Afghan border and Pakistan felt that supporting them would prove to lead to friendly relations with Afghanistan in the years to come. Thus, it always wanted to have a friendly Afghanistan, which seemed possible to it at the time if Afghanistan came under Taliban rule. Stability of Afghanistan was also important for Pakistan due to economic reasons. The wealth of natural resources in the Central Asian Republics could be tapped by Pakistan only through Afghanistan. There was the issue of the pipelines through Afghanistan from Central Asia which could be important for enhancing Pakistan’s economy. There was possible influence from USA which never wanted Pakistan to have a gas pipeline with Iran and instead much favored gas from Central Asia. Pakistan was also becoming concerned that Turkey and Iran could deprive it of trade with the landlocked Central Asian States via Karachi and Gwadar by developing trade links through Port Bandar Abbas in Iran and through the Mediterranean via Turkey. In October 1994, Pakistan’s interior minister Naseerullah Babar undertook a highly publicized journey across Afghanistan through Kandahar and Herat and then dispatched a trade convoy along the same path in order to display the potential of Pakistan as a trade outlet to the sea for Central Asia. It was the Taliban who had protected this very trade convoy (Marsden, 132). The Taliban were in control of this trade route so Pakistan felt that helping them could be beneficial for Pakistan. The Taliban had an appeal to the young madrassah students and had no difficulty in recruitment therefore. Thus, Pakistan felt that the Taliban had an excellent chance of controlling the Pakhtun belt and could also take over the whole of Afghanistan if they were supported, just as Abdur Rahman had done with British help in the 1800s. The political stability that would come as a result would therefore give Pakistan not only trade opportunities with Central Asian Republics, but also strategic depth against its rival India (Peter Marsden, 143). Taliban were also accepted by Saudi Arabia and UAE which were friends of Pakistan and Pakistan expected that after some time other countries would also recognize the Taliban regime. It was due to these factors that Pakistan continued to support the Taliban in the 1990s in the face of increasing opposition from the international community.
Bibliography
1. "Afghanistan Border." World Map, Map of the World. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 June 2009.
2. "The Geography of border landscapes -." Google Book Search. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 June 2009.
3. Grover, Verinder. Afghanistan. Minneapolis: Deep & Deep Publications,India, 2000. Print.
4. Marsden, Peter. Taliban war, religion and the new order in Afghanistan. Karachi: Oxford UP, Zed Books Ltd., 1998. Print.
(This article was written by me for my Pakistan's Foreign Relations class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Sophomore year at LUMS.)
Labels:
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Afghanistan,
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Gas Oil Pipeline,
Pakistan,
Taliban
Monday, May 11, 2009
Globalization, Sovereignty & Pakistan
This article will look upon the concept of sovereignty of states and how the ongoing phenomenon of globalization has blurred this concept by diluting the distinctions between national and international politics in the modern world where terrorism is a major threat for the world. Lastly, it will analyze the repercussions of the current NATO drone attacks on Pakistani territory on the traditional concept of sovereignty.
The sovereignty of a state implies the independence of a state under international law and its competence and right to exercise its rules or law within its clearly defined territory at its own discretion without the intervention from outside forces. The concept also includes all matters whereby the state is permitted under international law to defend its territory and safeguard the security of its citizens without stamping upon the sovereignty of other states and the rightful authority of the state to represent its citizens abroad by engaging in treaties etc.
The concept of sovereignty is not new. It was there in the form of established traditions of international relations amongst such states as Egypt, China and Holy Roman Empire. The present concept of sovereignty of a nation has its roots in agreements which were part of the Treaties of Westphalia which took place in 1648 A.D., signed by European states. The main points of the concept of sovereignty and the rights and duties of states were laid down in Montevideo Convention in 1933. These points include the following main criteria for a state’s eligibility to be declared sovereign: that a state should have “a permanent population, a defined territory, and a functioning government” (IRDC, 13). The UN Charter basically adopts and endorses all these factors in its vision of the system of international world that it strives to maintain. The UN Charter mentions the idea of the equality of all sovereign states. This equality is the foundation over which state governments forge relations with each other and participate in different organizations. This principle of legal equality of all sovereign states has a protective advantage for smaller or weaker states so that they do not come under political pressure from the more powerful states. The United Nation’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in 1949 that "between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations." (IRDC, 13) The International Court of Justice has also in the past referred to "the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on which the whole of international law rests." (IRDC, 13) Aggressive actions of states towards other states are viewed as negative in the international arena because they are a menace to the very structure of the international world as they violate the very concept of sovereignty of states which forms the basis of this structure. If the base is threatened then the entire structure could collapse. It is for this reason that states have used their sovereignty itself to condemn wars and conflicts which threaten world order, peace and security (IRDC, 13).
The concept of nonintervention in a state’s domestic jurisdiction is a very important aspect of sovereignty. This jurisdiction refers to the ability of the state to govern its citizens within its dominion. This jurisdiction is either “prescriptive” or “enforcement” (IRDC, 13). Prescriptive jurisdiction is the capacity of the state to create laws within and outside its borders. Enforcement jurisdiction is its ability to implement these laws within its borders. The United Nations Charter especially bans countries from intervening in the local affairs of other countries. Article 2 (7) of the Charter states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." (IRDC, 13)
We now turn our attention to the limits of sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations protects the sovereignty of nations but it also addresses the issue of maintenance of international law and order. By Chapter VII of the charter, the Security Council of the United Nations can take actions or intervene in the affairs of sovereign states if they threaten world peace, or engage in aggressive actions (IRDC, 13). Simply put, sovereignty of states only matters as long as there is peace and stability amongst states and can surrender to the demands of world peace and security.
Secondly, Article 1 (2) of the said Charter states that "[a]ll Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." (IRDC, 13) This means that all sovereign states of the world have international obligations, which can be customary or treaty obligations, and the mere idea that a state is sovereign does not mean that it can turn a blind eye to these obligations. The Charter also directs the member states of the United Nations to cooperate amongst themselves in solving problems related to economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian issues and achieving the basic human rights and freedoms of the people. Thus, the Charter raises these issues to an international level. Sovereignty of a state therefore does not mean that a state can violate international standards of human rights within its territory and expect to get away with it from the eyes of the international community (IRDC, 13).
A challenge to the traditional concept of state sovereignty arises in the cases of those states that are unable to exercise complete authority and control over their own people and over parts of their own territory. The ability of a state to achieve complete control over these dimensions is a core aspect for a state to be truly a sovereign nation. One analyst calls these states with weak authority as “quasi-states” (IRDC, 13). Some people even have the stance that such weak or failed states should not even be part of the United Nations which essentially comprises of members that are sovereign nations, because such weak states defy the United Nations Charter Article 4 which mentions that UN membership criteria for states requires that the states “are able to carry out” their obligations (IRDC, 13). A state’s incomplete control over its population and dominion casts doubts on its ability to be able to carry out such obligations. The state’s authority is essential for the protection of basic rights and is the foundation for local as well as international law and order. The proof of the failure of a state’s sovereignty is the existence of forces within the state’s domestic population which challenge the territorial sovereignty of the state. These forces bar the state from exercising its authority over its complete territory, preventing it from delivering fundamental public goods to its population such as establishment of public security and safety of the population’s life and property. Under such circumstances, what is seen to happen is the massive outflow of refugees towards safer places and the displacement of the local population (IRDC, 13). Such consequences can prompt the United Nations Security Council to legitimize foreign intervention in such a state, under consideration for the international peace and order.
An aspect of the concept of foreign intervention is the idea of "sovereignty as responsibility," created by Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (IRDC, 13). According to this idea, it becomes a state’s responsibility to request or accept foreign help or intervention if the state itself is unable to deliver fundamental public goods of security, justice and peace to its population. The state becomes answerable to two entities at the same time under such circumstances: the domestic population, as well as the international community whose responsibility it is to maintain world security and peace. In effect, this idea suggests that a state’s sovereignty gets temporarily discontinued under such circumstances and the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the country now falls with the international world (IRDC, 13).
Traditionally, security has been seen in terms of connections between nations. Today, the aspect of individual security of citizens is becoming the cardinal concern for states. A state is the principal provider of this security but in the case of states with weakened authority in their territories, it is the responsibility of the international community to come to the aid of the populations at risk.
We shall now look at how this concept of state sovereignty been seen to get diluted in recent years, particularly in the rapidly globalizing world.
The concept of “globalization” is related to the concept of “complex interdependence” between nations which is relevant to the topic under discussion in this paper. Today, the territorial state is being overshadowed by non-territorial factors which include multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international organizations (Keohane & Nye, 236). Telecommunication and air travel have reduced the world into being a “global village” and the increase in social, cultural and economic transactions mean we today are seeing a world which increasingly has lesser or softened boundaries or borders (Keohane & Nye, 236). Multiple channels of contact between nations are making the divide between domestic and international politics insignificant. The policy attitude or stance of a state’s local population gets affected by contact with populations of other states, through the media and other sources, whether this communication is organized communication or otherwise. We today are seeing a world in which economic issues are the principal concern of states and where states and people are becoming increasingly culturally, socially, and economically interdependent upon each other. Globalization, according to political scientist David Held, is the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (FP, 1).
All around the globe we are seeing increasing numbers of organizations and companies connecting with people and the current recession in the world economy is not hindering them in doing so. It might even help to revive the economy in some cases to a certain extent (FP, 1). For example, the demand for the services of international charity organizations is increasing as more and more people lose their jobs in the current economic crisis. Religions and cults too may witness greater numbers of followers as hardships encourage interest in the after-life. Transnational terrorists would also not be hindered in their activities by the economic recession. Globalization is such a powerful and multiform factor in today’s world that the current economic recession cannot drastically hamper or transpose it (FP, 1).
The deeper a political situation is entrenched in the complex interdependence between nations, the more likely are the results of the political process going to be affected by transnational relations. Terrorism is one such issue in question. It is a collective problem for the whole world no matter in which part of the world a terrorist act may take place in. A nation fighting terrorism should not be left alone to deal with it, abandoned by other countries of the world. Rather that nation should be supported morally, diplomatically and militarily in its fight by the whole world.
While globalization has created new opportunities and possibilities for mankind, it has also created problems which we have never encountered before. For example, it has created new opportunities for militants to engage in acts of terrorism. The Taliban and Al Qaeda’s mobility internationally, recruitment ability, and financial resources to fund their endeavors have been aided by the factors of globalization such as greater and better communication opportunities, greater ease of travel and wider means of transportation, and permeable borders (FP 2).
In the 1990s, it was thought that economic ties were a remedy to prevent wars. Power, it was thought, would eventually pass from government hands into the hands of the private companies and NGOs. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 changed that thinking of the world. Overnight, the thinking of the world changed and these ideas went out of trend. Public security now became the topmost priority of nations. The insecurity due to the ongoing economic recession has further fuelled this cry and we have also seen an increase in public demand for greater government control in the financial sector. Skeptics of globalization argue that commercial ties amongst nations have been enfeebled due to the current global economic crisis. With the return of stronger governments, these skeptics foresee a greater intensity in the traditional power politics of the states. They cite the evidence for this in the resurgence of nationalist spirit in South Asia, Middle East, Latin America and Russia. These skeptics argue that globalization’s role in stabilizing the political situation of the world is therefore exaggerated. But we must remember that claims of a return to nationalism and strong governments are also very exaggerated. Granted that China may ally itself with Russia to counter the US in its relations with Iran, but we must not forget that Chinese and American economies are today greatly intertwined with one another (China has trillions of dollars of US debt and the US is also its main market for Chinese goods). Russia itself has been hit badly by the economic crisis and its oil revenues are falling so much so that Venezuela is calling back foreign oil companies. The crux of the skeptic’s argument is that globalization did not eliminate nationalism; rather it made it more complicated such that globalization and geopolitics exist along side each other in the modern world (FP 2).
The opposite view to these skeptics is that due to increased interdependence amongst nations as a result of globalization, the aspect of nationalism is slowly disappearing and the world today is taking on a more integrated outlook in which countries are governed more by economic and commercial concerns and the exchange of ideas and cultural and social aspects. An example is that of the European Union (EU) which comprises of nations which were formerly each other’s enemies before the late twentieth century when nationalism was on the rise. Today the countries of European Union are peaceful trade partners, working together to achieve, maximize, promote and preserve their common economic goals. The increased interaction between countries of the world has resulted in them signing more treaties with each other and becoming members of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Band (ADB). Signing of treaties in a way mars the sovereignty of a state because it can pose limitations on the actions of states and also raise their international obligations.
The current Pakistani leadership has been caught unsuspectingly by the numbers of Taliban as well as the intensely bitter autonomy of other militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Recently there have started a series of NATO drone attacks on Pakistani territory. These attacks on Pakistani territory are indeed a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, but we must also remember that stopping the drone attacks in the tribal areas would not be a remedy against the problem of militancy because the public in those areas does not really accept Pakistani army and the United States is not very popular with them either. Pakistan could lose even its already little sovereignty in the tribal regions if something is not done soon. Pakistan has protested against these attacks but the United States argues that Pakistan has never been truly sovereign in the Federally Administered tribal Areas (FATA) as it has never been able to fully control that region ever since its independence in 1947. The United States argues that as Pakistan itself is not able to deal with the problem of militancy in the tribal region, it should allow the foreign forces to deal with the militants. I personally think that Pakistan should allow the NATO drone attacks to take place in FATA. The Taliban are becoming an increasing source of discontent and chaos in the country. They are a nuisance not only for global peace and security but also for the survival of Pakistan itself. Any attack or war against the Taliban should be welcomed in my opinion to eradicate the threat from them forever once and for all, even if it comes at the breach of our sovereignty. What use would our argument for Pakistan’s sovereignty be if Pakistan does not survive and breaks up? That would be a greater price to pay for Pakistan if it tries to defend its sovereignty at this hour. Even if we look at the principles of sovereignty as stated in the United Nations Charter, I think the NATO attacks are reasonable because Pakistan has really failed in fighting militancy in FATA. It has been unable to successfully control the tribal region for the last sixty years. It has been incapable of providing security to the population in that area and as such it is the responsibility and the duty of the international community to take the matter of fighting militants in FATA into their hands.
In conclusion, I think the overall concept of sovereignty still holds in international politics today, even though it has been diluted much by the phenomenon of globalization. Geopolitics and globalization coexist in the modern world.
Bibliography
"Foreign Policy: Think Again: Globalization." Foreign Policy - the global magazine of economics, politics, and ideas. 11 May 2009.
"1. State Sovereignty: International Development Research Centre." INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE | CENTRE DE RECHERCHES POUR LE D�VELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL. 11 May 2009.
Keohane, Robert & Nye, Joseph. “Complex interdependence and the Role of Force” in Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition (1977). Pp 236-250.
(This article was written by me for my Pakistan's Foreign Relations class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Sophomore year at LUMS.)
The sovereignty of a state implies the independence of a state under international law and its competence and right to exercise its rules or law within its clearly defined territory at its own discretion without the intervention from outside forces. The concept also includes all matters whereby the state is permitted under international law to defend its territory and safeguard the security of its citizens without stamping upon the sovereignty of other states and the rightful authority of the state to represent its citizens abroad by engaging in treaties etc.
The concept of sovereignty is not new. It was there in the form of established traditions of international relations amongst such states as Egypt, China and Holy Roman Empire. The present concept of sovereignty of a nation has its roots in agreements which were part of the Treaties of Westphalia which took place in 1648 A.D., signed by European states. The main points of the concept of sovereignty and the rights and duties of states were laid down in Montevideo Convention in 1933. These points include the following main criteria for a state’s eligibility to be declared sovereign: that a state should have “a permanent population, a defined territory, and a functioning government” (IRDC, 13). The UN Charter basically adopts and endorses all these factors in its vision of the system of international world that it strives to maintain. The UN Charter mentions the idea of the equality of all sovereign states. This equality is the foundation over which state governments forge relations with each other and participate in different organizations. This principle of legal equality of all sovereign states has a protective advantage for smaller or weaker states so that they do not come under political pressure from the more powerful states. The United Nation’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in 1949 that "between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations." (IRDC, 13) The International Court of Justice has also in the past referred to "the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on which the whole of international law rests." (IRDC, 13) Aggressive actions of states towards other states are viewed as negative in the international arena because they are a menace to the very structure of the international world as they violate the very concept of sovereignty of states which forms the basis of this structure. If the base is threatened then the entire structure could collapse. It is for this reason that states have used their sovereignty itself to condemn wars and conflicts which threaten world order, peace and security (IRDC, 13).
The concept of nonintervention in a state’s domestic jurisdiction is a very important aspect of sovereignty. This jurisdiction refers to the ability of the state to govern its citizens within its dominion. This jurisdiction is either “prescriptive” or “enforcement” (IRDC, 13). Prescriptive jurisdiction is the capacity of the state to create laws within and outside its borders. Enforcement jurisdiction is its ability to implement these laws within its borders. The United Nations Charter especially bans countries from intervening in the local affairs of other countries. Article 2 (7) of the Charter states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." (IRDC, 13)
We now turn our attention to the limits of sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations protects the sovereignty of nations but it also addresses the issue of maintenance of international law and order. By Chapter VII of the charter, the Security Council of the United Nations can take actions or intervene in the affairs of sovereign states if they threaten world peace, or engage in aggressive actions (IRDC, 13). Simply put, sovereignty of states only matters as long as there is peace and stability amongst states and can surrender to the demands of world peace and security.
Secondly, Article 1 (2) of the said Charter states that "[a]ll Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." (IRDC, 13) This means that all sovereign states of the world have international obligations, which can be customary or treaty obligations, and the mere idea that a state is sovereign does not mean that it can turn a blind eye to these obligations. The Charter also directs the member states of the United Nations to cooperate amongst themselves in solving problems related to economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian issues and achieving the basic human rights and freedoms of the people. Thus, the Charter raises these issues to an international level. Sovereignty of a state therefore does not mean that a state can violate international standards of human rights within its territory and expect to get away with it from the eyes of the international community (IRDC, 13).
A challenge to the traditional concept of state sovereignty arises in the cases of those states that are unable to exercise complete authority and control over their own people and over parts of their own territory. The ability of a state to achieve complete control over these dimensions is a core aspect for a state to be truly a sovereign nation. One analyst calls these states with weak authority as “quasi-states” (IRDC, 13). Some people even have the stance that such weak or failed states should not even be part of the United Nations which essentially comprises of members that are sovereign nations, because such weak states defy the United Nations Charter Article 4 which mentions that UN membership criteria for states requires that the states “are able to carry out” their obligations (IRDC, 13). A state’s incomplete control over its population and dominion casts doubts on its ability to be able to carry out such obligations. The state’s authority is essential for the protection of basic rights and is the foundation for local as well as international law and order. The proof of the failure of a state’s sovereignty is the existence of forces within the state’s domestic population which challenge the territorial sovereignty of the state. These forces bar the state from exercising its authority over its complete territory, preventing it from delivering fundamental public goods to its population such as establishment of public security and safety of the population’s life and property. Under such circumstances, what is seen to happen is the massive outflow of refugees towards safer places and the displacement of the local population (IRDC, 13). Such consequences can prompt the United Nations Security Council to legitimize foreign intervention in such a state, under consideration for the international peace and order.
An aspect of the concept of foreign intervention is the idea of "sovereignty as responsibility," created by Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (IRDC, 13). According to this idea, it becomes a state’s responsibility to request or accept foreign help or intervention if the state itself is unable to deliver fundamental public goods of security, justice and peace to its population. The state becomes answerable to two entities at the same time under such circumstances: the domestic population, as well as the international community whose responsibility it is to maintain world security and peace. In effect, this idea suggests that a state’s sovereignty gets temporarily discontinued under such circumstances and the responsibility of maintaining law and order in the country now falls with the international world (IRDC, 13).
Traditionally, security has been seen in terms of connections between nations. Today, the aspect of individual security of citizens is becoming the cardinal concern for states. A state is the principal provider of this security but in the case of states with weakened authority in their territories, it is the responsibility of the international community to come to the aid of the populations at risk.
We shall now look at how this concept of state sovereignty been seen to get diluted in recent years, particularly in the rapidly globalizing world.
The concept of “globalization” is related to the concept of “complex interdependence” between nations which is relevant to the topic under discussion in this paper. Today, the territorial state is being overshadowed by non-territorial factors which include multinational corporations, transnational social movements, and international organizations (Keohane & Nye, 236). Telecommunication and air travel have reduced the world into being a “global village” and the increase in social, cultural and economic transactions mean we today are seeing a world which increasingly has lesser or softened boundaries or borders (Keohane & Nye, 236). Multiple channels of contact between nations are making the divide between domestic and international politics insignificant. The policy attitude or stance of a state’s local population gets affected by contact with populations of other states, through the media and other sources, whether this communication is organized communication or otherwise. We today are seeing a world in which economic issues are the principal concern of states and where states and people are becoming increasingly culturally, socially, and economically interdependent upon each other. Globalization, according to political scientist David Held, is the “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (FP, 1).
All around the globe we are seeing increasing numbers of organizations and companies connecting with people and the current recession in the world economy is not hindering them in doing so. It might even help to revive the economy in some cases to a certain extent (FP, 1). For example, the demand for the services of international charity organizations is increasing as more and more people lose their jobs in the current economic crisis. Religions and cults too may witness greater numbers of followers as hardships encourage interest in the after-life. Transnational terrorists would also not be hindered in their activities by the economic recession. Globalization is such a powerful and multiform factor in today’s world that the current economic recession cannot drastically hamper or transpose it (FP, 1).
The deeper a political situation is entrenched in the complex interdependence between nations, the more likely are the results of the political process going to be affected by transnational relations. Terrorism is one such issue in question. It is a collective problem for the whole world no matter in which part of the world a terrorist act may take place in. A nation fighting terrorism should not be left alone to deal with it, abandoned by other countries of the world. Rather that nation should be supported morally, diplomatically and militarily in its fight by the whole world.
While globalization has created new opportunities and possibilities for mankind, it has also created problems which we have never encountered before. For example, it has created new opportunities for militants to engage in acts of terrorism. The Taliban and Al Qaeda’s mobility internationally, recruitment ability, and financial resources to fund their endeavors have been aided by the factors of globalization such as greater and better communication opportunities, greater ease of travel and wider means of transportation, and permeable borders (FP 2).
In the 1990s, it was thought that economic ties were a remedy to prevent wars. Power, it was thought, would eventually pass from government hands into the hands of the private companies and NGOs. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 changed that thinking of the world. Overnight, the thinking of the world changed and these ideas went out of trend. Public security now became the topmost priority of nations. The insecurity due to the ongoing economic recession has further fuelled this cry and we have also seen an increase in public demand for greater government control in the financial sector. Skeptics of globalization argue that commercial ties amongst nations have been enfeebled due to the current global economic crisis. With the return of stronger governments, these skeptics foresee a greater intensity in the traditional power politics of the states. They cite the evidence for this in the resurgence of nationalist spirit in South Asia, Middle East, Latin America and Russia. These skeptics argue that globalization’s role in stabilizing the political situation of the world is therefore exaggerated. But we must remember that claims of a return to nationalism and strong governments are also very exaggerated. Granted that China may ally itself with Russia to counter the US in its relations with Iran, but we must not forget that Chinese and American economies are today greatly intertwined with one another (China has trillions of dollars of US debt and the US is also its main market for Chinese goods). Russia itself has been hit badly by the economic crisis and its oil revenues are falling so much so that Venezuela is calling back foreign oil companies. The crux of the skeptic’s argument is that globalization did not eliminate nationalism; rather it made it more complicated such that globalization and geopolitics exist along side each other in the modern world (FP 2).
The opposite view to these skeptics is that due to increased interdependence amongst nations as a result of globalization, the aspect of nationalism is slowly disappearing and the world today is taking on a more integrated outlook in which countries are governed more by economic and commercial concerns and the exchange of ideas and cultural and social aspects. An example is that of the European Union (EU) which comprises of nations which were formerly each other’s enemies before the late twentieth century when nationalism was on the rise. Today the countries of European Union are peaceful trade partners, working together to achieve, maximize, promote and preserve their common economic goals. The increased interaction between countries of the world has resulted in them signing more treaties with each other and becoming members of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Band (ADB). Signing of treaties in a way mars the sovereignty of a state because it can pose limitations on the actions of states and also raise their international obligations.
The current Pakistani leadership has been caught unsuspectingly by the numbers of Taliban as well as the intensely bitter autonomy of other militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Recently there have started a series of NATO drone attacks on Pakistani territory. These attacks on Pakistani territory are indeed a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, but we must also remember that stopping the drone attacks in the tribal areas would not be a remedy against the problem of militancy because the public in those areas does not really accept Pakistani army and the United States is not very popular with them either. Pakistan could lose even its already little sovereignty in the tribal regions if something is not done soon. Pakistan has protested against these attacks but the United States argues that Pakistan has never been truly sovereign in the Federally Administered tribal Areas (FATA) as it has never been able to fully control that region ever since its independence in 1947. The United States argues that as Pakistan itself is not able to deal with the problem of militancy in the tribal region, it should allow the foreign forces to deal with the militants. I personally think that Pakistan should allow the NATO drone attacks to take place in FATA. The Taliban are becoming an increasing source of discontent and chaos in the country. They are a nuisance not only for global peace and security but also for the survival of Pakistan itself. Any attack or war against the Taliban should be welcomed in my opinion to eradicate the threat from them forever once and for all, even if it comes at the breach of our sovereignty. What use would our argument for Pakistan’s sovereignty be if Pakistan does not survive and breaks up? That would be a greater price to pay for Pakistan if it tries to defend its sovereignty at this hour. Even if we look at the principles of sovereignty as stated in the United Nations Charter, I think the NATO attacks are reasonable because Pakistan has really failed in fighting militancy in FATA. It has been unable to successfully control the tribal region for the last sixty years. It has been incapable of providing security to the population in that area and as such it is the responsibility and the duty of the international community to take the matter of fighting militants in FATA into their hands.
In conclusion, I think the overall concept of sovereignty still holds in international politics today, even though it has been diluted much by the phenomenon of globalization. Geopolitics and globalization coexist in the modern world.
Bibliography
"Foreign Policy: Think Again: Globalization." Foreign Policy - the global magazine of economics, politics, and ideas. 11 May 2009
"1. State Sovereignty: International Development Research Centre." INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE | CENTRE DE RECHERCHES POUR LE D�VELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL. 11 May 2009
Keohane, Robert & Nye, Joseph. “Complex interdependence and the Role of Force” in Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition (1977). Pp 236-250.
(This article was written by me for my Pakistan's Foreign Relations class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Sophomore year at LUMS.)
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Sovereignty,
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