Friday, May 14, 2010

Mahmud Ghaznavid and the Raid on Somanatha

In 1026 A.D., Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni raided the famous Hindu temple of Somanatha in present-day Gujarat, India. He is reported to have looted the wealth of the temple, desecrated and demolished the temple building and broken the Hindu idol which was a Shiva lingam. The event has been retold over the ages by different peoples in different ways. This paper will explore how the historiography of this event has been manipulated, embroidered and how it has evolved and changed over the period until it has reached us in its present version.

Before embarking on an exploration of the different perceptions of this event in history, we must first understand and acknowledge that the destruction of temples or other places of worship was not an unknown phenomenon in Indian society. Grand temples were built by rulers and were maintained by their successors as symbols of the might and glory of their dynasties. These temples were built with huge royal grants, and revenues from entire villages and estates were dedicated for their upkeep (Thapar, Early India, pg 427). In addition to performing the principal function of serving as places of worship, these temples exhibited the power and generosity of their royal patrons. As such, whenever a ruling dynasty was overthrown or a place conquered by an invader, many of these temples or other places of worship were sometimes destructed as bold statements of control by the incoming regimes, symbolizing an end of the previous government and the new rival government’s contempt for it. This destruction also served the additional purpose of impressing upon the masses that a similar fate awaited their other places of worship if they were not loyal to the new regime. The Rashtrakuta King, Indra III, destroyed a Pratihara temple in Kalpa when he defeated the Pratiharas. Similarly, Subhatavarma, the Paramara king of Malwa, destroyed the Chaulukyas’ temples, as well as the Jaina temples and Arab mosques that were built under Chaulukya patronage (Thapar, Early India, pg 428). Not only this but these temples were repositories of massive treasures, accumulated there from the offerings and taxation of pilgrims, revenues dedicated by entire villages, as well as the trade in which many of these temples themselves engaged. Inevitably, these temples attracted the plundering armies of various greedy rulers. The kings of Kashmir are known to have engaged in plundering temples, and one of them, Harshadeva, had a minister especially appointed for this purpose of sacking temples. Many such instances of temple destructions are on record (Thapar, Early India, pg 428).

We now come to examine the reasons behind Mahmud of Ghazni’s seventeen or so raids into India. There were several political developments in the Middle East at this time. The Seljuk Turks were rising in power and there were tensions with the Christians of Europe in the prelude to the Crusades (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 50). Mahmud needed to consolidate his rule in Central Asia. He had come to power by usurping his brother’s throne (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 49) (he defeated his brother Ismail in 997 A.D. in a battle and ascended the throne; his brother had inherited the throne from their father Subuktigin who had nominated Ismail as his successor) 1. He needed legitimacy in the eyes of his people as their king as well as finances to establish his authority (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 40). He also wished to develop his capital at Ghazni into a rich commercial and cultural centre to match the glories of Baghdad, and for this he needed wealth and craftsmen (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 41, 48). He needed elephants and slaves to maintain his army (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 39). The raids into the Indian Subcontinent were an ideal means to achieving all these ends. India was a wealthy, trading country and its temples were a rich source of wealth for replenishing the treasury at Ghazni. One entire raid of Mahmud was conducted for the sole purpose of acquiring a special kind of elephants for his armies (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 48). Also, at this time, horse trade was a very profitable business in India (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 30-31). Good quality horses were not bred in India and were imported instead from the Orient and Central Asia. Arabs were more dominant over the horse trade in Gujarat due to their sea trade than the Central Asians who traded over land with India. One possible reason for Mahmud’s invasion of Gujarat may have been to break the Arab monopoly over horse trade in the region (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 48). The raids, many of whose accounts were exaggerated by Mahmud himself in his letters to the Abbasid caliph, also helped Mahmud gain the caliph’s recognition and commendation which gained him respect and awe in the Muslim world as a champion of the Muslims. The Caliph Al-Qadir Billah lavished titles on him (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 51) such as “Yamin-ud-Daula” (after which his house became known as the Yamini dynasty) and “Amin-ul-Millat” between 1026 and 1029 A.D 2. The motives behind the raids of Mahmud into India were therefore mainly political and economical. To some extent, the raids of Mahmud were also based on religious iconoclasm. Mahmud did not only destroy Hindu temples as his Jihad against the infidel; he, being a staunch Sunni, also destroyed the Shiite and Ismailia places of worship in Multan, regarding any form of Islam other than Sunni Islam as being heresy (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 42, 48, 50; Thapar, Early India, pg 427).

The narratives of this event vary in their extent of underlining the importance of this event. The most fanciful and the most filled with contradictions are the narratives that come from the Muslim historians in Turko-Persian accounts. The Muslim historians tended to glorify this raid as being a huge achievement of the Muslims and of Mahmud. Many things in these narratives seem to be fantasies and on many counts it happens that the contradictory accounts of one historian cancel out those of other historians. For instance, some Turko-Persian historians mention that the idol had a human form (Thapar, pg 52, 56). The idol was meant as a lingam and as such it would be unprecedented in India if this was true (Thapar, pg 47-48). A lingam idol is supposed to be in the form of a stump or a column (Thapar, pg 56). Some Turko-Persian historians say that the idol’s form was such that it was partly inside the ground whereas the other parts were protruding outside (Thapar, pg 52). Still others think it used to hang in the air under the influence of magnetic fields. These claims contradict each other (Thapar, pg 52). Many accounts say that the idol was hollow and was filled with jewels inside. This too would be unprecedented in Hindu tradition, lingams are never hollow (Thapar, pg 52). Various Turko-Persian accounts exaggerate the implications of the raid when they state that the Gujarati economy was totally devastated by Mahmud’s raid when infact, historical evidence sees a flourishing economy in Gujarat at and after this time period. Some Turko-Persian accounts also exaggerate the number of villages that were dedicated to serving the Somanatha temple by putting their number upto 10,000 villages. The largest recorded number of villages dedicated to serving any major temple in India was 300 (Thapar, pg 54). Some Turko-Persian accounts claim that there were 30 rings marked around the idol, each ring representing 1,000 years of worship of the idol. This would put the age of Somanatha to 30,000 years, which is clearly an exaggeration (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 52). There are also many myths in the Turko-Persian traditions about the events that took place when Mahmud captured the temple; for example, it is said that Mahmud burnt the idol instead of smashing it and having reduced it to lime, he gave it to the priests in a betel leaf to eat (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 53). The amount of riches looted from the temple is also exaggerated; if it was true then Somanatha’s treasures would be greater than treasuries of states (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 42, 43, 51). In the letters which Mahmud sent to the Caliph in Baghdad, Mahmud almost always used to say that he had killed 50,000 of the enemy’s men. This number was repeated time and again in his letters no matter which conquest he made and against whom. It is an exaggerated amount, a formulaic number (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 51; Thapar, Early India, pg 427).

Coming to the Sanskrit accounts from Somanatha and its surrounding areas of Gujarat, we find no mention at all of Mahmud’s destruction of the temple. While the people of the area had not forgotten about the raid, it seems to be an event that generally did not arouse much interest and was therefore not warranted much attention. The Kadamba King came via the sea on a pilgrimage to Somanatha from the area around Goa in 1038 A.D. His account of the pilgrimage does not even mention Mahmud’s raid which had occurred about eleven years previously, nor does he mention any scenes of destruction or a devastated economy in the region, which is surprising if we consider the Turko-Persian narratives of the amount of destruction carried out during Mahmud’s raid (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 75). The first known inscription that actually mentions Mahmud’s raid comes from 1263 A.D.; 237 years after the raid had taken place. This inscription very briefly mentions in passing that Mahmud had left behind a governor at Somanatha after capturing the area (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 95). Another inscription which dates back to 1264 A.D. mentions an Arab trader who was given land in the vicinity of the Somanatha temple to build a mosque (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 84). The statements in the inscription show us that the people of the region were on friendly terms with the Arabs and there was a thriving trade between the two communities. The existence of mosques shows us that a reasonable number of Muslims were living in the area (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 97). Sanskrit inscriptions of the time seldom mention attacks into India by Turks, not mentioning Mahmud’s attack on Somanatha at all (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 83, 99). One might say that perhaps the Hindus deliberately do not mention attacks by Muslims on Hindu temples out of shame. This argument is offset by the fact that the inscriptions mention attacks on temples by Hindu rulers more frequently than they mention the Muslim attacks over India.

It should be noted here that Hindus at that time did not view the raids by Mahmud or other Muslims into the Subcontinent as being “Muslim” attacks (Thapar, Somanatha, 98, 164). Rather, they tended to think of them in terms of the invaders’ nationalities. The attacks were perceived as being attacks by Turks, Central Asians etc as such, and there was no such antagonism amongst the Hindus. They did view the attacks with distaste but there was no Hindu versus Muslim antagonism, and there was no trauma amongst Hindus as such over the attacks. They were used to invasions for a long time (the Greeks, Huns, Kushans and many others had invaded India in the past). One reason why the Hindus of Somanatha at that time might not have been so bitter about the destruction of the temple might be because the effects of the destruction were very short lived, the region slipped back into Hindu control very soon, and the economy thrived so much so that it reached a peak that was never seen before Mahmud had invaded the region. Perhaps all this covered up the initial short-lived resentment that might have been there amongst Hindus. Sanskrit inscriptions state that the temple of Somanatha was reconstructed and renovated several times over the ages. However, they state that this was done because the temple was withering away with age, they do not say that reconstructions were done because the temple got attacked (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 81, 189).

We now come to the British versions of Mahmud’s raid on Somanatha. The British tended to take for granted that the versions of history coming from Muslim historians, particularly Farishta, were accurate (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 163-164). They did not consider the Sanskrit accounts or versions of history available in other regional languages. The British, like other Europeans, looked upon the Muslims as being barbarians. They came up with the notion that Mahmud had turned the greenery of India into deserts, and that the British were now there to return to India its gardens (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 164). They tried to understand the Indian society in terms of being characterized by a clear-cut dichotomy between the Muslims and Hindus, and hence came up with the notions of “Hindu rule” and “Muslim rule” over the Subcontinent (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 164). In order to prolong their presence in India, they used the “divide and rule” strategy and started up the Hindu versus Muslim antagonism. The version of Mahmud’s raid on Somanatha which is today believed to be a source of deep antagonism between Hindus and Muslims was fanned during the British rule over India. To some extent, it can be said that Muslim historians are to be blamed too because it is infact their version which the British used to propagate. However, we must remember that these versions were largely exaggerated.

It should be mentioned here about the controversy of the gates of Somanatha temple. In about 1842, Lord Ellenborough came up with “The Proclamation of the Gates” and a debate arose in the House of Commons (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 166). The British had went to war in Afghanistan, and at Ghazni, they plucked out the gates from Mahmud’s tomb, bringing them back to India as trophies, proclaiming them to be gates of the Somanatha temple. How Lord Ellenborough came to think of these gates as being from the temple of Somanatha remains a mystery as there are no historical accounts in Turko-Persion sources of Mahmud taking any gates from the temple with him back to Ghazni (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 167). Even the design of the gates was not Indian (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 168). The British brought these gates to India with a huge publicity, hoping to win over loyalties of the Hindus by showing themselves as their saviors and protectors of their interests in India (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 169-170). The impact was not up to their expectations as the Hindus were not incited against Muslims as that time (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 169), which makes one think that the present Hindu-Muslim antagonism probably arose after the Indian War of Independence in 1857. Matters concerning India were of much interest in the House of Commons at that time; Macaulay’s “Minute of India Education” to establish English as the medium of instruction in India had been discussed a few years back. People in the House debated about what motivated Ellenborough to start the controversy, whether it was right to use religious differences to fuel Hindu-Muslim antagonism or would it be in their national interest (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 171). Whatever the case, the story of the so-called gates of Somanatha did not yield the desired results at that time and the story was abandoned subsequently. The gates today lie abandoned in a room in the Agra Fort.

The present Somanatha temple was constructed after Independence in 1951 (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 186). The reconstruction required clearing away of the ruins from the site. Archeologists and historians protested at the idea as they thought as they did not want past politics to destroy the historical site. Their efforts were overruled and the site was identified as a Hindu national monument. Munshi and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel used the temple as a symbol of the resurgence of ‘Hindu’ nationalism and liberty from Muslim ‘foreign’ oppression. The non-Hindus were not allowed to worship in the new temple. Munshi spoke of the rebuilt temple as being associated with the Government of India and this stance was vehemently opposed by Jawaharlal Nehru since it went against his policy of a secular government ruling over India. This position of Nehru was different from that of Vallabhbhai Patel who was the Home Minister from Gujarat (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 190). Nehru was adamant that the funding for rebuilding the temple should come from public donations and not from the Government of India (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 191).

The ratha-yatra of the Vishva Hindu Parishad and Bharatiya Janata Party offset the secular credentials of Indian government. It was designed to mobilize support for the destruction of Babri Mosque and it began its journey from Somanatha in September 1990. The second gathering in 1992 resulted in the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya, leading to the violence which ended in the killings in Gujarat in 2002. The motivation behind all this was the theory of antagonism that had always existed between Muslims and Hindus, a theory fanned by the British in India. It was the result of the debate in the House of Commons and the resulting religious nationalisms which arose from it (Thapar, Somanatha, pg 194).

In the end, it can be concluded from the research that Mahmud’s raid on Somanatha was not historically a significant event. However, in subsequent years it was made to seem to be so crucial in Indian history that it has today infact become important.

Research based on:
1. "Mahmud of Ghazna: Biography from Answers.com." Answers.com: Wiki Q&A Combined with Free Online Dictionary, Thesaurus, and Encyclopedias. Web. 14 May 2010. .
2. "Muslims Invade India." Voice of Dharma. Web. 14 May 2010. .
2. http://www.cyberistan.org/misub28294445.pdf
Thapar, Romila. Penguin History of Early India: from the Origins to A.D.1300. New Delhi: Penguin, 2003. Print.
Thapar, Romila. Somanatha: the Many Voices of a History. London: Verso, 2005. Print.
Tarikh-i Farishta (Call number KIC 954.022 M952T, available in LUMS Library).
The life and times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna / Muhammad Nazim (Call number KIC 958 M952L 1971, available in LUMS Library).
Somnath ki Fatah, by Muhammad Husain Azad. From an Urdu textbook used in the curriculum of Matric Board of Karachi.

(This article was written by me for my Themes in South Asian History class, taught by the acclaimed historian Dr Ayesha Jalal at LUMS in my Junior year.)

Monday, May 3, 2010

Pakistan's Unstable Relationship with Central Asia

The Islamic states of Central Asia share a relationship marked with both economic interdependence as well as mistrust with Pakistan. They share a cultural and historical relationship with each other since times immemorial. Most of the invaders who came into the Indo-Pak region over the centuries came here from the north and central Asia, including the Mughals and the Ghaznavids. Pakistan and this region also share the common bond of being linked by Islam as a common faith; many people in the Indian Subcontinent converted to Islam due to the efforts of Sufis who came here from Central Asia. In today’s world, these states face similar economic problems and threat perceptions. A common strategy against these problems can go far in achieving economic milestones and bringing stability into the entire region. As such, Central Asia occupies a very special position in Pakistan’s foreign policy. This is apparent to the Central Asian States, as can be seen from the high level exchanges that have taken place between them.1

It would be relevant to go back into the 1990s to examine Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian Republics. The birth of the Central Asian states was welcomed in the Islamic world when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s. These states are extremely rich in mineral resources. Their gas reserves are estimated at more than 236 trillion cubic feet, whereas their oil reserves are estimated to be about 60 billion oil barrels, sufficient for fuelling entire European needs for about eleven years. Still other estimates put the region’s oil reserves to an even higher 200 billion barrels.2 However, being landlocked, these states were unable to take advantage of their natural endowments when they came into being. As such, these states needed to cooperate with neighbouring states in order to engage with the global economy. These neighbouring states were Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Furthermore, the need to engage with other countries was important for these states because they wanted to lower their dependency on Russia and be able to stand on their own feet; all their bureaucratic, political, military, financial structure was based on the communist Russian model.

Amongst all the neighbouring states, Pakistan was the one which was looked upon with the most favour by the Central Asian States. Amongst Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, Pakistan was most developed in technology, science, education and industry. Pakistan’s official language was English which gave it an edge over the other two countries because English is the language of the modern world transactions and negotiations. The Central Asian states were eager to learn English from Pakistan in order to engage in world economy. Pakistan could train pilots from the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan also had prosperous textile, shipping, and fishing industries, and a commendable banking and ports sector. Pakistan could serve the interests of these states by providing them with the much needed access to the sea via its ports of Karachi, Bin Qasim and Gwadar.3 Iran was not looked upon with favour by Central Asia mainly due to the Islamic Revolution which had taken place there. The Iranians were emphatic about Islamization and were engaged in religious interference in the region. They were seen as radicals by these states mainly because these states had a relatively more secular and tolerant attitude, having lived under the communists for decades. With Turkey, these states had a colonial past and they did not want to revive it, hence they were relatively distant with Turkey as well. This does not mean that these states did not want good relations with Iran or Turkey; it was just Pakistan which was viewed with relatively greater favour by these states in wanting to establish good relations.

At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Pakistan was overly eager in wanting to recognize the Central Asian states and wanted to start a cordial relationship with them. It did not take into consideration the various diversities of these states and therefore the need to address each of them in accordance to their complexity and multiplicity of national interests. Pakistan became one of the first countries of the world to formally recognize the Central Asian states on 19th December, 1991. The first high-level Pakistani delegation, headed by Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali who was the minister of state for economic affairs, visited the Central Asian Republics in November – December 1991. At that time, Akram Zaki who was the secretary general of foreign affairs had said, “recognition of the Central Asian states would open new vistas of bilateral co-operation with these states with whom Pakistan had close ties of history, faith, and culture.” Pakistan gave a loan of $ 10 million to each of these states, with a loan of $ 30 million for Uzbekistan. As a sign of its good-will, Pakistan also gave medicines worth $ 100,000 to each of these states as well as five thousand tons of rice. The time between 1991-1993 saw a great number of high-level meetings between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics. Although Pakistan’s engagement increased with all the Central Asian states, it was Uzbekistan which had most of Pakistan’s attention. A lot of agreements for economic, cultural, education and technological cooperation were signed between the two nations. Pakistan agreed to import hydroelectric power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1992 and set up Joint Economic Commissions (JECs) with the Central Asian states to implement various projects. Apart from this, Pakistan also provided these states with fully funded programs for instruction in English language, accounting, banking, insurance, postal service and diplomacy. These programs continued despite political disturbances amongst the states.4 Pakistan was amongst the first countries which sent its passenger planes to these states.

Although Pakistan’s policies towards these states had an emotional streak based on bonds of Islamic brotherhood, its objectives remained economic and commercial. In 1992, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which was created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as a successor organization of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), extended its membership to Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and the five Central Asian Republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). The organization had great plans for cooperation and development in the region but it has so far failed largely due to the scarcity of resources as well as lack of political concord5; Pakistan, Iran and Turkey fell over each other in their attempts to reap the most advantage from the organization.

The Central Asian states did not want to support the political aspirations of any state; they were only desperate to build their economic infrastructure. The Central Asian states mainly wanted economic and cultural relations with Pakistan, as opposed to political relations. Pakistan on the other hand, tried to exploit the ECO platform to gain support for its cause in Kashmir. The Central Asian states opposed this move by Pakistan as the ECO was a platform for economic cooperation and not for the settlement of political issues. Pakistan’s efforts to exploit ECO for its own political objectives greatly disillusioned the Central Asian States. They began to wonder whether Pakistan really was sincere towards them. Even if Pakistan wanted to gain the support of Central Asian Republics over Kashmir against India, Pakistan failed to consider that these states for decades had lived under the rule of the Soviet Union which had a deeply pro-Indian attitude. These newly independent countries needed time to overcome the psyche they had inherited from the Russians, the psyche of India being considered good and Pakistan being considered bad. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev told Pakistan’s then Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan that the bureaucratic, political, economic structure of the Central Asian states was still based on the lines of the communist model so Pakistan should not try to force them to change their stance overnight. The stance of these countries would change, but it would take some time.

Relations between Pakistan and Central Asia seemed fairly good when the Taliban emerged out of the blues on the scene of civil war in Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to support the Pakhtuns against the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic factions in Afghanistan for its own strategic interests in Afghanistan. The Taliban were Pakhtuns and Pakistan’s support for them after 1994 came as a blow to its initial warm relations with the Central Asian states. Pakistan’s recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 adversely affected its relations in particular with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both of which are neighbours of Afghanistan and were apprehensive that the Taliban’s radical ideology would seep into their territories from Afghanistan. There were Islamist militant groups already operating in both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which had relations with al-Qaeda and Taliban and which allegedly received their training in Afghanistan. This posed a serious security threat to the stability of the newly independent Central Asian states. Pakistan, in pursuit of its own strategic interests, continued its backing for the Taliban despite opposition from these states regarding Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. As a result, relations began dwindling between Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics.6 Iran too came into the fray and wanted to assert its influence in the region after the Taliban slaughtered the Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan. Now both Iran and Pakistan were fighting to control the New Great Game instead of cooperating to play a constructive role in the economic growth of the region.

Then came the events of 9/11 which gave a one eighty degree turn to Pakistan’s foreign policy overnight. Pakistan joined hands with USA in the war on terror to dismantle the al-Qaeda and Taliban network in Afghanistan. The current altered environment in the light of the new foreign policy stance of Pakistan has once again opened the doors of bilateral cooperation between Central Asia and Pakistan. However, the mistrust that has built up amongst the Central Asian states against Pakistan due to the Taliban episode in Afghanistan can not evaporate anytime soon.7

One more factor which might adversely affect Pakistan-Central Asia relations is the existence of foreign elements (Arab, Central Asian, Chechen) in Pakistan’s tribal belt in its north-west frontier. These elements came to Pakistan after the USA attacked Afghanistan in 2001. The elimination of these elements is essential for the stability and security of the entire region, and is a pre-requisite for any sort of economic cooperation, investment and trade amongst the regional powers. Pakistan has been conducting military operations in the tribal areas to clear the area of these militants ever since 2004. However, it is difficult to seal the Pak-Afghan border to keep out these militants due to the difficult and long terrain. Pakistan wants to close the border via landmines and fencing but the idea is not welcomed by the regime in Afghanistan.8

In order to establish good economic relations and build the trust of the Central Asian states, Pakistan needs to ensure the safety and security within its own dominion first. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has reported a rise in terrorist attacks in Pakistan from about 1,800 occurences in 2008 to greater than 1,900 occurences in 2009. Suicide attacks increased from 40 in 2007 to 84 in 2009, a more than two-fold increase. More than 8,600 people were either killed or wounded in these terrorist incidents in 2009, a 30 % increase from 2008.9 Such an environment of insecurity, uncertainty, and failure of law and order can never be conducive for attracting foreign investment and capital into the country.

Maintenance of good relations with India and Afghanistan both are crucial if Pakistan wants to start economic activities with Central Asia. One of the proposed oil and gas pipelines is supposed to originate in Turkmenistan and reach Pakistan through Afghanistan, going onwards into India. Pakistan’s population of 170 million people together with India’s population of 1.15 billion is a huge and unexplored market for energy and oil companies such as Chevron, Total and Delta, and can also be a source of readily available skilled, cheap, abundant labour for them. But the stability of the region is essential for these companies to come in because ultimately it is companies like these which will set up the pipeline with their technical expertise and financial strength. As such Pakistan, Afghanistan and India need to maintain good relations with each other. Pakistan should stop supporting the mujahidin in Kashmir and India should stop supporting the Baloch separatist elements in Pakistan. It is essentially a battle between the intelligence agencies of the two countries, ISI and RAW. It is proposed that these agencies should sit down and talk their way to a settlement of disputes for the larger interests of the region. With Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to build a policy which will safeguard its interests in Afghanistan when the US forces leave the country so that there is no power vacuum in Afghanistan as it had been in the past. A durable solution might be to support Karzai’s current regime and work towards building popular support and confidence for the regime amongst the Afghans rather than supporting different corrupt warlords in the area. For this, Pakistan needs the help of the advanced countries to build up infrastructure, education and health facilities in Afghanistan. Helping to solve the issues of the common Afghan is crucial in order to decrease the support for Taliban. Pakistan needs to change its attitude of treating Afghanistan as a backward and lowly state that should be grateful for Pakistan’s help in troubled times and should instead move forward with it as a partner state.

Pakistan also needs to make new and better policies for its economy and governance. Many countries of the world had suffered from terrorism in the past, yet they did not falter in their economic growth. Pakistan’s textile exports stood at $ 4.20 billion during July-November 2009-10, a 3.21 % decline from the same period in fiscal year 2008-09 when it had stood at $ 4.34 billion, says the Federal Bureau of Statistics. The All-Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA) claimed that Pakistan has suffered a drop in textile exports for the first time in twelve years because of security issues in the country, the on-going energy crisis, electricity and gas tariffs, rising cotton prices, and the rise in borrowing rates which hindered the textile companies from taking loans from banks. All this contributed to the increase in the input costs of the textile industry.10 Pakistan, which at one time had a far more commendable textile industry, has now been surpassed by Bangladesh in textile exports. Pakistan needs to switch its exports from agricultural raw materials to finished goods in order to make the economy more knowledge-based. A feasible and better economic and governance policy is needed to attract investment projects from abroad.

These problems cannot be solved overnight. It would be a long and exhausting process and many of the solutions proposed might seem to be on the wishful side. However, nothing is impossible, what is needed is consistency and the political will. Pakistan’s solving these major hurdles in the establishment of security and political stability in the region would help Pakistan credibly demonstrate to the Central Asian states its sincerity, eagerness and hope for wanting to establish commercial and economic relations with these states. This would go miles in reducing the trust deficit that presently exists between the two regions.

Today, Pakistan is endeavouring to improve bilateral relations with Central Asia. It is trying to use multilateral organizations in order to strengthen its ties for cooperation with all the regional countries, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The objectives of Pakistan’s policy towards these countries are the same as before, to wit, they are still based on commercial and economic interests and the creation of good-will for strengthening of the relationship. Pakistan wants to realize the advantages it has due to its geostrategic location as a possible energy and trade corridor for the landlocked Central Asian states, Afghanistan, and western China. The infrastructure for this intense activity is being setup in Pakistan, as evident from the development of the Karakoram Highway in the north and the Gwadar deep seaport in Balochistan. China has pledged $ 350 million to Pakistan for maintenance and upgrading of the Karakoram Highway, and the 2004 quadrilateral agreement amongst Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, China, and Kazakhstan for transit and trade can be expanded to incorporate Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in future.11

Today, Pakistan’s efforts to re-establish warm relations with Central Asia are gradually beginning to bear fruit. Islam Karimov, the Uzbek president, visited Pakistan again after fourteen years in May 2006. Nine agreements for trade and economic cooperation, and one agreement for fighting against terrorism were signed during this visit. At present, Pakistan and Tajikistan are considering the establishing of lines from Tajikistan for the transmission of power to Pakistan. National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) has now been operating in Central Asia for nearly the past five years and today has about fourteen branches in the region, generating 90 % of the bank’s overseas revenue.12 China wants to open up its western regions for trade through Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway, Karachi and Gwadar in order to reduce the economic disparity which currently exists in west China as compared to the more developed eastern areas.13 West China is too far away from the Chinese coastline in the east for it to engage in much economic activity.

Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in December 2002 to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, with an estimated cost of $ 2 billion. There are hopes that the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan oil and gas pipeline would originate as soon as the political situation in the region becomes stable. Hu Deping, the chairman of All China Federation of Commerce and Industry, said during Musharraf’s 2006 tour of China that China had plans to set up an oil refinery in the Gwadar region with an expenditure of $ 4.5 billion and a capacity of 10 million tons per annum. The refinery would help transform the crude oil imported from the Middle East into petroleum products before it is transported into west China via the transit corridor of Pakistan.14

Musharraf, during the same Shanghai visit in 2006, emphasized the potential for Pakistan in contributing to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He said, “…in geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic terms, Pakistan is most suitably positioned not only to promote but also to play a key role in all interests espoused in the SCO charter. Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia. We offer critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra-regionally and inter-regionally…We have a vision to develop Pakistan as a hub of economic activity linking the neighbouring regions through our railways, highways, and ports, thus serving as a trade and energy corridor.”15

Bibliography

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15)
http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no16_1_ses/11_rahman.pdf

10) "January-2010 - Textile Briefs National." Pakistan Textile Journal. Pakistan Textile Journal. Web. 03 May 2010. .

1, 3, 4) Khwaja, Asma Shakir. "THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst." The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 23 Feb. 2005. Web. 03 May 2010. .

12) Mangi, Naween A., and Farhan Sharif. "National Bank of Pakistan Aims to Tap ‘War Chest’ of Bad Debts - BusinessWeek." BusinessWeek - Business News, Stock Market & Financial Advice. Bloomberg, 16 Mar. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010. .

2) Maresca, John J. "Oil Pipeline - Central Asia - Gas - Energy." Worldpress.org - World News From World Newspapers. Worldpress.org, 12 Feb. 1998. Web. 02 May 2010. .

9) Pakistan. "Pakistan, Afghan Make South Asia Terror Capital." JPOST.com. The Jerusalem Post, 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 03 May 2010. .

(This article was written by me for my Critical Issues in Pakistan's Foreign Policy class taught by Ambassador Shaharyar Khan during my Junior year at LUMS.)

Sunday, May 2, 2010

"It was never between you and them" ~ Mother Teresa

People are often unreasonable, illogical, and self-centered;
Forgive them anyway.

If you are kind,
people may accuse you of selfish ulterior motives;
Be kind anyway.

If you are successful,
you will win some false friends and some true enemies;
Succeed anyway.

If you are honest and frank,
people may cheat you;
Be honest and frank anyway.

What you spend years building,
someone could destroy overnight;
Build anyway.

If you find serenity and happiness,
they may be jealous;
Be happy anyway.

The good you do today,
people will often forget tomorrow;
Do good anyway.

Give the world the best you have,
and it may never be enough;
Give the best you've got anyway.

You see, in the final analysis
it is between you and God;
it was never between you and them anyway.

~ Mother Teresa

(A beautiful poem which makes me feel humble whenever I think about it.)